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Abstract 
Online examinations are an integral component of many online learning environments 
and a high-stake process for students, teachers and educational institutions. They are 
the target of many security threats, including intrusion by hackers and collusion. Col-
lusion happens when a student invites a third party to impersonate him/her in an 
online test, or to abet with the exam questions. This research proposed a profile-
based challenge question approach to create and consolidate a student’s profile dur-
ing the learning process, to be used for authentication in the examination process. 
The proposed method was investigated in six research studies using a usability test 
method and a risk-based security assessment method, in order to investigate usability 
attributes and security threats. 
The findings of the studies revealed that text-based questions are prone to usability 
issues such as ambiguity, syntactic variation, and spelling mistakes. The results of a 
usability analysis suggested that image-based questions are more usable than text-
based questions (p < 0.01). The findings identified that dynamic profile questions are 
more efficient and effective than text-based and image-based questions (p < 0.01). 
Since text-based questions are associated with an individual’s personal information, 
they are prone to being shared with impersonators. An increase in the numbers of 
challenge questions being shared showed a significant linear trend (p < 0.01) and in-
creased the success of an impersonation attack. An increase in the database size 
decreased the success of an impersonation attack with a significant linear trend (p < 
0.01). The security analysis of dynamic profile questions revealed that an impersona-
tion attack was not successful when a student shared credentials using email 
asynchronously. However, a similar attack was successful when a student and imper-
sonator shared information in real time using mobile phones. The response time in 
this attack was significantly different when a genuine student responded to his chal-
lenge questions (p < 0.01). The security analysis revealed that the use of dynamic 
profile questions in a proctored exam can influence impersonation and abetting. This 
view was supported by online programme tutors in a focus group study. 
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1 Introduction 
Online learning – delivering teaching and learning through the Internet – has attract-
ed increased interest in the past 15 years, and continues to offer more opportunities 
(Levy and Ramim, 2007). It is used in education today with a positive influence on 
the learning experience and teaching alike (Barker et al., 2007). Some of the bene-
fits of online learning include accessibility, quality of teaching and learning, a 
knowledge-based approach, re-usability of learning resources, use of interactive 
media, cost effectiveness, enhanced time management and remote access 
(Strother, 2002, Ruiz et al., 2006).  
Besides the anticipated benefits, online learning has some limitations, including the 
security of online examinations, one of the major concerns. It is an important and 
integral component of online learning. With the increasing use of technology and the 
Internet, human interaction has been reduced and substituted with computers, tab-
lets, mobile phones and software. The lack of face-to-face proctoring and the use of 
remote authentication approaches create security threats to high-stake examina-
tions. The issues of security and authentication have been discussed in many 
research studies (McMurtry, 2001, Olt, 2002, Chan et al., 2003, Colwell and Jenks, 
2005, Vician et al., 2006, Wielicki, 2006, Jung and Yeom, 2009). Some studies 
(Agulla et al., 2008, Harmon et al., 2010) suggest that unethical conduct has intensi-
fied in online learning due to an uncontrolled environment, as a result of the use of 
technology and the Internet. These studies indicate that remote and weak authenti-
cation approaches cause many threats, and also create opportunities for academic 
dishonesty. These threats may come from intruders or legitimate students. Students 
collude with third parties, who may impersonate them in their online tests, or accept 
help from abettors to answer their test questions. 
This thesis investigates the usability and security of authentication in online exami-
nations. The study reports on multi-method empirical research to use a profile-based 
challenge question approach and to understand the usability attributes and their in-
fluence on security in online examinations. 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Online Learning 
The term ‘online learning’ has been discussed in the literature with multiple defini-
tions. Researchers and practitioners have referred to distance learning, e-learning 
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and online learning interchangeably (Lowenthal and Wilson, 2010, Volery and Lord, 
2000, Moore et al., 2011). The context and use of these classifications is different 
based on their objectives, target audience, access method and type of content 
(Moore et al., 2011). Distance education is a common reference used for distance 
learning, which refers to providing education to geographically distant learners. With 
the introduction of computers and software in delivery of education, this term is used 
for teaching and learning using both print and electronic media. The history of dis-
tance learning goes back to the 19th century, when Isaac Pitman taught shorthand 
in Great Britain via correspondence through postal services in the 1840s (Kearsley 
and Moore, 2005).  
Society has embraced new forms of teaching and learning through the years. One 
such form is referred to as online learning, which was introduced in the 1980s with 
the advent of the World Wide Web (Harasim, 2000, Moore et al., 2011). Another sim-
ilar form is known as e-learning. It is the use of electronic media and associated 
tools for teaching and learning, which covers web-based training (WBT), computer-
based instructions (CBI), computer-based training (CBT), Internet-based training 
(IBT) and virtual learning delivered via the Internet, intranet, mobiles, satellite broad-
casts and interactive TV (Moore et al., 2011).  
Online learning is described as a modern version of distance learning, where teach-
ing and learning is performed remotely with the use of technology and the Internet 
(Carliner, 2004, Benson, 2002). In recent years, it has become an important tool for 
teaching and learning. Kolowich (2014) states that approximately 5.5 million stu-
dents in the US participated in at least one online learning course till 2012. There 
has been an increase in the acceptance of online learning: a report published by 
Ambient Insight Research (2012) identified that the worldwide market for online 
learning products was $32.1 billion in 2010 and it was forecasted to rise to $49.9 
billion by 2015. In a similar report by Global Industry Analysts (2012), the online 
learning market is projected to reach $168.8 billion by 2018. The above studies indi-
cate a rising trend in the adoption of online learning.  
1.1.2 Online Examinations 
The term ‘examination’ in the context of education means testing and measuring a 
student’s knowledge and skills acquired during a learning period on a course. It 
drives the learning process and evaluates learning outcomes. The UK Quality As-
surance Agency (QAA) code of practice (Agency, 2006) describes the purpose of 
examination as i) promoting the learning process by evaluating a student’s feed-
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back, ii) evaluating a student’s skills and knowledge against the learning goals and 
iii) providing marks or grades based on evaluation that enable a student’s perfor-
mance to be established. With the development of learning techniques, examination 
has also evolved and become an integral part of many learning environments 
(Joosten-ten Brinke et al., 2007). Depending on the intended purpose and outcome, 
examinations are classified into two main categories: summative and formative as-
sessments, which are used in both traditional and remote settings.   
 Summative Assessment or Examination: evaluates the outcome of learning and 
measures a student’s skills against learning goals using a set of assessment 
techniques. The outcome is recorded in a grade book and accumulated in the fi-
nal score. Apampa et al. (2010a) suggest that summative assessments are 
taken towards the end of a learning event and the outcome is counted in a mark 
sheet for the final award. It is a high-stake process, which confirms a student’s 
qualification for the award as a result of attaining the required abilities and skills 
in a specific domain. 
 Formative Assessment or Examination: teachers and educational supervisors 
use formative assessment to review and provide feedback on students’ perfor-
mance (Birenbaum, 1996). Xiang and Ye (2008) suggest that tutors use 
formative assessment in multiple iterative phases during the learning process. 
This enables them to reflect on learning feedback and manage teaching and 
learning processes. The outcome of this type of assessment does not count to-
wards the final award. 
Several methods have been implemented to conduct examinations. These methods 
have evolved due to intensive research work and ongoing student and teacher ex-
periences (Moreno-Ger et al., 2008). Commonly used methods include 
questionnaires, assignments, projects, peer reviews, essays, quizzes, self-
assessments and portfolios (Gaytan and McEwen, 2007, Joosten-ten Brinke et al., 
2007). 
1.1.3 Research Context 
In typical online learning environments, examinations are often conducted remotely 
(Apampa et al., 2009, Ullah et al., 2014a). This poses many security threats. With 
the increasing demand for online learning, there is a rising concern about the integri-
ty of such examinations (Watson and Sottile, 2010). According to Phillips and Lowe 
(2003), verifying the identity of students is a major security issue. Karvonen (1999) 
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indicates that students’ interaction with an online learning environment is performed 
remotely, and building confidence and trust is essential for the credibility of remote 
examinations.  
The high-stake process relies upon remote authentication approaches for the identi-
fication of test takers. These features are performed using human factors, which are 
classified into three categories: knowledge-based, object- or token-based and bio-
metrics. Examples of the knowledge-based method are user-identifiers and 
passwords, challenge questions, and graphical passwords. The object- or token-
based method includes swipe cards and magnetic chip cards. Biometric features 
include fingerprint recognition, signature recognition, audio recognition and video 
recognition. These approaches provide different security assurances against differ-
ent threats.   
Usability is an important quality of systems. It is a measure of useful interactions be-
tween a system and target users in a specified context. This is important for the 
implementation of secure systems. Sasse et al. (2001) state that security techniques 
are only effective when usable. Security and usability experts suggest that authenti-
cation can only provide adequate security when usable (Sasse et al., 2001). Hence, 
it is essential to investigate the influence of usability on the security of authentication 
approaches in online examinations.  
The research work presented in this thesis investigates security threats to online ex-
aminations. These threats include intrusion and non-intrusion attacks which are 
performed by both hackers and genuine students. It is anticipated that students are 
likely to have higher stakes in the online examination process compared to hackers. 
Therefore, this research focuses on non-intrusion threats posed by genuine stu-
dents. These include collusion and non-collusion (plagiarism) threats, which are 
major security concerns. For example, some universities in the UK deliver their 
online courses remotely, whereas the high-stake examinations are conducted in su-
pervised, invigilated locations (Cardiff, 2007, Queen Mary, 2011). Similarly, a 
number of market-leading licence and certificate providers including Microsoft 
(Adelman, 2000), IBM (Reinschmidt and Francoise, 2000), Apple and Cisco 
(Lammle, 2011) conduct several courses online and use the Prometric (1990) ser-
vice for face-to-face invigilated examinations before the final award. This service is a 
subsidiary of the Educational Testing Service (ETS), which administers tests over 
10,000 manned supervised sites in 160 countries. This indicates a lack of trust in the 
use of the remote online examination process and a desire to enhance security us-
ing a traditional supervised approach for further reassurance of students’ identities. 
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The rise in collusion is a challenge to the security and credibility of online examina-
tions (Dick et al., 2002, Pillsbury, 2004). In such attacks, a student invites a third 
party to help with an online test in different ways. Collusion is classified into imper-
sonation and abetting threats. In impersonation, a student shares access credentials 
with a third party, who impersonates them and takes the online test. In abetting, a 
student takes the test while a third party helps, sitting close by or in a remote loca-
tion. 
Keeping in view the above research problems, the aim and objectives of this thesis 
are described below. 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives  
The main aim of this PhD thesis is: 
“To design and analyse an authentication approach, understand the essential us-
ability attributes of the proposed approach and its impact on security threats in 
remote online examinations” 
In order to achieve the above aim, a list of objectives was generated to: 
Objective 1) Investigate security threats to online examinations. 
Objective 2) Investigate and design an authentication approach, and under-
stand its influence on the potential security threats to online 
examinations. 
Objective 3) Evaluate the usability and its influence on the security of the pro-
posed authentication method. 
Objective 4) Evaluate the security of the proposed method. 
The first objective of this research is to investigate security threats to online exami-
nations. These threats are documented in various pieces of literature. Learning and 
examinations are delivered online in web-based environments, which are open to a 
wide number of security threats (Kritzinger, 2006). The lack of security is identified in 
a number of research studies (Percoco and SpiderLabs, 2014, Apampa et al., 2009, 
Levy and Ramim, 2007). The security of high-stake online examinations is based on 
authentication and the assurances that only a legitimate student can gain access to 
an online test.  
Conventional authentication approaches provide a different level of security assur-
ances, cost effectiveness and usability. These are implemented to determine 
whether someone is who they claim to be (Marcel and Del Millan, 2007). Burr et al. 
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(2006) indicate that authentication verifies the identification of users. However, some 
of these methods may not ensure identification in certain threat scenarios. For ex-
ample, a password feature cannot identify an attacker who logs into a system as a 
legitimate user with a stolen password (Chun-Li et al., 2001). Similarly, it is challeng-
ing to counter identification theft and masquerading, which is likely to help students 
in collusion attacks. Hence, the second objective of this research is to design an au-
thentication approach and understand its impact on security threats. 
Usability is essential in the design of secure authentication methods. It is the extent 
to which a system can be used by specified users efficiently and effectively in a giv-
en context (Jokela et al., 2003). It is important for the implementation of secure 
systems. Hence, the third objective of this research is to investigate the usability at-
tributes associated with the proposed authentication method. 
Security evaluation is essential for understanding how the authentication methods 
achieve the intended goals. Hence, the fourth and final objective of this research is 
to investigate the security of the proposed method in order to understand its impact 
on various types of attacks. 
1.3 Research Questions  
In an attempt to achieve the research objectives, this thesis aims to answer the fol-
lowing research questions and sub-questions: 
RQ 1) What are the potential security threats to online examinations? 
 a. What are the potential collusion and non-collusion threats to online ex-
aminations? 
RQ 2) What method can be used to support secure authentication of stu-
dents in online examinations?  
 a. How can the challenge question approach be used for authentication of 
students in online examinations? 
RQ 3) How does the usability of the proposed authentication method in-
fluence the security? 
 a. How does the usability of text-based questions influence the security of 
the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
 b. How does the usability of image-based questions influence the security 
of the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
 c. How does the usability of dynamic profile questions influence the securi-
ty of the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
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RQ 4) How does the proposed authentication method influence security 
threats? 
 a. How does the use of text-based questions influence collusion threats in 
online examinations? 
 b. How does the use of dynamic profile questions influence collusion 
threats in online examinations?  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into 12 chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the re-
search background, objectives, context and original contribution to knowledge. The 
structure of the chapters is given below.  
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) presents a literature review on information security, 
authentication, and usability of authentication methods, which provides a rationale 
and basis for this thesis. This chapter explores information security with particular 
interest in identifying system assets and threats to inform security goals, in order to 
protect assets. It also explores the information security of online learning and exam-
ination with a focus on threats to online examinations. The literature review provides 
evaluation of authentication in online learning with a focus on challenge questions 
authentication. The chapter describes the need for usability relating to information 
security and usability attributes that constitute usability in software systems. In addi-
tion, it also describes the influence of usability on security of authentication 
approaches. The literature review leads to the next chapter, which describes an 
overview of the research problems. 
Chapter 3 (An Overview of Research Problems) explores various types of security 
threats to online examinations, in order to substantiate a theoretical underpinning for 
this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to locate evidence of threats in the litera-
ture and also identify new evolving threats using abuse cases. The chapter presents 
a threat classification tree and factors that motivate students and intruders to attack 
online examinations. The collusion threats are classified into impersonation and 
abetting attacks. In impersonation, a student shares access credentials with a third 
party, who impersonates the student in an online test. In abetting, a student takes an 
online test; however, a third party helps the student to answer the test questions. 
This chapter provides the justification and need for this research. In response to the 
research problems, the next chapter will propose a challenge questions authentica-
tion approach.  
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Chapter 4 (Profile-based Authentication) proposes a challenge question approach 
for the authentication of students in online examinations. This chapter presents the 
overview and structure of the proposed method. It describes the text-based chal-
lenge question type and explains the architecture, design and development of an 
initial prototype, and integration with the MOODLE learning management system. In 
order to evaluate the proposed method, research methods and methodology are 
presented in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 (Research Methods and Methodology) presents research methods and 
methodology used to approach the research problems. This chapter presents a 
background of quantitative and qualitative methods associated with research stud-
ies. Furthermore, it provides justification for using empirical enquiries for security 
and usability evaluation. A risk-based security assessment method is described, 
along with the manner in which this method will approach specific parts of this re-
search. This chapter also describes the need for a focus group to be utilised in this 
research and the overall security threats and empirical evaluation. The usability test 
method and questionnaire are presented, as well as examining how it will evaluate 
the usability attributes associated with this research. To evaluate the proposed chal-
lenge questions method developed in chapter 4, the first empirical study is 
presented in the next chapter using research methods described in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 (Text-based Challenge Questions) presents the first empirical study 
involving an initial prototype of the proposed approach using text-based challenge 
questions. This chapter presents an exploratory simulation study to collect the 
benchmark data for the evaluation of usability attributes. The chapter presents study 
hypotheses, method, details of participants, empirical study phases and results. The 
initial findings show some usability issues as a result of syntactic variation, ambigui-
ty, spacing and spelling errors. To address these issues, design of the text-based 
questions is revised in the next chapter. In addition, image-based questions are pre-
sented for improved usability. 
Chapter 7 (Image-based and Text-based Challenge Questions) proposes image-
based questions and presents an empirical study to investigate the usability of text-
based and image-based challenge questions in a real online course. In response to 
usability issues reported in the previous chapter, this chapter implements image-
based and revised text-based questions. Additionally, this chapter presents the 
purpose of the study, research questions, a relevant hypothesis, study method and 
phases, and, finally, reports the findings of efficiency and effectiveness analysis as-
sociated with text-based and image-based questions. Text-based questions are 
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associated with an individual’s personal information which can be shared with a third 
party impersonator for impersonation attacks. The next chapter presents a simula-
tion study to evaluate students’ ability to share text-based questions with a third 
party impersonator. 
Chapter 8 (Impersonation and Text-based Challenge Questions) presents a third 
study to investigate impersonation attacks when pre-defined text-based challenge 
questions are implemented. This study examines the influence of sharing text-based 
questions with a third party impersonator. It investigates how the number of ques-
tions shared and database size affect the success of an impersonation attack. This 
chapter is detailed with the purpose, research questions and relevant hypotheses, 
impersonation abuse case scenarios, study method, details of participants, and 
study phases. Finally, it reports the findings of an impersonation abuse case scenar-
io to test the study hypotheses. Text-based questions are associated with an 
individual’s personal information and students are required to register their answers 
during the learning process. This introduces an additional process and also provides 
an opportunity for students to memorise or store these questions for sharing with a 
third party impersonator. In order to address this, the next chapter introduces non-
intrusive dynamic profile questions. 
Chapter 9 (Impersonation and Dynamic Profile Questions) presents study four, 
which proposes dynamic profile questions. These questions are non-intrusive and 
dynamically created during the learning process, which does not require students to 
register their answers. This chapter investigates impersonation attacks via email and 
phone when dynamic profile questions are implemented. It reports the usability find-
ings and the outcome of impersonation abuse case scenarios via phone and email. 
Dynamic profile questions influence impersonation via email or phone during an 
online examination where the response time factor is implemented.  
The previous studies were conducted in simulated and real online courses, inviting 
students to be stakeholders in the process. However, it is important to involve online 
programme tutors as significant stakeholders. The next study will investigate a focus 
group study, inviting online programme tutors to provide feedback on the research 
problems and the proposed solution. 
Chapter 10 (Focus Group with Online Programme Tutors) reports feedback ob-
tained from a focus group session with online programme tutors as the experts. 
Given their expertise in online learning, teaching and assessment, online pro-
gramme tutors have a central role in an online learning and examination context; 
- 10 - 
therefore, it is important to understand their views on threats and prevention meth-
ods. They were invited to provide their views on potential threats, authentication 
methods, usability and applicability of the proposed challenge question approach 
against identified threats with a focus on collusion attacks, and remote proctors and 
secure examination browsers.  
The online programme tutors agreed to the use of dynamic profile questions and 
remote proctoring for the reduction of impersonation and abetting attacks. However, 
it is anticipated that students may still be able to share information related to dynam-
ic profile questions with a third party impersonator before an online examination 
session. The next chapter will report an impersonation abuse case scenario in a 
proctored exam. 
Chapter 11 (Dynamic Profile Questions and Proctoring) presents study six, which 
implements content-based dynamic profile questions in an online course and 
simulates an impersonation abuse case scenario, where a student shares the 
learning experience with a third party impersonator before an online test by means 
of email, phone, instant messaging or face-to-face meeting. The third party attempts 
to impersonate a student in the presence of a live proctor.  
This chapter concludes the research work investigated in this thesis. The next 
chapter reports the summary of conclusions developed from the research work 
conducted in this thesis. 
Chapter 12 (Conclusion) presents the conclusions which reflect the objectives intro-
duced in chapter 1 and answers the subsequent research questions. Additionally, 
this chapter summarises the main contributions of the work, and addresses the fu-
ture outlook of securing online learning and examination environments. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter provided an introduction to this work. The terms ‘online learning’ and 
‘examinations’ were introduced in the context of this research. Online learning is a 
modern version of distance learning, where teaching and learning are performed 
remotely with the use of technology and the Internet. In the context of this work, 
online examinations are assessments which are performed remotely in and out of 
classroom settings with no face-to-face interaction. The aims and objectives of this 
research were identified. Four research questions were created in order to achieve 
the research aims and objectives.  
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In order to provide the rationale for this research, a relevant literature survey is con-
ducted, which is presented in the following chapter. 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents a literature review on information security, authentication, and 
usability of authentication methods, which provides the rationale and basis for this 
thesis. This includes a literature review of information security with particular interest 
in identifying system assets and threats in order to inform security goals and, con-
sequently, protect assets. The chapter also explores the security of online learning, 
focusing on threats to online examinations. Moreover, it provides a review of authen-
tication in online learning with a focus on the challenge question approach. Finally, it 
addresses the need for usability relating to information security, describing usability 
attributes that constitute usability in software systems. In addition, the final section 
describes the influence of usability on security of authentication approaches. 
2.1 Security 
Computer security is a process of protecting computer software, hardware and net-
works against harm (Schechter, 2004). In this context, harm implies a loss of desired 
system properties such as confidentially, integrity and availability. The application of 
computer security has a wider scope, including hardware, software and network se-
curity. The focus of this research is application-level security, which falls into the 
information security context described in the following section. 
2.1.1 Information Security 
“Information security is the protection of information and systems from unauthorised 
access and use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording 
or destruction, in order to meet the information security principle” (Khalfan, 2004). 
The concept of information security is formed from the recognition that “information” 
is valuable and that it requires protection (Tajuddin et al., 2015). According to 
ISO/IEC 27002 (2008), it is the protection of information from a wide range of threats 
that ensures business continuity and minimises business risks. The concept of busi-
ness can be applied in any commercial or non-commercial context, such as online 
learning. Stallings (2007) defines it as “a collection of related components: assets, 
threats, goals and preventive measures designed to protect a system.” Stallings’ 
definition is helpful in identifying assets in a business context, describing and detail-
ing various types of threats, and evaluating security goals to propose 
countermeasures against any potential threats. 
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Gollman (2010) states that security is the protection of assets against unauthorised 
access. Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2002) define assets as software, hardware and hu-
man resources that support the operational aspects of a system. Gollman (2010) 
indicates that the identification of assets is relatively easier than their valuation, 
which is closely related to a business context. According to ISO/IEC 27001 (2005), 
an asset is anything that has value for an organisation. A common view from the 
above discussion indicates that assets can be classified into tangible (i.e. hardware, 
human resources and infrastructure) and non-tangible assets (i.e. software, skills, 
reputation, data and information). It is vital for an organisation to protect tangible and 
non-tangible assets against all threats. These “assets” have value not only for an 
organisation but also for attackers (p. 10, Faily, 2011). Stakes for attackers may vary 
depending on their nature. In the context of online learning, course content and ex-
aminations are identified as valuable assets. Any breach of security properties, i.e. 
confidentiality, integrity and access, may cause harm to learning and examinations.  
According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), protection of assets from all possible threats is 
unattainable; therefore, security requirements, i.e. confidentiality, integrity and ac-
cessibility, are often derived by assessing their risks. Risk is the probability of a 
particular adverse event during a stated period of time, or resulting from a particular 
challenge (p. 2,Warner, 1992). A Royal Society Study Group report (1983) classified 
risk into objective and perceived risks.  Hansson (2010) states that objective risk is 
the probability of harm occurring which can be measured and described scientifical-
ly; perceived risk is based on subjective assumptions about future events. Risk 
comprises a combination of assets, threats and vulnerabilities (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 
1996, p.5-10), and it is essential to identify threats and vulnerabilities (Jung et al., 
1999). The above discussion suggests that risk is indicative of a threat, danger or 
hazard, and provides an estimation of the likelihood of a threat exploiting vulnerabil-
ity and compromising assets. 
Threat and vulnerability are closely related with the concept of risk. According to 
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), a threat is a potential cause of an unwanted incident; a vul-
nerability is a weakness of assets that can be exploited by threats. To protect a 
system’s assets, it is important to understand its threats. Assets of an information 
system may attract a number of threats, which may target the security. The security 
goals are commonly referred to as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA), 
which ensure that assets are not compromised by threats (Gollmann, 2010). The 
BS7799/ISO17799 (1999) standards describe CIA as: 
1. Confidentiality: ensures that assets are restricted to authorised users only.  
- 14 - 
2. Integrity: ensures that assets are only altered by authorised users.  
3. Availability: ensures that the system is available and operational.  
A compromise in the CIA security goals may compromise secure assets. A threat is 
the potential for misuse or abuse that will cause harm or abuse assets (Haley et al., 
2004). In security taxonomy, threats that exploit vulnerabilities of assets are: inter-
ception, modification, interruption and fabrication (Apampa et al., 2010b), which are 
described below:  
1. Interception: An attack on confidentiality, when an unauthorised user gains 
access to an asset.  
2. Modification: An attack on the integrity of assets, when an unauthorised us-
er gains access and alters an asset.  
3. Interruption: An asset of the system is attacked and made unavailable to 
render service.  
4. Fabrication: An attack on authenticity, occurring when an unauthorised user 
creates a counterfeit asset.  
Authentication is an addition to the three primary security goals; it may or may not 
be included in the taxonomy (Stallings, 2007). It has been a widely researched area 
and seen as the main challenge for online examinations. Apampa (2010b) states 
that the security of online examinations faces two challenges, i.e. identity manage-
ment and authentication. In an online test, a student is required to prove that “he is 
who he claims to be”. Identity management and authentication are closely inter-
related and embedded in many approaches (Schultz et al., 2001). The authentica-
tion goal is to verify the claimed identity of a user. It has a central role in prevention 
against identification attacks.  
2.1.2 Security in Online Examinations 
The growth in the use of online learning in higher education has been documented 
and reported in many studies (Buzzetto-More, 2008, Eshet-Alkalai and Geri, 2007, 
Allen and Seaman, 2007, Koohang et al., 2009, Analysts, 2012). It has attracted a 
considerable level of research focus on developing and delivering secure, efficient 
and effective online learning systems. However, researchers have also raised con-
cerns about the security of online learning environments. Watson and Sottile (2010) 
indicate that there is an increasing demand for online learning, but with it there are 
rising concerns for the integrity of the online examination process. 
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Security is about the protection of assets (Gollmann, 2010) and the online examina-
tion is an important asset in the context of online learning. In a recent study, Miguel 
et al. (2015b) state that among the learning activities developed in most educational 
institutions, online examination is an essential component of a course, which ena-
bles educators to assess online students. The lack of security in such examinations 
is reported in a number of research studies (Percoco and SpiderLabs, 2014, 
Apampa et al., 2009, Levy and Ramim, 2007). Due to the high-stake nature of ex-
amination, security is based on the assurance that only a legitimate student can gain 
access to an online test. However, remote access and the absence of proctoring 
provide extra freedom to students when taking their online exams. Hence, the secu-
rity goals are an essential factor in terms of countering security threats. 
Based on the definition of assets above (see section 2.1.1), online examination is an 
important asset, and a security threat compromising an online learning system may 
cause potential harm (Apampa et al., 2009). This threat may come from intruders 
motivated for various reasons or a legitimate student with valid credentials. Harm 
from a legitimate student is seen differently than harm from an attacker with mali-
cious intentions. A student is motivated by various factors to boost his grades 
without causing any harm to the online examination. However, the fair process of 
assessment is compromised, which is also an asset as discussed earlier. The infor-
mation security literature review in the previous sections described security goals as 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, and ensuring that assets are not compro-
mised by threats. In the context of this study, the CIA relationship may be written as 
follows:  
 Online examinations to be accessed by authorised users (Confidentiality). 
 Online examinations to be modified by authorised users (Integrity). 
 Authorised students may access online examinations in a timely manner 
(Availability). 
To contextualise security goals to the current research, an impersonation attack is 
“unauthorised access” and “modification by unauthorised users”. The following sce-
nario describes how the violation of security goals occurs when such attacks are 
perpetrated: 
 A student shares his/her login and password with a friend to help 
with an online quiz which is part of the summative assessment. The 
friend logs in using the shared credentials to impersonate the student 
at a scheduled time and takes the online quiz. 
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If the above chain of events occurs, the security is breached and the threat scenario 
outlined is realised. To understand the potential harm a security breach may cause, 
it is important to understand the likelihood and nature of a threat. Identifying threat 
scenarios may help us understand what can go wrong if a scenario occurs.  
Kritzinger (2006) states that various online learning activities are open to abuse and 
security threats. These include unauthorised access and alteration to course con-
tent, fake content submission to students, unauthorised access and copying of 
submitted assignments, unauthorised changes or removal of submitted assign-
ments, changes or removal of course grades, unauthorised access to online exams, 
unauthorised changes or removal of online exams, collusion and receiving help dur-
ing online exams, destruction of online course or database, denial of service attack 
(DDoS) on the online learning server, and stealing and misuse of a student’s online 
authentication information (Kritzinger et al., 2006). McGee (2013) identifies intrusion, 
collusion, deception and plagiarism as major information security threats. The ob-
servations of Kritzinger et al. and McGee are valid; however, the description of 
collusion can be explored in more detail. With the advent of technology such as the 
evolution of smart phones, and availability of 3rd and 4th generation Internet, chat 
applications and instant messaging on smart phones can be used by students to 
exploit holes in security. In collusion attacks, students may involve third parties to 
assist with their online examination in various ways, which are described in the next 
chapter (see Chapter 3). Such attacks are motivated by students’ desire to perform 
well and obtain high grades, as well as peer and social pressure. After identifying 
assets and potential threats, the security goals are formed to prevent: 
 an incorrect or illegal student from taking an online examination 
 abuse of authentication details 
 denial of service attacks against online examinations  
The security goals described above ensure that only the correct student takes an 
online test. Within the context of this thesis, the goal of information security is to in-
vestigate threats to online examinations and understand the influence of 
authentication methods to counter these threats. 
2.2 Authentication 
Authentication is a widely used first line of defence in the security of information sys-
tems (Furnell et al., 2000). It is a component of security taxonomy that confirms the 
identity of remote users. Many authentication methods are implemented to deter-
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mine whether someone is who they claim to be (Marcel and Del Millan, 2007). Burr 
et al. (2006) state that it is a process of establishing confidence in user identities 
presented to an information system. Researchers share a common view that au-
thentication implements the identification of users. The problem with this view is that 
some methods are unlikely to ensure identification in certain threat scenarios. As an 
example, a password method cannot identify an attacker who logs into a system as 
a legitimate user with a stolen password (Chun-Li et al., 2001). This observation is 
helpful in understanding that some approaches cannot prevent identification theft 
and masquerading.   
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines suggest that 
authentication is a challenging issue for network applications, including the Internet 
and web-based systems, when the process involves remote users (Burr et al., 
2006). The security model for authentication has evolved and been reviewed in the 
light of an evolving threat model over time (Anderson, 2010). However, certain 
threats are unreported or under-represented in this model, which is exploited by at-
tackers. Schneier (2011) argues that security threats are always the same whereas 
security tools are just not as effective as they were in the past when initially devel-
oped. Overall, the literature review suggests growing threats to remote 
authentication in online environments and recommends a continuous evaluation of 
security goals and threats.  
Many authentication features have been developed to secure online learning and 
examinations, which are discussed in the following section. 
2.2.1 Authentication in Online Learning and Examinations 
Authentication has an important security role in online learning and examinations, 
particularly in the absence of visual identification. Conole and Oliver (2006) state 
that a lack of face-to-face interaction with students increases the challenge of know-
ing that “they are who they say they are”. Alwi and Fan (2010) studied a threat 
analysis of online learning systems, which is helpful in analysing information security 
threats. They identified authentication of students as a leading challenge. Moini and 
Madni (2009) consider this to be a major security concern for stakeholders, which is 
a reason why many educational institutions prefer supervised examinations over the 
use of a remote online examination. The consequences of weak and vulnerable au-
thentication approaches can raise the concerns of stakeholders. The prevailing 
views of researchers indicate this as a reason for potential threats to the high-stake 
online examination process.  
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Learning and examinations are delivered online in a web-based environment, which 
is open to a high number of security threats (Kritzinger, 2006). Collusion, plagiarism 
and intrusion were identified as major concerns. Kritzinger proposed identification 
and authentication as an information security goal to prevent these threats. Paullet 
et al. (2014) state that online learning and examinations provide many benefits to 
educators, administrators and students, which sometimes overshadow the need to 
enforce student identities and academic integrity. Paullet et al. argue that this could 
potentially introduce the risk of collusion, where another student impersonates the 
one registered for the course and completes assignments in their place. This view is 
insightful because the identification and presence of students in online environments 
is often reliant upon authentication mechanisms. Absence of visual identification is a 
common cause for concern.  
The literature review also suggests that some risks are associated with incentives 
for the attacker. For example, stakes for a user of an online examination are differ-
ent than an online bank, i.e. “it is unlikely for a user to share login identifier and 
password for his online bank account due to a higher risk, however, a student may 
be willing to share login details for his online course with another student to com-
plete his assignment due to a relatively lower risk” (Bailie and Jortberg, 2009).  
The traditional authentication methods are implemented using human factors based 
on “what you know” (Huiping, 2010),“what you have” (Deo et al., 1998) and “what 
you are” (Moini and Madni, 2009). These methods are discussed below: 
1. Knowledge-Based Authentication (KBA): This method is based on the con-
cept of “what you know”. These features employ the method of verifying users by 
matching one or more secrets supplied by an individual against data associated 
with the same individual (Chen and Liginlal, 2008). It is a widely accepted ap-
proach because of its simplicity, availability and accessibility on a wide range of 
platforms. It is a low-cost and preferred authentication method implemented in 
the majority of secure systems due to simple administration requirements (Hafiz 
et al., 2008). 
The KBA method implements both secret and shared knowledge. Secret 
knowledge is only known to a user, such as PIN numbers, pass phrases and 
passwords. Shared knowledge relates to an individual’s personal information, 
which may potentially exist in the public/friends domain; for example, personal 
questions related to date of birth, place of birth, best friend, academic qualifica-
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tion and last school attended. The login-identifier, password and challenge 
question methods are commonly known as knowledge-based features. 
2. Object-Based Authentication (OBA): This method is based on the concept of 
“what you have”. This approach verifies users’ identification based on the pos-
session of physical objects such as a smart card (Sandhu and Samarati, 1996). 
In day-to-day life, physical objects are often used as proof of identification, e.g. 
ID cards, staff card, passport and driver’s licence. The OBA feature utilises an 
electronic chip and embedded magnetic strip, which are programmed. This ap-
proach implements various types of token-based technologies, e.g. smart card 
(Smart Card, 2003), magnetic strip card (Brown and Chatelain, 2007) and prox-
imity card (Mandel et al., 2004). Special purpose card-reading devices are 
required for the implementation of this method.  
3. Biometrics Authentication: This method is based on the concept of “what you 
are” or “what you do” (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2004). It performs authentication and 
identification using an individual’s physical or behavioural characteristics (Asha 
and Chellappan, 2008). It frees users from remembering passwords and carrying 
cards, as the user is the key for identification (Gil et al., 2010). These features 
are based on an individual’s physical characteristics, e.g. fingerprints, video au-
thentication, face recognition and audio recognition. Some biometric features are 
based on behavioural characteristics such as keystroke dynamics, mouse-use 
characteristics and signature recognition (Gamboa and Fred, 2004). 
The authentication features above provide different levels of security assurance, 
cost effectiveness, usability, accessibility and prevention against threats to online 
examinations. This research investigates the use of a challenge question approach 
for authentication of students in online examinations, which is described below. 
2.2.2 Challenge Questions Authentication 
Challenge questions represent a knowledge-based feature, which is widely seen as 
a credential recovery technique (Just and Aspinall, 2009a). This is a knowledge-
based feature and relies upon personal information associated with individuals, e.g. 
mother’s maiden name, favourite holiday destination, best friend’s surname, etc. 
The conventional challenge questions use information which could be a “shared se-
cret”. This approach has developed and evolved over the years. Ozsoyoglu and 
Chin (1982) proposed a question-and-answer-based system for the security of a sta-
tistical database in the early 1980s. Zviran and Haga (1991, 1990) identified 
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question-and-answer-based cognitive or associative passwords that were memora-
ble and difficult to guess. However, this method became popular when used by 
leading email providers such as Yahoo, Google, Microsoft and AOL (Schechter et 
al., 2009). These service providers use it for authentication when a user needs to 
reset or retrieve lost credentials. 
Challenge questions is a cost-effective method, which minimises the administration 
cost when a user needs to recover his/her lost credentials (Just, 2004). However, 
some studies have reported usability and security associated issues with this meth-
od. Just and Aspinall (2009a) studied a usability and security analysis of this method 
using 73 participants. The authors reported that, of the 117 questions asked in their 
study, 88 (75%) answers were recalled exactly, while 21 (18%) had different punctu-
ation/capitalisation (typically performed when registering answers). 8 (7%) of the 
answers were completely different, citing a memorability issue in a span of 28 days. 
The authors identified that the memorability issue of 8 (7%) was higher than the 
password memorability of 4.28% reported by Florencio and Herley (2007). In the 
security evaluation, participants believed that 88% of the questions would be 
“somewhat difficult” for a stranger to answer; however, this reduced to 46% when 
considering the case of a friend or family member. To address the memorability, Re-
naud and Just (2010) proposed associative picture-based cues with multiple choice 
answers. The authors of the study reported a 13% increase in memorability. 
Schechter et al. (2009) evaluated the security of challenge questions used by four 
mail service providers – Google, Yahoo, AOL and Microsoft. The authors of the 
study reported that acquaintances of participants were able to guess 10% of their 
answers and 13% of answers could be guessed within five attempts. The authors 
state that participants forgot 20% of their own answers within six months.  
The security and usability of the challenge question approach is reliant upon the 
quality of question design. In their study, Griffith and Jakobsson (2005) attributed 
security and usability issues to weak question design, including memorability, avail-
ability of information on the Internet or among close acquaintances, and lack of 
clarity. Rabkin (2008) discovered that a significant number of questions were either 
insecure or difficult when he analysed administratively chosen challenge questions. 
Schechter et al. (2009) reference Sarah Palin (the Republican vice-presidential can-
didate in the 2008 US election), whose Yahoo email account was compromised, as 
the answer to her secret question had been figured out (Bridis, 2008). The user of a 
password tends to memorise the password for later use; however, challenge ques-
tions are based on information a user would already know. This information relating 
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to certain questions may consist of “shared secrets” and be known to family and 
friends. Such questions have weak security and may be vulnerable to guessing at-
tacks, as in the case of Palin. There is a common view among researchers relating 
to guessing and memorability of questions with design flaws. For example, “date of 
birth” is common knowledge in a family and friends domain, and could also be found 
from social media websites such as Facebook. This discussion is helpful in under-
standing that some challenge questions may be weak against guessing attacks by 
family, friends and acquaintances. 
Several banks utilise a dual text credential using the challenge question approach  
(Just and Aspinall, 2012). This method is implemented by many banking websites in 
verifying a customer’s identity. Rabkin (2008) investigated 15 online banks that im-
plemented this approach of customer verification. He identified that questions used 
by these 15 institutions were classified into three categories. Six institutions used 
personal challenge questions, coupled with a username or “Social Security” number 
and email verification. Four institutions used both personal challenge questions and 
account details, such as account number or credit card number and a PIN number. 
Two institutions relied only on account numbers and PINs. Rabkin inferred that 
these questions were difficult to guess and may not be easy for an attacker to learn. 
The majority of financial institutions implement challenge questions as a second fac-
tor used alongside another option in order to deter any guessing attacks. Bruce 
(2007) states that challenge questions are adopted as a low-cost method by many 
financial institutions. Bruce proposed using a structured approach to the design of 
challenge questions with a focus on usability, uniqueness, integrity, affordability and 
accuracy. He also suggested that asking multiple questions during the authentica-
tion process can improve overall security, but some residual risk will remain.  
2.2.2.1 Challenge Questions in Online Examinations 
The challenge question approach  in an online examination context was initially pro-
posed by Jortberg and Baile (2009). They suggested the use of questions from a US 
consumer database for the identification of online students. A prototype involving 
students from the National University of America and Acxiom Corporation, acting as 
a third party database, was piloted (Jortberg, 2009). The data of 183 identity verifi-
cation instances was reported, where an average of 8% either failed or aborted the 
verification process. Barker and Lee implemented video identification and chat veri-
fication from a student information database for identity verification (Barker and Lee, 
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2007). The main objective of their research was preventing impersonators from log-
ging into an online examination.  
This was a usable approach. However, the implementation of challenge questions 
from a third party database has other issues, i.e. integration, data protection, acces-
sibility, bandwidth usage and tariff. With the rapid growth of the Internet and 
increasing popularity of online learning, it has been used by students from all over 
the world. One of the key challenges of using a US consumer database is the wider 
implementation for students outside the US consumer market. 
This thesis will explore the idea of using a challenge question approach with no reli-
ance on a US consumer database. Discussion in the previous section suggests that 
this approach faces many usability issues. The following section describes the im-
portance of usability and how it applies to this research. 
2.3 Usability 
Usability is an important quality of software systems. It is a measure of useful inter-
actions between a system and target users in a specified context. The word usability 
emerged to replace the term “user-friendly” in the mid-1980s and was adopted by 
the software industry in 1990 (Bevan, 1995). The body of knowledge is large and 
includes various perspectives, from usability engineering (Nielsen and Hackos, 
1993) to more context-oriented approaches (Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1997). The litera-
ture review suggests a consensus regarding the definition; however, there are 
different approaches to measure usability. Multiple definitions for usability have been 
developed in numerous influential studies (Shackel, 1991, Nielsen and Hackos, 
1993, Hix and Hartson, 1993, Preece et al., 1994, Wixon and Wilson, 1997, 
ISO9241-11, 1998, Shneiderman and Ben, 1998, Constantine and Lockwood, 1999, 
Seffah et al., 2001). The authors in these studies tried to define usability attributes 
that can be measured to compose usability. These attributes are described in the 
following section. 
2.3.1 Usability Attributes 
Usability is not a single component, but multiple attributes applied to a system in a 
specified context. Table 2-1 shows a selection of such attributes defined by re-
searchers over time to measure usability. Description of these definitions and 
attributes is given below.  
  
- 23 - 
Table 2-1 Overview of Usability Attributes (Pedersen, 2010) 
ISO 9241-11 (1998) Nielsen and Hackos (1993) Quesenbery (2010) 
Efficiency  
Efficiency of use Efficient 
Learnability Ease to Learn 
Effectiveness 
Memorability Effective 
Errors Error Tolerant 
Satisfaction Satisfaction Engaging 
 
Nielsen is one of the first authors to define usability measurement scales. Besides 
designing 10 heuristics, he identified the following attributes (1993): 
 Learnability: measured by how easily a system can be learned and utilised, 
so users can start using it in a minimal amount of time. 
 Efficiency: another attribute that measures the time a user needs to accom-
plish tasks after he or she has learned how to utilise a system. 
 Memorability: measured by how easily a user can remember a system or pro-
cess if they use it again after leaving it for an extended period of time. 
 Errors: an attribute that measures the rate of errors that users make during 
their use of a system. These errors, if they exist, must be minimal and easy to 
recover from.  
 Satisfaction: measures users’ satisfaction. 
Quenesbery (2010) defined the following usability attributes, also known as the 5 
Es: 
 Effective: how complete and accurate the work is. 
 Efficient: how quickly the work can be completed. 
 Engaging: how pleasant and satisfying the product interface is to use. 
 Error tolerant: how effective the product is in preventing errors and how it can 
help the user to recover from mistakes. 
 Easy to learn: how well the product supports learning throughout its lifetime of 
use. 
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According to ISO/9241-11 (2003), usability is “the extent to which a product can be 
used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction in a specified context of use”. 
 Efficiency: a measure of completion time for each separate task and sub-task 
(Seffah et al., 2001). A system is considered efficient if users are able to com-
plete tasks in a reasonable time.  
 Accuracy: an important usability factor that indicates a degree of completeness 
with which users achieve a specified task in a certain context (Seffah et al., 
2001).   
 Satisfaction: reflects the desirability of a product. It determines the extent to 
which a user finds a product to be effective and efficient. 
Jacko (2012) states that usability is closely related to a system’s context of use. The 
ISO/9241-11 definition above encapsulates this contextual nature. Table 2-2 further 
describes the ISO/9241-11 standard. Figure 2-1 shows a relationship between dif-
ferent usability measures.  
Table 2-2 ISO 9241 Usability definition  
Concept Description 
Product 
Equipment i.e. hardware, software and material for 
which usability is to be evaluated 
User Person who interacts with the product 
Goal Intended outcome 
Effectiveness 
Accuracy and completeness with which user achieves 
specified goals 
Efficiency 
Completion time in which user achieves specified 
goals 
Satisfaction Positive attitude towards the use of a product 
Context of use 
Users, tasks, product, i.e. hardware, software and ma-
terials, and the physical and social environments in 
which a product is used. 
The figure represents a “Work System”, described in the ISO standard, i.e. a system 
consisting of users, equipment, tasks, and a physical and social environment, for the 
purpose of achieving particular goals (ISO/ISO9241-11, 1998). 
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The following sections review the user-centred design approach according to this 
definition, and problems that arise when considering security and usability. 
User-Centred Design 
The design principle adopted by most usability professionals is known as User-
Centred Design (UCD). The term was first used by Donald Norman (2013), who de-
signed this as "a philosophy based on the needs and interests of the user, with an 
emphasis on making products usable and understandable". The UCD is a prevalent 
usability paradigm for many systems including software. The principles of UCD 
place increased focus on users when developing products, in order to ensure that 
they are useful and usable (Shackel, 1991, Gould and Lewis, 1985, Dumas and 
Redish, 1999, Eason, 2005). Gould and Lewis recommended three design princi-
ples: 
 Early focus on users and tasks: encourage designers to directly contact us-
ers. The authors encourage designers to “interview”, “review” and “verify” 
design with users. 
 Empirical measurement: emphasises empirical evaluation of actual behav-
ioural usability. 
 Iterative design: a cycle of design, test, measure and redesign should be car-
ried out and repeated as necessary. 
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Figure 2-1 ISO 9241-11 Usability Framework 
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The principles proposed by Gould and Lewis are similar to Human-Centred Design, 
described by ISO/IEC 13407 (Jokela et al., 2003): 
 the active involvement of users and a clear understanding of user and task re-
quirements 
 an appropriate allocation of function between users and technology 
 the iteration of design solutions; and 
 multi-disciplinary design. 
2.3.2 Usability of Authentication Methods 
Many researchers argue that secure systems are compromised through human er-
rors and that “ease of use” is essential in order for users to behave securely (Adams 
and Sasse, 1999, Yee, 2002, Poulsen, 2000). Sasee et al. (2001) state that security 
techniques are only effective when implemented correctly. They suggest that securi-
ty designers should understand user behaviour in order to build usable and secure 
systems. Sasee and Flachais (2005) argue that usability and security mechanisms 
can only offer the intended protection if used correctly. They stressed the importance 
of usable systems for the implementation of adequate security: “when users fail to 
comply with the behaviour required by a secure system, security will not work as in-
tended.” Braz and Roberts (2006) state that the usability of security systems has 
become a major issue in the research on efficiency and user acceptance. They ex-
pressed their concerns regarding a trade-off between security and usability when 
both are essential in the authentication process.  
One possible solution in the implementation of usability is security awareness and 
training of users; however, this could not be a substitute for a usable authentication 
method to fill the gap between a secure system and a user’s behaviour (Krug, 
2005). Krug suggests that security training and advice require additional resources, 
and this is infeasible in an online context. Herley (2009) identifies that users tend to 
ignore security advice and prefer an alternative security approach with minimal re-
quirements.  
Schultz et al. (2001) state that the key security controls that exist today apply to 
identification and authentication of a user. Braz and Robert (2006) state that usabil-
ity is essential in the design of authentication methods. They argue that these 
methods may fail to protect digital assets if users are unable to use them correctly. 
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As an example, a strong password or a challenge question may be more secure but 
less usable as it may be difficult to memorise.  
There is increased demand for a secure and usable authentication method. Design-
ing a secure authentication mechanism that is usable enough to be effective is a 
specialised problem, and interface design strategies that are effective for other soft-
ware will not be sufficient to solve this problem (Whitten and Tygar, 1998). 
Authentication provides a gateway to many secure systems and, therefore, it is suc-
cessful when security and usability are aligned. Di Raimondo and Gennaro (2005) 
state that authentication is the main goal when security is implemented, whereas 
usability is the main goal of the system’s implementation. Both are the main drivers 
to user acceptance of a system. According to Braz and Robert (2006): 
“Usability becomes a strategic issue in the establishment of user au-
thentication methods.” 
Many research studies (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005, Dustin et al., 2002, Just and 
Aspinall, 2009c, Braz and Robert, 2006) identified security and usability as major 
success factors for authentication approaches. Therefore, usability evaluation is an 
important aspect of designing a secure authentication method. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter provided a literature review of information security, threats to online ex-
aminations, authentication, usability and the challenge question approach. 
Information security is a collection of related components: assets, threats, goals and 
preventive measures designed to protect a system where assets are considered to 
be anything that has value for an organisation. Security is about protection of as-
sets. The online examination is an important component of the learning model and a 
valuable asset. However, this faces the numerous security threats reported in the 
literature. Collusion is identified as one of the major security threats, where students 
are assisted by third parties in completing their online tests. Remote authentication 
and lack of visual identification of students are some of the reasons for collusion at-
tacks.  
Jortberg and Bailie (2009) proposed challenge questions from a US consumer data-
base for the authentication of students in online examinations to influence collusion 
attacks. Their approach is not feasible for students who are not registered in the US 
consumer database, including international students. Moreover, some research 
studies reported usability and security issues such as memorability, and guessing by 
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friends and families when using the challenge questions. Many online banks and 
email service providers still prefer challenge questions for recovery of users’ lost or 
forgotten credentials in order to reduce additional administration costs. In the litera-
ture review, many studies suggested the usability evaluation of authentication 
methods and considered this as an integral part of the security paradigm. The 
ISO/9241-11 standard identified efficiency and effectiveness as the main attributes 
that constitute a usable authentication method.  
The review of information security suggests that a detailed description of all threats 
is important for the design of a secure authentication method. Different forms of se-
curity threats to online examinations are described in the following chapter. 
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3 An Overview of the Research Problem 
The previous chapter identified weak authentication as one of the reasons behind 
security threats to online examinations. This chapter explores different types of se-
curity threats in order to substantiate a theoretical underpinning for this thesis. The 
purpose of this chapter is to locate evidence of threats in the literature and also 
identify new, evolving threats using abuse case scenarios. This includes an over-
view of the factors that motivate students and intruders to attack online 
examinations. It provides a review on intrusion and non-intrusion attacks, including 
collusion of various types. Finally, it provides the justification and need for this re-
search in light of the literature review. 
3.1 Threats to Online Examinations 
A threat represents the potential for misuse or abuse that will cause harm or exploit 
assets (Haley et al., 2004). In security taxonomy, threats which exploit vulnerabilities 
of assets are interruption, interception, modification and fabrication (Apampa et al., 
2010b). Based on the definition of assets described in Chapter 2, an online exami-
nation is considered a critical asset in the context of online learning. It is delivered in 
a remote web-based environment, which is open to a wide number of threats 
(Kritzinger, 2006). In an attempt to mitigate them, it is essential to understand and 
identify the nature and details of all threats. Miguel et al. (2015a) state that security 
threats in online examinations can be approached in two stages, i.e. threats are 
analysed, and then recommendations are introduced and discussed in order to cope 
with the detected threats.  
Security threats may come from different sources including intruders and genuine 
students, which are motivated by a variety of objectives. It is anticipated that stakes 
for intruders in online examinations are potentially not as high as online banks with 
deposit transfer capabilities. However, stakes for students in such examinations are 
high. Therefore, this work focuses on security threats sourced from students. These 
threats are motivated by varying objectives. Many studies agree that cheating con-
tributes to a large number of them. It is reported by researchers in all forms of 
education (Aggarwal et al., 2002, Bowers, 1964). Research on cheating dates back 
to the 1930s (Strang, 1937). More work was published and reported regarding 
cheating in the 1960s and 1970s (Wrightsman Jr, 1959, Bushway and Nash, 1977). 
Bowers (1964) identified the involvement in cheating activities of 75% of students 
from 99 colleges and universities in the US. Thirty years later, McCabe and Pavela 
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(1997) repeated the study and reported the involvement of 70% of students in cheat-
ing. McGee (2013) states that although cheating is a priority in all environments, it is 
a particular concern for courses offered in remote online learning environments. 
For example, numerous studies (Vician et al., 2006, Olt, 2002, Colwell and Jenks, 
2005, Wielicki, 2006, Jung and Yeom, 2009, McMurtry, 2001) have reported that 
online learning offers more opportunities for cheating than traditional face-to-face 
examinations. Chiesel (p.330, 2009) reported that 64% of university professors per-
ceived cheating in online examinations to be easier. In another study, King (2009) 
reported that 73.6% of students perceived that cheating in online examinations is 
easier compared to traditional face-to-face exams. Pillsbury and Harmon (2004, 
2010), in their studies, indicated that unethical conduct has intensified in online 
learning platforms, due to more opportunities for cheating as a result of the use of 
technology and the Internet. The lack of physical interaction or monitoring during 
learning and examinations is a security risk which increases opportunities for cheat-
ing.  
However, some researchers indicate that there is no difference in cheating as a di-
rect result of the type of examination environment (McNabb and Olmstead, 2009, 
Spaulding, 2009). McNabb surveyed faculty members regarding their perception of 
cheating in both online and face-to-face examinations. The majority of faculty mem-
bers did not believe that there was a difference in cheating between the two 
environments. Spaulding (2009) presented a similar literature survey, reporting no 
difference in cheating between the two environments. McGee (2013) argues that 
much of the research about cheating is based on self-reports or students’ percep-
tions of academic dishonesty. Spaulding (2009) states that it is difficult to capture 
comprehensive rates of cheating in either environment.  
Students often cheat in online examinations to qualify or enhance their grades. This 
motivates a number of unique security threats, which may be classified into multiple 
categories including non-intrusion and intrusion. Non-intrusion threats are further 
classified into collusion and non-collusion threats. Collusion attacks happen when 
students invite third party impersonators or abettors to help with online examina-
tions. Intrusion attacks are performed by cyber attackers, cybercriminals and 
hackers. In general, all the above threats are open-ended and widespread due to 
access on the Internet, and a weak authentication mechanism. An overview of po-
tential application-level threats to online examinations are shown in Figure 3.1 and 
described below. The threat classification does not cover network or serv-
er/database side attacks:  
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Figure 3-1 Overview of Threats to Online Examinations 
3.1.1 Intrusion 
Unlike an online bank with deposit transfer capabilities, a university with an online 
programme is normally not a target for an attacker looking to gain access for the 
purpose of financial gain. However, there are still concerns regarding intrusion in 
online examinations (Bailie and Jortberg, 2009). Intrusion attacks are carried out 
with malicious intentions and classified as i) targeted and ii) trawling attacks 
(Bonneau et al., 2010). In a targeted attack, the attacker possesses information 
about the user of the targeted account. For example, a student attacking the ac-
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count of an online tutor would be interested in collecting information about the tutor 
in order to penetrate his account using different attack methods. These methods in-
clude eavesdropping or sniffing (Mir et al., 2011), key loggers (Cordes, 2005), 
clickjacking (Rydstedt et al., 2010), malware (Christodorescu et al., 2005), dictionary 
attacks (Pinkas and Sander, 2002) and brute force, i.e. an exhaustive pattern search 
attack on cryptographic credentials (Schneier, 1999). Other social engineering 
methods include token theft and surveillance (Perković et al., 2011). By contrast, a 
trawling attack is performed without any prior information about a user. Intrusion at-
tacks may come from fellow students, friends and cyber criminals using the above 
methods. Different types of intrusion attacks are described below.  
3.1.1.1 Student Impersonated by Intruders (Trawling) 
In this type of attack, an attacker impersonates a student in an online examination 
without his or her knowledge (Kumar et al., 2011). Such attacks are deliberate and 
may come from cybercriminals with the intention of revealing confidential information 
about an online course and examinations (Barik and Karforma, 2012). Hugerat et al. 
(2013) state that such attacks are carried out to exploit information in an online 
learning course and examinations without causing any harm to the online learning 
system. Although the attacker may not destroy data in an online course, this causes 
distrust and affects the credibility of an online system. Ramim and Levy (2006) con-
ducted a case study on the Knowledgeville University, which experienced a 
cyberattack in 2002 that resulted in shutting down the server hosting online courses 
in the middle of the semester. This thwarted the academic work of students and fac-
ulty members on the courses. These attacks may come from fellow students, 
hackers and individuals who sell exam secrets on the Internet to potential students 
undertaking online courses. A scenario of this type of attack is described below:  
“A hacker stages an attack by intercepting a student’s password. The hack-
er impersonates the student and gains access to an online examination. 
The hacker retrieves test questions and sells it online” 
With the advent of new technologies, students are adopting new methods of cheat-
ing (McGee, 2013). For example, Krsak (2007) reported a method of cheating where 
a student starts an online test in order to retrieve all the questions. The student 
stores the exam questions, aborts the test in order to search for answers and then 
re-attempts the test. Students or attackers may share or sell exam questions to stu-
dents on the same course or on the Internet. As an example, a professor of Indiana 
State University found her test questions for sale on eBay (Hill, 2010). Research 
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studies have reported a new method of cheating known as “braindump”, which is a 
service that maintains a bank of questions and answers stolen from many online 
examinations (Paullet et al., 2015, Hill, 2010, Howell et al., 2010). Hackers may at-
tack online examinations to access questions in order to sell or share them with 
online users and potential buyers such as braindump services. Braindump is an 
online business that provides students with studying services and often guarantees 
passing scores. For example, Cramster, Koofers, Study Blue and Course Hero are 
famous braindump sites, which are considered tutoring websites, where students 
can review past exams, assignments and projects used in their current courses. 
3.1.1.2 Tutor Impersonated by Intruders/Students (Targeted) 
Rowe (2004) has shown that students can attempt to log in as online tutors in order 
to reveal answers to exam questions. He identified that most online tests are pro-
tected by short passwords. For example, Blackboard allows passwords as few as 
eight characters to protect online assessments. Such passwords are relatively sim-
ple to circumvent using systematic "cracker" software. Rowe explains that even if 
the password guessing fails, the student can still use "social engineering" methods 
that have been successfully used to scam people into revealing their passwords. As 
an example, "emergency" calls from alleged programming staff or "please change 
your password temporarily for system testing" requests (Mitnick, 2002). Since few 
online tutors are security experts, they can potentially fall for many of these scams. 
A scenario of this type of attack is described below: 
“A student stages an attack by intercepting an online tutor’s password. The 
hacker impersonates the tutor and gains access to all questions and an-
swers on an online examination. The student uses questions and answers 
to complete an online test.” 
Students and hackers can use different methods to gain access to online examina-
tions. For example, password protection can be circumvented by using a key logger 
(Cordes, 2005), sniffing, clickjacking (Rydstedt et al., 2010), dictionary attacks, to-
ken theft, user surveillance, malware (Christodorescu et al., 2005) and brute force 
login. For example, sniffer could decipher message packets of a local-area network 
used by fellow students or the instructor and thereby read their answers or pass-
words (McClure et al., 2009). In another example, Rowe (2004) states that students 
could use spyware to sneak a look at the activities of a person preparing electronic 
files for an online test.  
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However, a number of security measures could be implemented to deter intrusion 
attacks. For example, use of secure authentication, anti-virus, anti-spyware, anti-
malware, anti-phishing and security socket layers (SSL certificates) can mitigate 
many intrusion attacks (Kirda et al., 2006). 
3.1.2 Non-Intrusion 
Non-intrusion attacks may come from a legitimate student acting individually or invit-
ing a third party collaborator. There are a number of reasons that influence cheating 
behaviour of students in general. Evans and Craig (1990) identified numerous com-
mon reasons including desire for better grades, fear of failure, pressure from parents 
to do well, unclear instructional objectives and being graded on a curve. Chiesel 
(p.329, 2009) identified more reasons, including “everyone else is doing it”, “it helps 
me get better grades, a good job, or admitted to graduate school”, no fear of being 
caught, and no fear of punishment if caught. Other studies provided similar reasons, 
including pressure to succeed, to gain high grades, getting away with something, 
lack of organisational skills, and fear of failing a course (Faucher and Caves, 2009, 
Simkin and McLeod, 2010, Heyneman, 2015). Other reasons that students report 
include a desire to help others, procrastination, need to pass, course difficulty, “it 
doesn’t matter if I cheat”, or cheating being easy (Christie, 2003, Owunwanne et al., 
2010). Irrespective of the factors that motivate students, there is a common consen-
sus that collusion and plagiarism are major threats to online examinations. 
Non-intrusion is classified into two categories, namely collusion and non-collusion. 
These threats are also identified in the code of practice for the Assurance of Aca-
demic Quality and Standards in Higher Education (QAA) for the UK. The QAA 
identified plagiarism, collusion, impersonation and use of inadmissible material as 
academic misconduct in online examinations (Quality Assurance Agency, 2006). 
Such attacks can be carried out in several ways, which are described below. 
3.1.2.1 Non-Collusion 
A non-collusion attack is a form of cheating which is different from collusion, as it 
does not involve a third party collaborator. Such attacks happen when a student 
breaks regulations about what can be used to complete course assignments or ex-
ams (McGee, 2013). Some research studies suggest that students in online 
environments feel “distant” from others, and are more likely to engage in deceptive 
behaviour (Burgoon et al., 2003, George and Carlson, 1999, Rowe, 2004). This view 
is incomplete, as regardless of the learning environment, non-collusion threats may 
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be a cause for concern in different modes of assessment. In both face-to-face and 
online learning environments, students can write assignments, dissertations and 
course work in their own time. 
Bunn, Caudill and Gropper (1992) identified non-collusion as planned cheating 
which involves copying from books, notes and plagiarising. This is classified further 
into the following categories: 
 Copying from the Internet, Books and Notes 
While writing assignments and online tests, students can search for answers 
from the Internet, books and notes. Such attacks are known as panic cheating, 
when a student is at loss for answers during an online test. However, planned 
cheating is more common than panic cheating due to the nature of the online 
environment (Grijalva, 2006). Underwood and Szabo (2003) reported students 
using concealed notes to cheat on tests, exchanging work with other students 
and using the Internet. 
These threats depend upon the type of assessment and examination. In many 
remote assessments a tutor may not be particularly concerned about students 
using a book or other source of information. These tests are designed carefully 
and may need to be completed in an allocated time, which may discourage stu-
dents from accessing books or the Internet. 
 Plagiarism 
Plagiarism is copying someone else’s ideas and material, from any source, and 
claiming it as your own work (Dietz-Uhler and Hurn, 2011). The growth of the In-
ternet makes it appealing to copy and paste the writing of others without having 
to exert oneself. It has been defined in many ways, including theft, deception 
and misunderstanding (Sutherland-Smith, 2010, Vander Schaaf, 2005).   
Use of the Internet and technology has increased a student’s ability to plagiarise 
written assignments (Scanlon, 2003). Plagiarism has been reported in both 
online and face-to-face courses. However, with the increasing availability of in-
formation online, some researchers believe that it is more prevalent in online 
courses (Ackerman and White, 2008, Gilmore et al., 2010). Turnitin is a widely 
used originality software to determine the origin of written work (Turnitin, 2014). 
It is used by more than 3,000 institutions in the US alone, with 55 million docu-
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ments submitted for plagiarism checking. However, plagiarism still poses a 
threat to online examinations. 
3.1.2.2 Collusion  
A collusion attack is an organised form of cheating which involves collaboration be-
tween a student and a third party to solve examination problems. It is a consensual 
and pre-planned cheating attack by a student. It is an ongoing issue, which has 
been reported in a number of recent studies (Apampa et al., 2010b, Ayodele et al., 
2011, Sonhera et al., 2012). The threat level of collusion in an online examination 
can be different from other online applications such as banking, where implicit collu-
sion is unlikely to happen as the stakes are different (Rabkin, 2008). This type of 
threat involves legitimate students and may be challenging to circumvent. However, 
it can be made harder for an attacker to reach their goal. Schechter (2005) states 
that the greater the incentive, the more likely it is for an adversary to attack a sys-
tem. If a student stages an attack on an online test, the incentives are high, i.e. 
passing an exam, getting a degree or certificate, boosting grades. Wheeler et al. 
(2003) reported collusion in different disciplines, including medicine. As reported by 
Carter et al. (2003), collusion is a security risk which can bring into question the va-
lidity and credibility of online examinations. In another study, Laubscher et al. (2005) 
suggest that collusion is one of the major security threats to remote assessment, 
and proposed remote proctoring to detect impersonation. Howell et al. (2010) re-
ported online services such as Wetakeyourclass (2016), Boostmygrades (2016) and 
UnemployedProfesssors (2016), in which students pay a fee for someone to take 
their online classes and exams. It is anticipated that students would be sharing their 
credentials with these websites, in order that someone else could take their online 
tests. There are two types of collusion attacks, i.e. impersonation and abetting, 
which are described in the following sections. 
3.1.2.2.1 Impersonation 
In an impersonation attack, a student shares his or her access credentials with a 
third party impersonator, who impersonates and takes the online test. It is difficult to 
detect impersonation once an online test is completed (Kerka and Wonacott, 2000). 
These attacks are pre-planned and consensual, involving legitimate students with 
valid access credentials. Moini and Madni (2009) state that impersonation and illegal 
sharing or disclosure of authentication secrets is challenging to defend against in a 
remote online setting. They identified that students invite third parties to take their 
online tests for extra benefit. Such attacks are evolving with the advent of new 
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communication technology. A number of scenarios are presented below to describe 
the potential impersonation attacks. 
 Credential Sharing with a Third Party via Email (Non-Real Time) 
The conventional login-identifier and password is a widely used approach for the 
authentication of students in online tests. This method may provide adequate 
security in many online applications. However, it is vulnerable to attacks when 
students invite third parties to take their examinations. A student is able to share 
his or her access credentials prior to the test via email, phone and instant mes-
sage. Rowe (2004) states that individuals share credentials with collaborators, 
who take the online test on behalf of the intended test taker. Email is a widely 
used communication method and students may share access credentials via this 
method. An abuse case scenario for such an attack is described below. 
Consider that an online test authenticates students using a login and password. 
A scenario of collusion via email is described below: 
“Alex is a registered student on an online course ‘PRG-1 programming lan-
guages’. He is due to write his final semester online test on a scheduled date. 
Alex wants to boost his grades but he has not prepared for the test. He finds a 
professional helper, John, to assist with his test. John has agreed to imperson-
ate him in the test for an agreed amount of money. Alex emailed his online test 
details and password to John before the test date. On the test day, John satis-
fies authentication by providing the shared login and password. He writes the 
answers and completes the online test on behalf of Alex.” 
 Credential Sharing with a Third Party via Phone (Real Time) 
The mobile phone has become an increasingly used communication technology 
and an essential personal accessory. McGee (2013) identified that students may 
use smartphones for information exchange during online examinations. Howell 
et al. (2010) reported that students exchange answers to questions using their 
phones and take photographs of exams and transmit them to others. Paullet et 
al. (2015) identified phone use as a new method of cheating. They argue that 
the use of browser-locking techniques may become irrelevant if a student has 
access to a smartphone during their exam. There are two possible scenarios 
where a smart phone may be used to cheat in an online test, i.e. sharing an-
swers to questions, and sharing access credentials for impersonation. It may be 
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argued that access credentials could be shared before an online test, but if a 
challenge questions method (Bailie and Jortberg, 2009) or a random PIN code is 
implemented, where questions or PIN code are generated randomly, students 
will not know their credentials before an online test. Thus, in this case, students 
must use smartphones to share access credentials during the test with a third 
party. This provides a real-time interaction between a student and an impersona-
tor. In a recent study, Paullet et al. (2014) identified the use of mobile phones as 
a rising concern, which is a challenging issue to combat. An abuse case scenar-
io for such attacks is described below. 
Consider that an online test is only available in a secure browser, which pre-
vents unwanted applications, e.g. remote desktop, instant messaging 
applications. Students are authenticated using two factors: login identifier and 
password, and a randomly generated PIN code emailed to the student upon 
completing the password authentication. A scenario of collusion using a 
smartphone is described below: 
“Joe is a registered student on an online course ‘OS-1 Operating Systems’. He 
is due to write his final semester online test on a scheduled date. Joe feels that 
he might not be able to pass his final test. He discusses this with a close friend, 
Daniel, who has already completed the same course. Daniel is willing to help 
Joe and agreed to impersonate him in the test on the scheduled date. Joe 
shared his online test details and password with Daniel before the test. Howev-
er, the online test requires students to provide a randomly generated PIN code, 
sent to their phone at the time of the test, in order to authenticate their identity. 
On the scheduled date, Daniel satisfies the initial login using the shared pass-
word; however, the PIN code is sent to Joe’s phone, as he is the registered user. 
Joe collects the PIN code and forwards it to Daniel on his phone, who satisfies 
the authentication. Daniel writes the test answers and completes the online test.” 
 Credential Sharing with a Third Party via Instant Messaging (IM)  
Instant Messaging (IM) is another potential method to communicate during an 
online examination session. The growth of IM services is a global phenomenon, 
which is rapidly changing the way people interact. IM applications are easily 
available on mobile phones, tablets and computers for little or no cost. Ease of 
access makes it a potential tool for cheating in an online examination. Examples 
of instant messaging applications include Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and Phone 
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(Church and de Oliveira, 2013). The prevalence and free availability of these 
applications means they are gradually replacing short messaging service (SMS) 
communication (Oghuma et al., 2015). As of 2016, chat service WhatsApp has 
reached 1 billion registered users (McCarthy, 2016). Technology has been a 
useful tool for advanced learning; however, it may also be used by people in 
promoting their personal objectives, including cheating. McGee (2013) stated 
that technology is the most commonly used strategy to cheat in online examina-
tions. Many research studies reported that students with access to phones and 
computers use instant messages during online examinations (Dee and Jacob, 
2012, Rogers, 2006). IMs may be used for communication with a third party for 
help with exam questions as well as impersonation attacks. A student and a third 
party impersonator may exchange access credentials using IMs in order that the 
third party can access an online examination. An abuse case scenario for such 
an attack is described below. 
Consider that an online test is only available in a secure browser, which miti-
gates unwanted applications, e.g. remote desktop, instant messaging 
applications. Students are authenticated using two factors: login identifier and 
password, and a randomly generated PIN code sent to the student’s phone upon 
completing the password authentication. A scenario of collusion using IM is de-
scribed below: 
“Joe is a registered student on an online course ‘PRG-1 programming lan-
guages’. He is due to complete his final semester online test on a scheduled 
date. Joe wants to pass his test in the final semester, but he has not studied, 
and therefore is not confident in taking the test. He discusses this with his close 
friend Daniel, who has already completed and passed the same course. Daniel 
is willing to help Joe and agreed to impersonate him in the online test. Joe 
shares his online test details and password with Daniel before the test. However, 
the online test requires students to provide a randomly generated PIN code sent 
to their phone in order to authenticate their identity. On the test day, Daniel satis-
fies the initial login using the shared password; however, the PIN code was sent 
to Joe’s phone, as he is the registered user. Daniel chats with Joe using Skype 
instant messaging on a smartphone, collects the PIN code instantly and satisfies 
the authentication process. He writes the test answers and completes the online 
test on behalf of Joe.” 
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 Remote Desktop Sharing 
Using remote desktop sharing applications, a remote user can access and con-
trol a desktop with permission to all programs (Manion et al., 2014). By 
combining remote desktop sharing and an online examination session, a student 
may login and invite a third party to impersonate him in an online test. Desktop 
sharing is reported as one of the ten most inventive cheating attempts in eCam-
pus News (Barbour, 2014). Heussner (2012) state that it could be tempting to 
accept help from a friend or helper remotely using technology including remote 
desktop sharing. This enables a third party in the next room, or even in a differ-
ent city, country and time zone, to impersonate a test taker. This type of attack is 
pre-planned and the student and attacker agree a time to perform the test. 
Consider that there is no protection against remote desktop sharing during an 
online examination. A scenario of collusion using remote desktop sharing is de-
scribed below: 
“Joe is a registered student on an online course ‘RD-1 relational databases’. 
He is due to sit his final semester online test on Saturday but has not pre-
pared for the test. Joe makes contact with William, who is an experienced 
programmer and helps students with their tests for money. William agreed 
to impersonate him and sit his online test for an agreed amount. Joe sent a 
remote desktop login to William before the test time on Saturday. On the 
test day, William logs in to Joe’s computer using a remote desktop applica-
tion. Joe logs in to his online test and hands over the test to William, who 
completes the answers and finishes the test.” 
A secure browser is one possible solution to prevent remote desktop shar-
ing during an online examination session. For example, a safe exam 
browser is an application to prevent the running of undesirable applications 
during an online examination session (Frank, 2010). Respondus Lockdown 
Browser (Respondus, 2016) is an example of a secure browser application. 
The security of the online examination is breached in the above scenarios. It is chal-
lenging to detect these types of collusion attacks. 
3.1.2.2.2 Abetting 
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In abetting attacks, a legitimate student takes an online examination with the help of 
a third party abettor (Dietz-Uhler and Hurn, 2011). This is also described as “panic 
cheating”, when a student is struggling to answer a question during the test. Stuber-
McEwen et al. (2009) state that aiding and abetting is a common practice in both 
online and classroom cheating. Regardless of whether students were online or 
physically in classes, aiding and abetting with exams was the most frequently re-
ported form of cheating (Dietz-Uhler and Hurn, 2011). Dietz-Uhler and Hurn state 
that panic cheating occurs during a test when a student finds himself at a loss for an 
answer. The absence of monitoring or proctoring allows students to invite third par-
ties to assist with their online examinations. The potential abetting threats are 
described below: 
 Third Party – Same Location 
A fellow student or a third party collaborator sitting next to a student can help 
him/her in an online test (2004). In the absence of a live invigilation or remote 
monitoring, it may be a challenge to prevent the presence of helpers and abet-
tors during an online test. McGee (2013) identified that in a test-taking situation, 
a student and a third party may be physically located in the same place. Rowe 
(2004) stated that the issue of authentication has been widely researched in or-
der to ensure that a genuine student is present, but not to ensure that he or she 
is alone, which requires different methods. The presence of a third party with a 
test taker is a challenging issue. 
 Third Party – Remote Location 
Students may get help from a third party collaborator based in a remote location 
during an online exam. Some research studies reported that students use their 
phones to receive help with the exam questions, and take photographs of ques-
tions to transmit them to others (Howell et al., 2010). As discussed in the 
previous section, a student may use a smartphone, instant messaging and 
emails to gain assistance from third parties remotely. Paullet et al. (2015) identi-
fied that the phone has been increasingly used for cheating in online 
examinations. This view is helpful to establish that students may use all possible 
means in a panic situation when they need help with exam questions. 
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3.2 Countermeasures 
While deterrence of all types of threats to online examinations is a priority, based on 
a review of threats it is observed that collusion is a particular concern, due to the 
involvement of students and third parties (Hernandez et al., 2008, Apampa et al., 
2009, McGee, 2013). As pointed out in numerous studies (Wisher et al., 2005, Levy 
and Ramim, 2007, McGee, 2013, Bailie and Jortberg, 2009), a major threat when 
conducting a remote online examination is the inability to know whether the correct 
student is taking the test or someone else has taken over the test on their behalf. 
This threat translates into impersonation, as described in the preceding sections. In 
this type of attack, a student and a third party collude, with the latter impersonating 
the registered student in an online test. This is considered to be a major concern 
and perceived as a great risk by the academic community (Kerka and Wonacott, 
2000). 
3.2.1 Existing Authentication Approaches 
The existing authentication satisfies identity and authentication to ensure that the 
correct student has access to an online test. However, based on the literature re-
view and evaluation of potential threats above, it has been identified that an 
authenticated student is sometimes not the expected student, or an expected stu-
dent may start a test but does not complete it. Hence, the existing mechanisms are 
not sufficient to ensure that the correct student takes the online test. 
Table 3-1 shows an overview of the existing methods in the context of impersona-
tion threats. In the majority of features, students may be able to share access 
credentials with an impersonator. For example, students reveal their passwords to 
third parties for impersonation (Weippl, 2005). Apampa et al. (2010b) state that an 
impersonator could produce correct login details on behalf of a student during au-
thentication, which raises the question “is the student really who he/she claims to 
be?” As discussed in Chapter 2 above, authentication methods are implemented to 
achieve identity and authentication security goals. However, each method provides 
a different level of security assurances, reliability and deterrence to impersonation 
threats. According to guidelines for authentication in online examination, the pro-
posed method needs to: 
 support, not prevent or disrupt, learning (usable) 
 be integrated in the learning process (secure) 
 be simple and flexible to deploy (usable) 
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 be secure, non-invasive and not diminish privacy (secure and usable) 
 be low-cost (feasible). 
(Jortberg, 2009) 
Table 3-1 Authentication Methods to Mitigate Impersonation Threats 
Authentication methods Impersonation 
Knowledge-based Authentication (KBA) 
Login identifier and password Can be shared with a third party 
Personal challenge questions Can be shared with a third party 
Object-based Authentication (OBA) 
Smartcard, or magnetic card Can be shared with a third party 
Biometrics 
Fingerprint recognition Cannot be shared with a third party 
Face recognition Cannot be shared with a third party 
Signature recognition Cannot be shared with a third party 
Web video recording Cannot be shared with a third party 
Human invigilation 
Face-to-face invigilation Cannot impersonate with identity verification 
Remote monitoring (Web cam) Cannot impersonate with identity verification 
 
KBA is the simplest technique to fulfil the security requirements. This is an easy to 
use method, and expected to provide secure authentication in online examinations. 
This is a low-cost, accessible, widely acceptable and preferred authentication meth-
od (Hafiz et al., 2008). However, a review of KBA methods suggests impersonation 
attacks are inevitable. Using both challenge questions based on personal infor-
mation, and login-identifier and password, students may be able to share credentials 
with third party impersonators using phone, IMs, remote desktop and email. 
OBA method utilises physical objects such as smart cards and magnetic strip cards 
for authentication (Deo et al., 1998). This method is widely used in the banking, 
transport and hospitality sectors with a purpose-built infrastructure. Implementation 
of these features requires special purpose input devices and infrastructure, which 
incurs additional costs and human resources. Smart cards can be shared in person 
or by post with impersonators before online tests, meaning the method is fallible, 
and vulnerable to impersonation attacks. Furthermore, implementation of the OBA 
method may be challenging to implement in dispersed geographical locations with 
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students needing to access online learning and examinations from their homes and 
offices. 
Biometric features such as fingerprint and face recognition methods are suggested 
to enhance security in online examinations (Agulla et al., 2008). Thus, it is anticipat-
ed that only the correct student can authenticate, due to unique physical attributes 
associated with individuals. Ko and Cheng (2004) proposed the use of video record-
ing of an online examination session, which may countermeasure impersonation 
attacks. These features are reported to be more reliable than KBA and OBA. How-
ever, some studies identified issues with the use of biometrics. Balie and Jortber 
(2009) state that biometrics require proprietary software, special purpose hardware 
and broadband Internet to transmit the required input. Unlike KBA, biometric fea-
tures are associated with an individual’s physical or behavioural characteristics, 
which cannot be updated if compromised. For example, some studies indicated that 
an individual’s fingerprint can be lifted from the surfaces of objects without one’s 
knowledge and used for replay attacks (Moini and Madni, 2009, Derakhshani et al., 
2003). False Reject Rate (FRR) and False Accept Rate (FAR) are widely known is-
sues with these features: Ratha et al. (2000) stated that fingerprint matching faces 
two common and competing errors, these being FRR and FAR. The same issues 
were reported in other biometric features, including face recognition. In a recent 
study, Sahoo and Choubisa (2012) identified the performance issues of algorithms 
used in biometric features, which include FAR, FRR, Equal Error Rate (ERR), Fail-
ure to Enrol Rate (FER), Failure to Capture Rate (FCR) and Template Capacity (TC) 
issues. The video recording feature may enhance security, but it will require post-
assessment monitoring of exam sessions for all students, which incurs additional 
resources and demands extra effort (Ko and Cheng, 2004). This discussion implies 
that biometrics is more reliable in terms of identification; however, they are unrea-
sonably intrusive, expensive and may cause difficulties in wider implementation 
where students are situated in dispersed geographical locations.  
A human invigilator is an example of a secondary authentication method which can 
be used to ensure the presence of the correct student. This includes face-to-face 
proctoring and remote monitoring via a web cam. Face-to-face proctoring requires 
test centres and human invigilators in all locations (different cities worldwide) where 
students are enrolled on an online course. In addition, each test centre requires a 
review by academic staff to ensure proctor quality and compliance with the institu-
tion’s test centre standards (Bailie and Jortberg, 2009). Student authentication that 
relies upon a human invigilator will require extra human resources, costs and allo-
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cated test centres. Remote monitoring via webcam may be a feasible alternative to 
physical invigilation. A dedicated proctor is assigned to authenticate identity and 
monitor an online test (Mahmood, 2010). Students can access their tests from the 
home or office without needing to go to an allocated test centre. This approach may 
be cost-efficient compared to face-to-face invigilation, but there is a cost attached to 
remote proctoring (Mahmood, 2010). This approach requires one-to-one monitoring 
and, therefore, would be expensive and challenging in testing a large number of 
students in dispersed geographical locations. 
3.2.2 Exploratory Study with Online Programme Tutors 
Xiao et al. (Xiao et al., 2011) conducted an exploratory survey with the academic 
staff from the University Hertfordshire. The participants of the study were teaching in 
online programmes offered by School of Computer Science. 
The questionnaire was aimed to investigate the types of assessments used in online 
programmes, and to collect information on participants’ awareness of possible stu-
dent cheatings in online examinations. The participants had adequate experience of 
online teaching with 33% teaching on more than 3 online modules and 67% teach-
ing on more than 2 modules across different levels of BSc and MSc programmes.  
The results showed that individual coursework is favoured as the main assessment 
method (92%) compared to in-class-test (42%) and examination (17%). Group 
coursework was not adopted due to the lack of face-to-face communication among 
students. Online programme tutors showed concern about students’ cheating in 
online examinations. Although only being asked to tick the most concerned type of 
cheating, many of them showed their concern on all types of cheating including pla-
giarism, impersonation, and abetting.   
This study was a driver and motivated further research conducted in this thesis. The 
findings of this study and discussion in the previous sections suggest a need for an 
authentication approach which is accessible, usable, cost effective, and prevents 
collusion attacks in online examinations. 
3.3 Summary  
This chapter provided a review of threats to online examinations in general, and a 
detailed analysis of collusion. Collusion is further classified into impersonation and 
abetting threats. Impersonation occurs when a student works with a third party, who 
impersonates him or her in an online test. Abetting occurs when a student takes an 
online test aided by a third party either based in the same location or with remote 
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access. Collusion is identified as a major challenge when conducting online exami-
nations. In this chapter, it is suggested that weak authentication methods make 
online examinations fallible to these threats. The need for an authentication method 
was identified to satisfy the security goals, in order to ensure that the correct person 
is taking the online examination and that the student undertaking the test is the 
same one that completed the online course. In order to address this and answer re-
search question two, a challenge questions authentication method is proposed in 
the next chapter. 
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4 Profile-Based Authentication  
The previous chapter described threats to online examinations in general and collu-
sion attacks in more detail. Discussions in the previous chapter emphasised the 
need for an authentication approach which is usable and may prevent collusion at-
tacks. This chapter proposes the profile-based method, which utilises challenge 
questions for the authentication of students in online examinations. The following 
sections present an overview and structure of the proposed method. Details are 
provided for the design and development of an initial prototype. Finally, the architec-
ture of the MOODLE learning management system is described to demonstrate the 
integration of the proposed approach. 
4.1 Proposed Solution 
In an attempt to address the research problems and answer the research questions, 
this thesis proposes that learning, examination and authentication should be inte-
grated to achieve the security goals. The conventional authentication methods may 
disregard the learning process to confirm that the person who is taking the test is the 
same one that completed the learning. The proposed solution attempts to ensure 
that a student who is authenticated is the same one that completed the course.  
This thesis proposes a challenge question approach to collect and consolidate a 
student’s information during the learning process and randomly use a subset of the 
collected information for authentication during an online test. This attempts to en-
sure that i) a student who is taking an online test is the same one that completed the 
coursework and ii) a student is deterred from sharing information with a third party 
impersonator during or before an online test. The design, development and imple-
mentation of the proposed approach are described in the following sections. 
4.2 Profile-Based Authentication 
To implement the proposed solution described above, a profile-based challenge 
questions authentication method is presented here. Figure 4-1 shows an overview of 
the proposed method. This is a knowledge-based approach, designed for secure 
and usable authentication in online examinations (Ullah et al., 2012a). Using this 
method, information about a student is collected in the form of questions and an-
swers during the learning process to build and consolidate a profile, which is used 
for authentication in examinations. 
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Figure 4-1 Profile-Based Authentication 
As shown in Figure 4-1, this method can be implemented using two types of ques-
tions, i.e. pre-defined or dynamic non-intrusive questions, which are described 
below. 
Figure 4-1 (a) shows a design of the proposed method implementing pre-defined 
challenge questions. Using this type, an administrator creates and sets questions at 
the start. A student is required to provide answers to these questions, referred to as 
profile questions, in order to access learning activities. These answers are used to 
build and consolidate a student’s profile. In order to access an online examination, 
the student is presented with a subset of random challenge questions extracted from 
his or her profile. A student registers n profile questions and is presented with t ≤ n 
challenge questions upon authentication. 
Figure 4-1 (b) shows a design of the proposed method implementing non-intrusive 
dynamic questions. Using this type, a student’s profile is built and consolidated non-
intrusively in the background during the learning process based on his or her inter-
actions with learning activities. Features of the challenge question method are 
described below: 
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 Profile: The information associated with an individual student is stored in the da-
tabase and referred to as the profile. Based on a question type, it represents a 
student’s description or an individual’s learning profile. The data in a profile is a 
collection of questions and answers associated with a student. Profiles are cre-
ated for all students participating in learning activities. 
 Profile Questions: These are registered during the learning process to build and 
consolidate a student’s profile. Answers to profile questions are registered by 
students or created dynamically in the background. The learning is anticipated to 
be a continuous process, and therefore, answers to profile questions are collect-
ed recurrently when a student performs learning activities. 
 Challenge Questions: These are randomly extracted from an individual’s profile 
for authentication. As discussed above, a student registers n profile questions 
and is presented with t challenge questions upon authentication, where t  ≤  n 
(Just and Aspinall, 2009c, Ullah et al., 2012b). Profile and challenge questions 
are the same entities used in different contexts, i.e. learning and examination. 
To an individual student, r = t challenge questions must be answered correctly in 
order to access an online examination. 
 Traffic Light Access Control: This is an optional feature, which could be imple-
mented to relax the authentication constraints based on the number of correct 
answers to challenge questions. If a student registers n profile questions and is 
presented with t challenge questions upon authentication, it is sufficient to an-
swer r ≤ t challenge questions correctly in order to access an online 
examination. The outcome of this method is classified into three categories de-
scribed below, which are based on the number of correct answers: 
o Red: If the number of correct answers is t1 out of n (n = total questions 
presented), deny access. 
o Orange: If the number of correct answers is t2 out of n, present more 
questions for re-authentication. 
o Green: If the number of correct answers is t3 out of n, grant access. 
The proposed method has a number of benefits and limitations. Recall Chapter 2, 
which described the use of a challenge questions method to mitigate impersonation 
attacks, citing advantages over other approaches (Bailie and Jortberg, 2009). In 
their work, Bailie and Jortberg proposed challenge questions based on a US con-
sumer database to prevent impersonation attacks. The method presented in this 
thesis is adaptable and based on a student’s learning activities. The key benefits of 
using a knowledge-based approach include wider accessibility on standard input 
- 50 - 
devices, Internet speed and a lower cost compared to biometrics and object-based 
approaches (Ullah et al., 2014b). Furthermore, this method attempts to link learning 
and examinations to deter security threats. It is anticipated that the process of col-
lecting information over a period of time in the learning process may deter a student 
from sharing it with a third party impersonator. 
There are also some limitations to the use of the challenge questions method. Sev-
eral studies reported usability as a major issue for challenge questions (Just and 
Aspinall, 2012, Schechter et al., 2009). These issues include usability attributes 
such as efficiency and effectiveness. This approach introduces additional steps in 
learning and examination processes, which will cause distraction for students. 
Guessing has been reported as a security concern for questions associated with 
personal information (Just and Aspinall, 2009c).  
This research work will examine the proposed method for relevant usability attrib-
utes and to understand its influence on collusion attacks in an online examination 
context. The initial prototype was designed for use with the conventional text-based 
challenge questions, which are discussed below. 
4.3 Question Types 
4.3.1 Text-Based Questions 
This is a widely used question type implemented by leading email service providers 
(Just and Aspinall, 2009a). These are associated with an individual’s personal and 
professional information, which is further classified into fixed and open questions, as 
described below (Just, 2003): 
 Fixed Questions: Presented to users from a pool of pre-defined questions (Just, 
2005). A user is required to register answers to pre-set questions presented “as 
is” at registration, e.g. “what is your mother’s maiden name?” With this type of 
question, a user is not provided with the ability to modify the question text. This 
provides the ability to a question designer to create secure and usable ques-
tions. Some websites provide a list of pre-defined fixed questions for users to 
select during registration (Schechter et al., 2009). 
 Open Questions: Open to users, who can create their own questions in a free 
text area during registration (Just, 2004). This is a user-driven type of question, 
with users having full control over choosing questions and answers. Most often, 
questions and answers are received in a free text format.  
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The initial prototype implemented fixed type questions and the course administrator 
was required to create and upload pre-defined questions. Similar to question type, 
there are different answer types including free text, multiple choice and fixed set an-
swers, which are described below:  
 Free Text Answers: This is the most commonly used answer type. Users can 
provide their answers in a free text format. Using this type, answers of different 
data types, i.e. date, numeric, alpha-numeric and string, can be implemented. 
The initial prototype implemented free text answers. 
 Multiple Choice Answers: Users are presented with multiple choice answers and 
must choose the correct answer. There is always a correct answer in the list of 
choices. 
 Fixed Set of Answers: These are similar to multiple choice answers. Users are 
presented with a list of options to select a correct choice. The most common in-
terface used for fixed set answers is a drop down list. 
4.3.2 Image-Based Questions 
The concept of image authentication has been implemented as image-based ques-
tions. They are pre-defined questions and an administrator is required to upload 
multiple choice image questions at the start. Students register their answers during 
the learning process. These questions are further classified into recall and recogni-
tion-based image questions, which are described in further detail in Chapter 7. 
4.3.3 Dynamic Profile Questions 
Figure 4-1 (b) shows the design of the proposed method with dynamic profile ques-
tions. These questions are adaptable and created dynamically. Questions are 
created non-intrusively and non-distractingly in the background during the learning 
process to build a student’s profile. These questions are extracted from a student’s 
learning activities, content submissions, grades, lessons, and forum posts in order to 
build and consolidate a student’s profile. These questions are described in more de-
tail in Chapter 9. 
4.4 Initial Prototype 
In order to evaluate the challenge questions method, an initial prototype was devel-
oped based on the design shown in Figure 4-1 (a) above. It was developed using 
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PHP (Hypertext Pre-processor) scripting language and a MySQL database. It was 
integrated in MOODLE (Modular Object Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment) 
Learning Management System (LMS) as a proof of concept for evaluation. 
4.4.1 What is MOODLE? 
MOODLE is free source online learning software known by multiple definitions, such 
as Learning Management System (LMS), Course Management System (CMS) and 
Virtual Learning Environment (VLE) (Dougiamas and Taylor, 2003). It is a popular 
system, used by a large number of institutions across the world. As of December 
2012, MOODLE had 72,087 registered sites in 223 countries with 63,955,527 users 
(Dougiamas, 2012). Reasons for choosing MOODLE are described below. 
4.4.1.1 Reasons for Choosing MOODLE 
MOODLE has a number of features, and the important reasons for choosing it for 
the current research are listed below (Williams, 2005, Al-Ajlan and Zedan, 2007, 
Dougiamas, 2012): 
 A free source environment available to end users for development, distribution, 
copying, studying and modifications, which makes it feasible for use in this re-
search.  
 A wide range of open source community developers for help and support with de-
velopment and design queries. 
 A widely used and acceptable LMS. 
 Highly extendable and customisable.  
 Students and tutors familiar with the concept of online learning in the majority of 
educational institutions are familiar with MOODLE. 
 Detailed documentation and online community support available 24/7, which is a 
useful resource for developing prototypes, extending the functionality and promot-
ing the research work. 
 MOODLE is developed in PHP scripting language, compatible with a range of da-
tabase software including MySQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle, SQL Server databases in 
the backend. PHP and MySQL are popular open source development environ-
ments that can be used to develop, deploy and distribute the initial prototype of 
the challenge question approach, without any licence restrictions. 
4.4.2 MOODLE Architecture  
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Figure 4-2 shows three-tier MOODLE architecture. It is a structured modular object-
oriented application and a highly customisable and expandable learning manage-
ment system (Al-Ajlan and Zedan, 2007). The three-tier architecture comprises a 
user interface or presentation layer, business logic layer and data layer. 
As shown in Figure 4-2, the core is surrounded by a number of independently cus-
tomisable plug-ins at site and course levels. The basic authentication, access 
control (roles), learning and examination activities, and grades are delivered with the 
core application. The MOODLE core constructs the basic infrastructure necessary to 
build the LMS component and implements the key concepts with which all the differ-
ent plug-ins will need to work (Dougiamas, 2012). The three-tier MOODLE 
architecture is described in the following sections. 
4.4.2.1 Presentation Layer 
The presentation layer is responsible for rendering the user interface. It can be seen 
in Figure 4-2 that a combination of plug-ins is linked with the core. The user inter-
face for all plug-ins is defined in the respective interface folder. Each plug-in inherits 
the presentation (view) objects from the core and implements the inherited or cus-
tomised view. The global theme plug-in is responsible for the overall style of a user 
interface. The following is a list of important plug-in types. 
 Blocks: responsible for small building blocks and delivers a range of func-
tions. Blocks are rendered and positioned in customisable left and right 
columns of the page. Examples of blocks include blog menu, settings, recent 
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activity, comments, messages, main menu, online users, etc. The profile-
based challenge questions method was developed and implemented as a 
block. 
 Activities: responsible for delivery of teaching and learning components. Ac-
tivities create learning content and deliver online assessments such as 
quizzes, assignments, forums, lessons, chat, long questions, etc. 
 Themes: responsible for the look and feel of the entire website. The overall 
style of a MOODLE website, specific course and categories can be custom-
ised using the theme plug-in. 
 Users: responsible for managing site and course users. 
 Reports: responsible for reporting various outcomes to site administrators, 
teachers and students. 
 Gradebook: manages and reports the outcome of formative and summative 
assessments. It provides a flexible interface for parameterised gradebook 
rendering. 
 Course Format: MOODLE offers a number of different course formats, in-
cluding topics, weekly and daily, which are defined in the course format. This 
component is responsible for rendering a chosen course format. 
 Enrolment: responsible for access control, such as contexts, roles, capabili-
ties and permissions. 
4.4.2.2 Business Logic Layer 
The business logic layer is a combination of PHP and HTML script files. System and 
user inputs are processed and serviced by this layer. The MOODLE core is respon-
sible for holding the core objects, which interact with the expandable plug-ins. Each 
plug-in is responsible for processing its functionality together with the core. As 
shown in Figure 4-2, presentation, functional logic, deployment and database logic 
is defined and processed by the business logic layer. Code for all blocks is located 
in the “Blocks” folder. Similarly, resources and activities are stored in the “mod” fold-
er. MOODLE is expandable and therefore, new blocks, activities, resources and 
themes can be added. A customisable block can be added with the knowledge of 
MOODLE programming and coding conventions.  
The profile-based challenge questions method was developed and implemented as 
a new block. The codebase for this block was stored using the MOODLE coding ap-
proach in “install”, “db”, “lang” and “images” folders located inside “Blocks”. 
MOODLE automatically detects new installations and deploys the core to install and 
- 55 - 
configure a new block plug-in into the database, which is available for configuration 
from the administrator interface. 
4.4.2.3 Data Layer 
The data layer is responsible for the storage of data in the database. The MOODLE 
database comprises more than 200 tables. It is a combination of core and other as-
sociated tables to hold information about configurations, installations, users, 
courses, activities, resources, grades, plug-ins, etc. The number of tables may 
therefore increase with the deployment of more plug-ins. 
4.4.3 Development and Integration of the Challenge Questions 
The profile-based challenge questions method was integrated as a MOODLE block 
deployed with a configurable interface. After integration, it was set up and linked with 
all the available resources (online examinations components) such as quizzes, Fo-
rums, databases and assignments for authentication purposes. Figure 4-3 shows 
the profile-based challenge questions block configuration interface. 
 
Figure 4-3 Challenge Questions Settings  
4.4.4 Configuration of the Challenge Questions (Course Administrator) 
In order to implement the profile-based challenge question approach , configurations 
of different settings are described in this section. A user with an administrator role is 
required to enable the block in an online course. This is followed by a number of 
configurations, which include setting up authentication variables, adding questions 
and monitoring reports, which are described below: 
4.4.4.1 Authentication Setup 
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Authentication variables are configured to determine the functionality of the chal-
lenge questions method. Figure 4-4 shows the configuration interface implemented 
in a MOODLE block.  
Descriptions of all variables shown in Figure 4-4 are given below:  
1) Modules: This links examination modules with the challenge questions. All 
assessment modules in MOODLE are available in the multiple select list, i.e. 
MCQs, Quiz, Lesson, Database, Chat and Forum discussions. Outcomes of 
the assessment modules are reported in the gradebook; therefore, users at-
tempting to access these modules are authenticated using the profile-based 
challenge questions method. For the purpose of this study, MOODLE quiz 
was the main assessment module. 
2) Profile Questions Frequency: In the initial prototype, students were required 
to register their answers to profile questions at the learning stage. A student 
was required to provide answers to profile questions in order to access 
course content. The frequency of these questions was made configurable to 
enforce collection of answers once per “login session” or “day”. 
3) Maximum Number of Profile Questions: This variable determines the number 
of profile questions presented to a student in order to register their answers. 
The default value of this variable was 3. 
4) Maximum Number of Challenge Questions for Authentication: This variable 
determines the number of challenge questions presented to a student to au-
Figure 4-4 Authentication Configuration 
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thenticate their identity, in order that they can access an online examination 
(quiz). The default value of this variable was 3. 
5) Maximum Number of Image Questions: This variable determines the number 
of image-based profile and challenge questions presented to a student to 
register answers and authenticate their identity. 
6) Number of Correct Challenge Questions for Green Classification: This varia-
ble determines the number of correct answers needed to authenticate a 
student based on a traffic light access control system. For example, a stu-
dent is authenticated if the number of correct answers is 2 out of 3 challenge 
questions. 
7) Number of Correct Challenge Questions for Orange Classification: This vari-
able determines the number of correct answers to re-authenticate (present 
more questions to) a student based on a traffic light access control system. 
For example, present more questions to a student (to re-authenticate) if the 
number of correct answers is 1 out of 3 challenge questions. 
8) Number of Correct Challenge Questions for Red Classification: This variable 
determines the number of incorrect answers to penalise a student based on 
a traffic light access control and disable access. For example, disable a stu-
dent’s account if the number of correct answers is 0 out of 3 challenge 
questions. 
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4.4.4.2 Adding Questions  
The profile-based challenge questions method is a questions-driven approach and 
pre-defined text-based questions were utilised in the initial prototype. A set of pre-
defined questions can be uploaded via a configurable interface. Figure 4-5 shows 
the user interface for adding questions. Different types of questions can be added, 
updated and deleted through this interface. 
4.4.4.3 Authentication Reports 
A reporting interface is built for an administrator to monitor and audit students’ au-
thentication outcomes. A student account can be activated or deactivated from this 
interface. Similarly, a student failing the challenge questions authentication in an 
online assessment module is locked out from further access to any assessments. 
This allows the course administrator to verify the identity of an individual student and 
take appropriate action.  
Figure 4-6 Challenge Questions: Authentication Report  
Figure 4-5 Initial Configuration: Add Questions   
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4.4.5 Registration and Challenge Questions Authentication (Student) 
This section describes students’ interaction with an online course, examinations and 
challenge questions authentication. A student is required to sign up before gaining 
access to an online course; therefore, registration is an essential process for each 
student.  
4.4.5.1 Registration 
MOODLE allows multiple ways to register students, i.e. self-registration, bulk upload 
and individual user registration by an administrator. Figure 4-7 shows a standard 
MOODLE registration form, where (*) denotes mandatory fields to register a user. In 
order to register a student, information in the registration form is filled and submitted 
online. This triggers and sends an email to the user account with a confirmation link. 
The registered student can access the online course with a username and pass-
word, selected during the registration process. 
4.4.5.2 Profile Questions 
Profile questions are randomly presented from the questions uploaded by an admin-
istrator as described above (see section 4.4.4.2). Students are required to register 
their answers to profile questions. As shown in Figure 4-8, this is a mandatory pro-
cess and students can only proceed to view learning resources when answers to 
profile questions are registered. As described above (see section 4.4.4.1), the num-
ber of questions presented is configurable. Answers to profile questions are used to 
Figure 4-7 Moodle: Registration 
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build and consolidate an individual’s profile, which is used for authentication, as de-
scribed in the following section. 
 
Figure 4-8 Learning: Profile Questions 
4.4.5.3 Challenge Questions 
Challenge questions are randomly presented from an individual student’s profile for 
authentication, as shown in Figure 4-9. In order to access an online quiz, students 
are required to authenticate their identity and provide correct answers to their chal-
lenge questions. Answers to these questions were initially registered by students 
during the learning process described above (see section 4.4.5.2). The number of 
questions presented is configurable, as described above (see section 4.4.4.1). Stu-
dents can be asked to answer challenge questions in multiple attempts if the traffic 
light access control system is enabled.  
 
Figure 4-9 Authentication: Challenge Questions  
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the design of the proposed challenge question approach was devel-
oped and implemented. Question design associated with the initial prototype was 
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described, i.e. pre-defined text-based questions. The proposed method was imple-
mented using MOODLE Learning Management System, which is a free source 
learning management software. It is customisable, expandable and feasible for 
evaluating the challenge question approach. The system architecture of MOODLE 
was presented to describe the user interface, business logic layer and data layer. 
The challenge question approach was integrated as a MOODLE block, which is ac-
cessible and configurable from a user interface. 
In order to evaluate the proposed approach, research methods and methodology 
are presented in the next chapter. 
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5 Research Methods and Methodology  
The previous chapter described the design and development of the profile-based 
challenge questions authentication method. This chapter presents research meth-
ods and methodologies to approach the research problems and evaluate the 
proposed method for usability and security. The background of quantitative and 
qualitative methods associated with research studies conducted in this thesis are 
explained. The chapter provides the justification for using empirical enquiries for se-
curity and usability evaluation. A risk-based security method is presented along with 
the manner in which it will approach specific parts of this research. The chapter pre-
sents a focus group method and how it is applied to this research. The usability test 
method, questionnaire and usability attributes associated with this work are justified. 
Finally, titles of the empirical studies and associated ethical considerations are pre-
sented. 
5.1 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative methods are applied on numerical and quantifiable data to draw mean-
ingful results (Creswell and Clark, 2007). This method is classified into inferential, 
experimental and simulation methods. Inferential statistics allow an opportunity to 
draw inferences using characteristics or relationships of a population from the data 
(Cohen et al., 2013). This approach usually utilises surveys and questionnaires, 
where a sample of the population is studied to determine its characteristics in order 
to draw interpretations. 
The experimental method is also known as the empirical method, which gives the 
researcher greater control over the research environment using variables wherein 
manipulation of variables is observed (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Using this meth-
od, the researcher can get facts (data) first-hand. This is a data-driven method, 
which produces a conclusion. In this approach, the researcher must set up hypothe-
ses to approve or disprove on the basis of data analysis. This method is based on 
an experimental design to manipulate processes and participants in order to investi-
gate the hypothesis. Kothari (2004) states that empirical research is appropriate 
when evidence is sought that certain variables affect other variables in some way. 
Kothari identified that evidence gathered through empirical studies is considered to 
be the most powerful support possible for a given hypothesis. 
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5.2 Qualitative Research 
The qualitative approach is associated with subjective assessment of attitudes, opin-
ions and behaviours (Berg and Lune, 2004). This approach generates results of 
non-quantitative form. In some instances the research outcome is not subjected to 
rigorous quantitative analysis. Qualitative methods include focus groups and inter-
views. This research method is concerned with phenomena relating to or involving 
quality; as an example, research investigating the reasons for human behaviour (i.e. 
people’s opinions and responses to certain things). Motivation research is an im-
portant type of qualitative research, which aims to discover the motives and desires 
of participants by using detailed interviews. Other such techniques are word associ-
ation tests, sentence completion tests, story completion tests and similar projective 
techniques (Gibbs, 1997). The following sections describe different qualitative and 
quantitative methods to evaluate security and usability of the proposed method. 
5.3 Security 
The methodology and research approach for security and usability design in 
computer science has been a widely discussed area. Many authors reported the 
benefits and limitations of various research approaches. Studies involving security 
analysis are logistically challenging in terms of accessing the actual resource assets 
for research and evaluation. Empirical studies are identified as useful techniques to 
evaluate security and usability of artefacts. Perry et al. (2000) state that an empirical 
study has a fundamental role in scientific research in software development, helping 
us understand how and why things work. However, Fléchais (2005) warns that real-
world empirical research in security design can be difficult logistically. This view is 
insightful, as those responsible for a real-world system would be reluctant to dis-
close their system security model and data for empirical evaluation. Nevertheless, 
empirical validation is essential to evaluate the security design of information sys-
tems.  
As discussed in the Chapter 2 literature review, security taxonomy covers areas in-
cluding confidentiality, authentication and authorisation. The premise of this 
research is, however, focused on authentication. Recall Chapter 3, which described 
security threats to online examinations. Chapter 4 introduced and developed the 
proposed method, and to validate the research work in this thesis, a relevant re-
search method is proposed to evaluate the security. Potter and McGraw (2004) 
proposed a “Risk-Based Security Test Approach” for risks and security evaluation. 
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They created use cases, listed normative security requirements and performed se-
curity risk analysis.  
5.3.1 Risk-Based Security Test Approach 
There are two methods to approach security testing: i) testing of functionality with 
standard security testing techniques, and ii) a risk-based security approach based 
on the threats, risk analysis and abuse cases. The risk-based security approach is a 
quantitative method, which provides rapid quantification of security-level risks asso-
ciated with processes (Ni et al., 2003). This method focuses on the testing of 
features and functions of artefacts based on the risk of their failure (McGraw, 2004). 
Some authors suggest that the risk model evaluates the importance of functions and 
the impact of their failure (Gerrard and Thompson, 2002, Bach, 2003). This view is 
helpful in understanding the impact of threats and security failures in the context of a 
system. Risk-based security testing identifies if the risks have been mitigated. The 
important risks are identified from architectural risk analysis, abuse cases, attack 
patterns and threat analysis. Based on the identified risks, tests are performed in 
three steps, i.e. plan, test and mitigate risks. Standard security techniques may not 
reveal all possible security issues; therefore, the risk-based security approach is 
used to evaluate the proposed challenge question approach  to mitigate the identi-
fied threats discussed in Chapter 3. The three steps of the risk-based security 
assessment method are described below. 
5.3.1.1 Plan 
A security test should be planned in a structured way to identify and mitigate poten-
tial threats. A test plan is organised, which combines multiple steps in order to 
identify the functions, risks and threats, and create abuse case scenarios. Descrip-
tions of the planning steps are presented below. 
 Identify Functions and Features: A conventional system translates business 
processes into functions and features based on a system design. At the outset, 
features and functions directly responsible for security are identified. The impact 
of these features on the secure assets is assessed. Users of the identified func-
tions and features are listed. 
In the context of this research the proposed challenge question approach  was 
designed and developed (see Chapter 4). Online learning and examinations are 
identified as important assets, and activities associated with them are essential 
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features and functions. Students, teachers and course administrators are 
identified as main users.  
 Identify Risks and Threats: Identification of risks and threats is a critical aspect 
of security testing. According to ISO, risk is a “probability of occurrence of harm 
and its effect on objectives” (Purdy, 2010). As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, 
risk comprises a combination of assets, threats and vulnerabilities (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p.5-10). In an attempt to mitigate threats, it is essential to identify 
them in detail (Jung et al., 1999). The threat analysis presented in Chapter 3 
identified potential threats which risk the security of online examinations. This 
described a number of threats including intrusion, non-intrusion, collusion and 
non-collusion. This research will focus on collusion attacks and evaluate the se-
curity by creating abuse case scenarios in the context of online examinations.  
 Creating Security Abuse Use Cases: McGraw (2004) states that thinking like 
an attacker is essential to identify and analyse security threats. This informs the 
creation of abuse case scenarios or abuse use cases, which are created for 
identified risks and vulnerabilities. A use case is a user interaction with a system, 
and an abuse use case is staging a scenario by simulating attacks. A user role is 
played by an actor in a simulation scenario or a user himself in a real empirical 
study. It involves users interacting with system features and functions with a fo-
cus on identified threats. The abuse case scenarios do not work in isolation, and 
involve multiple users and interdependent functions. These scenarios are exe-
cuted and the impact is recorded to mitigate risks. This is an important aspect of 
research methodology, which provides a basis for the empirical studies dis-
cussed later in this thesis. 
5.3.1.2 Security Test 
The test plan identifies features and threats, and describes abuse cases. A security 
test is executed based on the abuse case scenarios created at the planning stage. It 
can be executed involving actors (users) performing the abuse case scenarios in a 
simulation or a real situation. Actors are provided guidance and a task execution 
plan before the actual test. The data from security tests is traced and recorded for 
evaluation purposes. Security analysis is performed on the data collected from the 
execution of abuse case scenarios in an attempt to investigate the impact of threats 
and vulnerabilities identified in risks and threats analysis.  
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Table 5-1 shows an overview of the risk-based security test. It will attempt to 
evalulate the challenge question approach  against the collusion threats, identified in 
Chapter 3, in an online learning enviornment. 
Table 5-1 Overview of the Risk-Based Security Test 
Actors Features and 
Functions 
Threats Abuse 
case 
scenarios 
Students 
Tutor 
Administrator 
Online learning (lessons, 
course content, assignments) 
Online examintions i.e. Quiz 
Collusion 
(identified in 
Chapter 3) 
Attack scenarios 
in online 
examinations 
(identified in 
Chapter 3) 
5.3.1.3 Mitigate Risks 
In response to the security analysis of the test (which was based on the abuse case 
scenarios), the security is reviewed. Threats uncovered in security analysis are 
mitigated and risks are reviewed. Adequate security controls are implemented to 
mitigate risks (Jones and Rastogi, 2004). This is an iterative process, and in order to 
confirm that risks are mitigated, another iteration of the security test is planned. 
5.3.2 Focus Group 
Research designed to investigate people’s opinions, attitudes, or what individuals or 
groups think about a particular subject or institution is also qualitative research. This 
approach is particularly important in a situation where the aim is to discover the un-
derlying motives of human behaviour. This thesis adopted the focus group 
qualitative research technique. Several definitions for focus groups are available in 
the literature, i.e. collective activity (Powell and Single, 1996), organised discussion 
(Kitzinger, 1995), and social events and interaction (Goss and Leinbach, 1996). 
According to Powell et al. (1996), a group of representative individuals are chosen 
and gathered by researchers to discuss their personal experience and comment on 
the topic under research. This is a form of group interview performed collectively, at 
the same time, with a focus on questions and responses between researchers, 
moderators and participants. However, it relies upon interaction with the group on 
the subject under research. The primary objective of a focus group is to draw upon 
respondents’ behaviour, beliefs, feelings, experiences and reactions in such a way 
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that would not be feasible using other research techniques. Individuals in a group 
may have partially independent opinions, attitudes, feelings and beliefs; however, 
these are likely to be revealed via the social gathering and the interaction which be-
ing in a focus group entails.  
The focus group has been used to collect data, views and opinions of online pro-
gramme tutors on various threats to online examinations, and the proposed 
challenge question approach, which is discussed later in this thesis. 
5.4 Usability 
The importance of usability for secure systems is discussed in Chapter 2. Usability 
is essential in the design of authentication methods (Braz and Robert, 2006). Au-
thentication mechanisms may fail to protect digital assets if users are unable to use 
them correctly. This research will approach usability in the context of authentication 
and online examination systems.  
The discussion in Chapter 2 (literature review) suggests that usability and security 
are important and inter-related. Security experts emphasise the use of secure meth-
ods, whereas usability experts suggest “easy to use” methods. A Usability test and 
system usability questionnaire is selected for evaluating the usability of the pro-
posed challenge questions method. These approaches are described in the 
following sections. 
5.4.1 Usability Testing Approach 
The literature review in Chapter 2 established the importance of usability for a se-
cure authentication method. An effective means of ensuring usability of a secure 
system is periodic usability testing and evaluation. It is a method of usability inspec-
tion, which tends to focus on the interaction between humans and computers (Corry 
et al., 1997). Using this approach, usability goals are set at the design stage and 
evaluated with the involvement of active evaluators and system users. The repre-
sentative users work on typical tasks using the system or a prototype. This approach 
allows testing of the attributes of prototypes and the final product, even if it is not 
ready yet. The evaluators use the results to see how the system supports users to 
perform their tasks. 
Dumas and Redish (1999) described the following characteristics of usability testing: 
1) Improve usability: The primary goal of usability testing is to improve the usa-
bility of a system. Another goal is to improve the process of product design. 
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For each test you have specific goals which might be different from other 
tests.  
2) Real users: The participants performing the usability testing should represent 
real users in various roles.  
3) Real tasks: The participants performing the usability testing should undertake 
real tasks.  
4) Record Data: The evaluator records and observes the test activities. 
5) The evaluator analyses the data, diagnoses the issues, recommends chang-
es and applies fixes. 
In the context of this research, the usability test characteristics described above are 
translated into the following: 
1) The usability test goals, in the context of this research, are to evaluate usabil-
ity attributes, efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed challenge 
questions method. 
2) User roles associated with the proposed challenge questions method are stu-
dent, tutor and course administrator.  
3) The system tasks are user interactions with challenge questions during learn-
ing and examination processes. 
4) The data associated with users’ activities and challenge questions is recorded 
in a database. The researcher records data and observes the usability test. 
5) The data collected from the usability testing is analysed towards the end of 
each empirical study. 
The usability attributes associated with this research are based on ISO/9241-11 
(2003), which includes efficiency and effectiveness. 
5.4.2 Usability Evaluation Scale 
According to Molich et al. (2004), the effectiveness of a usability test is dependent 
upon the chosen tasks, the methodology and the people in charge of the test. Sauro 
and Kindlund (2005) state that customers or users of processes define what is an 
acceptable level of quality for any measure of a process. They state that acceptable 
levels of usability goals are relative and may change for different systems. As an ex-
ample, the state of being 99% error free is not good enough for critical functions 
such as nuclear plants. However, based on the literature review discussed in Chap-
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ter 3, designers of text-based challenge questions may anticipate errors. It is im-
portant to determine the acceptable level of usability for the proposed method. Bang 
et al. (2009), using the standard letter grade scale, proposed that products that 
scored in the 90s, 80s and 70s were exceptional, good and acceptable, respectively. 
Anything below a 70 had usability issues that were a cause for concern. This scale 
is adopted for evaluation of usability attributes later in this thesis. 
5.4.3 Questionnaire 
The survey is a widely used method to collect representative user feedback and per-
formance associated with a prototype system (Preece et al., 2002, Gable, 1994). 
The questionnaire is one of the most effective survey techniques used for data col-
lection and feedback. In this research, online web questionnaires are used to collect 
participants’ feedback on different aspects of the challenge question approach.  
Online questionnaire survey tools are becoming increasingly popular for research in 
various fields. These are interactive and offer cost-effective, validated and fast re-
sults. The questionnaire’s scales, adopted for this research, are commonly used and 
recommended by researchers for usability analysis, as discussed later in this thesis. 
5.5 Empirical Evaluation 
Six studies were conducted to build up the knowledge necessary for this research. 
These studies include five empirical enquiries and a focus group session listed be-
low: 
 Empirical Study 1 (Text-Based Questions) 
 Empirical Study 2 (Text-Based and Image-Based Questions) 
 Empirical Study 3 (Impersonation and Text-Based Questions) 
 Empirical Study 4 (Impersonation and Dynamic Profile Questions) 
 Study 5 (Focus Group with Online Programme Tutors) 
 Empirical Study 6 (Dynamic Profile Questions and Remote Proctoring) 
5.6 Ethical Considerations 
According to the University of Hertfordshire Policy and Regulations (UPR RE01), all 
empirical studies involving human subjects require ethical approval from the relevant 
ethics committee before the studies are undertaken. The policy describes the need 
for ethical approval and identifies the Ethics Committee with Delegated Authority 
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(ECDA). The respective designated committee for ethics considers requests in the 
relevant disciplinary area. The committee requires complete information, including 
empirical study design, number of participants, information sought, data capture 
details and survey questionnaires (if required).  
In relation to this research, ethical approvals were sought from the Ethical 
Committee for the Faculty of Science, Technology and Creative Arts. The approved 
protocols and pertinent studies are listed below in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Research Studies Ethical Approvals 
Research Study Protocol Ref Date 
Empirical Study 1 1112/63 01/03/2012 
Empirical Study 2 1213/05 30/10/2012 
Empirical Study 3 COM/PGR/UH/02006 22/10/2015 
Empirical Study 4 COM/PG/UH/00041 14/11/2013 
Study 5 Focus Session COM/PG/UH/00059 06/08/2014 
Empirical Study 6 COM/PGR/UH/02006 22/10/2015 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter described the research methods and methodology used to approach 
the research problems. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are used 
in this thesis. The justification and description of a risk-based research method is 
provided, along with how the abuse case scenarios are used to investigate security 
of the proposed challenge questions method. The usability test method is described, 
as well as how it will approach the usability analysis of the proposed method.  
An initial prototype of the proposed method was developed to conduct the first em-
pirical study in order to investigate usability attributes. The next chapter will report 
the study, which was conducted using research methods described in the current 
chapter. 
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6 Study 1 – Text-Based Challenge Questions 
This chapter presents the first empirical study using an initial prototype of the 
proposed challenge question approach . The study aims to collect the benchmark 
data from evaluation of the usability and security of text-based questions in a simu-
lation environment. The chapter describes the purpose, research questions, 
hypothesis and research method. The following sections explain participants’ re-
cruitment, design of a simulation online course and quiz, and study phases to 
describe how the problem was approached. This includes an abuse case scenario, 
in which a friend or colleague attempts to impersonate a student by guessing an-
swers to his text-based challenge questions. Finally, the chapter reports usability 
and security results. 
6.1 Purpose 
This is an exploratory study which aims to investigate the usability and security of 
text-based challenge questions. As described in Chapter 4, text-based questions are 
associated with individual personal information, contact and academic details. Some 
earlier studies (Just and Aspinall, 2009c, Just, 2004) identified usability as one of the 
major issues with the use of challenge questions. As discussed in Chapter 2, usabil-
ity analysis is important in evaluating how effectively security measures can be 
implemented. The common attributes defined by the International Organization for 
Standards (ISO) (ISO9241-11, 1998) which contribute to usability include efficiency 
and effectiveness. Efficiency is a usability metric, which can be evaluated by meas-
uring the completion time of each task and sub-task separately (Seffah et al., 2001). 
Effectiveness is considered to be the degree of accuracy of participants’ responses.  
Previous research suggests that challenge questions can be vulnerable to guessing 
attacks by adversaries, acquaintances, friends and colleagues (Schechter et al., 
2009, Just and Aspinall, 2009b). Just and Aspinall (2009c) described guessing in 
three categories: blind guessing, focused guessing and observation. Schechter 
(2009) investigated guessing attacks by acquaintances and statistical guessing in 
the context of credential recovery to evaluate the security of challenge questions. 
Therefore, this study investigates the security of challenge questions when a friend 
or colleague attempts to impersonate a student using a guessing attack. The 
purpose of this study was: 
1. To analyse the usability attributes, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness, of text-
based challenge quesitons.  
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2. To analyse impersonation by friends and colleagues using a guessing abuse 
case scenario.  
6.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions identified in Chapter 1 are cascaded into more questions 
associated with the usability of text-based challenge questions. The research 
question RQ 3) is associated with the usability attributes of efficiency and 
effectiveness of the proposed method. The research question RQ 4) is associated 
with the security of the proposed method. This study attempted to answer the 
following research questions, which were derived from RQ 3a) and RQ 4a): 
RQ 6.1) How efficient are text-based challenge questions when implemented for 
the authentication of students in online examinations? 
RQ 6.2) How effective are text-based challenge questions when implemented for 
the authentication of students in online examinations? 
RQ 6.3) How can the text-based challenge questions mitigate impersonation by 
friends and colleagues using guessing attacks in online examinations? 
The following hypotheses were framed to answer the above research questions. 
Each hypothesis is mapped to a corresponding research question: 
H 6.1) Text-based challenge questions are efficient when implemented for the 
authentication of students in online examinations. 
H 6.2) Text-based challenge questions are effective when implemented for the 
authentication of students in online examinations. 
H 6.3) Text-based challenge questions mitigate impersonation by friends and 
colleagues using guessing attacks in online examinations. 
6.3 Study Method and Design 
The usability test and risk-based security assessment methods described in Chapter 
5 were implemented to evaluate usability attributes and guessing attacks in a simu-
lation online course. The usability test is a usability inspection method, which tends 
to focus on the interaction between humans and computers (Corry et al., 1997). Us-
ing this method, the representative users (i.e. students) interact with online learning 
and examinations using text-based challenge questions for authentication. The us-
er’s response time to challenge questions was used to evaluate efficiency. The 
usability evaluation scale described in Chapter 5 (see section 5.2.1) was used to 
translate the effectiveness analysis. This scale translates the usability of products in 
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the 90s as exceptional, 80s as good, 70s as acceptable and anything below 70s in-
dicates issues that are a cause for concern (Bangor et al., 2009). 
The risk-based security assessment approach focuses on the test of features and 
functions of artefacts based on the risk of their failure using abuse case scenarios 
(McGraw, 2004). An abuse case scenario was simulated to analyse whether friends 
or colleagues could impersonate students by guessing their text-based challenge 
questions. 
The structure of text-based challenge questions, online course, examination and 
study phases are described in the following sections. 
6.3.1 Text-Based Questions Design 
A total of 20 text-based questions were created for this study, which are presented 
later in the results section. The study implemented fixed type questions and free text 
answers, as described in Chapter 4. These questions were classified into five differ-
ent themes, i.e. academic, personal, favourite, contact, and date. Questions in the 
academic and contact themes were based on the University of Hertfordshire under-
graduate admission form. Questions in the personal and favourite themes were 
copied from security questions used by Google, Microsoft, AOL and Yahoo 
(Schechter et al., 2009).  
6.3.2 Simulating Study Phases 
The study was organised into multiple phases, including participant recruitment, ini-
tial configuration, registration, learning, examination, traffic light access control 
system and performing a guessing abuse case scenario. These phases are de-
scribed in more detail below: 
 Simulation Online Course: A simulation online course was created and de-
ployed in MOODLE Learning Management System (LMS). Since this was a 
simulation course, only guidance notes were presented as course content. A 
simulation quiz was also created.  
 Participants Recruitment: A total of 23 participants were recruited from the 
University of Hertfordshire in Hatfield, UK, and the Institute of Management Sci-
ences in Peshawar, Pakistan. They were already enrolled in undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes in their respective institutions. Correspondence with 
participants was performed via email. They were provided with a design and 
guidance notes describing the aims and objectives of the study. To motivate par-
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ticipants, they were invited to attend a free “PHP & MySQL” online course sub-
ject to completion of the simulation. 
 Initial Configuration: An initial setup was required to assign values to configu-
rable variables of the challenge questions method. A total of 20 text-based 
questions, described above, were uploaded to MOODLE. The number of profile 
questions presented during the learning process was set to 3 in order to collect 
more data for analysis without causing fatigue in participants. Similarly, the num-
ber of challenge questions presented during the examination process was set to 
3. Bruce (2007) recommended that asking multiple challenge questions for au-
thentication improves security. A traffic light access control system was 
implemented to determine authentication on the basis of total number of correct 
answers to challenge questions. This was implemented to relax the authentica-
tion constraints. The following traffic light configuration was defined: 
1. Condition-1 Red: If the number of correct answers to challenge questions 
was 0 out of 3, the participant was locked out and access to the online exam-
ination was denied. This condition was classified as red.  
2. Condition-2 Amber: If the number of correct answers to challenge questions 
was 1 out of 3, the participant was presented with more challenge questions 
to re-authenticate iteratively. This condition was classified as amber. 
3. Condition-3 Green: If the number of correct answers to challenge questions 
was 2 or 3 out of 3, the participant was authenticated and access to the 
online examination granted. This condition was classified as green. 
 Registration: The study started from the registration phase, followed by learning 
and examination phases, which are described later. The registration was a 
standard MOODLE sign-up process, which was essential to create login creden-
tials to access the simulation online course. Upon successful registration, 
participants received their login-identifier and password. The course was availa-
ble to registered users only. 
 Online Learning: In a practical scenario, it is anticipated that a student will ac-
cess an online course multiple times in order to complete the course work. To 
simulate the learning process, participants were required to access the course 
for a period of one month with a minimum three-day gap between each visit. The 
following steps were performed in the online learning phase:  
1. Participants accessed the online course using their login-identifier and pass-
word. 
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2. On each visit, participants were required to provide answers to three profile 
questions in order to access the simulation course. This helped to collect suf-
ficient data for the preliminary analysis.  
3. Profile questions and their answers were stored in the database to build and 
consolidate participants’ profiles. 
 Online Examination: On completion of the learning phase, participants were 
emailed and advised to access the simulation quiz. There was an intervening pe-
riod of 30 days between learning and examination phases. The following steps 
were simulated in the online examination phase: 
1. Participants accessed the course using their login-identifier and password, 
and attempted to access the simulation quiz. 
2. In order to access the quiz, participants were required to authenticate their 
identity and provide answers to three challenge questions randomly present-
ed from their profiles.  
 Using the Traffic Light Access Control System: Authentication was per-
formed using the equality algorithm, i.e. a string-to-string comparison of answers 
(Schechter et al., 2009). To compare the data of the authentication process us-
ing the traffic light access control, it was disabled in the first authentication 
attempt. Participants were granted access to the quiz when answers to all their 
three challenge questions were correct. In all subsequent visits, the traffic light 
access control was enabled, as described above in the initial configuration. 
 Security Abuse Case: A follow-up study was conducted for security assess-
ment. An abuse case scenario was performed to examine the challenge 
question approach  when a friend or colleague attempts impersonation using 
guessing attacks. The following steps were performed to simulate the abuse 
case scenario: 
1. Participants were asked to identify their friends and colleagues who partici-
pated in the previous phases of the study. Of the total 23 participants, 6 
identified their friends and colleagues.  
2. Participants were paired up with their friends and colleagues in order to im-
personate a friend’s account. 
3. Fictitious passwords were created for all 6 participants in the abuse case 
scenario. The login-identifiers and passwords of friends and colleagues were 
amended for privacy reasons and shared with their pairs for impersonation.  
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4. Participants accessed the simulation course, each using their pair’s login-
identifier and password. 
5. In an attempt to impersonate, participants were required to answer challenge 
questions on behalf of their pair. Participants were encouraged to guess an-
swers to challenge questions. Results of authentication attempts were not 
revealed to participants and stored in the database for security analysis. The 
traffic light access control was enabled using the conditions outlined above in 
the initial configuration. 
6.4 Usability Results 
A total of 23 participants completed the initial registration. 18 participants completed 
the learning phase and answered 274 profile questions. A total of 13 participants 
answered 66 challenge questions during authentication in the online examination 
phase.  
The usability results presented here are extracted from the data collected during 
participants’ interactions with the online learning and examination phases discussed 
above. Participants submitted 38 (58%) correct answers in authentication, whereas 
28 (42%) were incorrect due to various usability issues discussed below. The effi-
ciency and effectiveness analyses are presented below. 
6.4.1 Efficiency 
Efficiency was analysed using data collected from participants’ answers to profile 
questions in the learning phase. To examine the efficiency of the challenge question 
approach, the “completion time” and “answer length” of answers to profile questions 
were measured. Table 6-1 shows the mean score and standard deviation (SD) of the 
completion time and answer length variables. The correlation analysis of the two 
variables was measured to analyse any relation between a user’s response and an-
swer length. A Pearson Correlation was computed to examine the relationship 
between the “completion time” and the “answer length”. The Pearson r = 0.152; p = 
0.01 indicates a significant correlation between the two variables for n = 274. The 
small value of r = 0.152 suggests that there were other intervening variables affect-
ing the completion time, however, these are not covered in this study. The efficiency 
of questions classified in various themes is discussed below. 
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Table 6-1 Usability Analysis: Efficiency of Text-Based Questions 
Question Themes Completion Time  
(seconds) 
Answer Length 
(characters) 
Academic Questions Mean SD Mean SD 
Find out about this course 14.14 7.98 7.0 6.11 
Student number 14.55  8.52 3.0 2.9 
Name of last school attended 14.60 6.67 14.86 9.38 
Grades in highest qualification 15.14 6.29 2.0 2.47 
Year of highest qualification 15.20 7.16 4.0 0 
Month started the current course 15.61 8.06 5.0 2.03 
Year started the current course 16.18 8.98 4.29 1.07 
Highest qualification 16.93 6.80 9.40 8.47 
Personal Questions 
Father’s surname 13.55 8.76 4.71 1.26 
Country of birth 13.78 7.25 7.20 1.37 
Best friend’s surname 14.47 6.95 5.79 2.57 
Dream job as a child 18.03 8.65 9.85 5.24 
Favourite Questions 
Hero of your childhood 14.70 5.94 11.71 5.31 
Tutor  15.06 8.13 8 3.48 
Module on this course 18.34 9.8 7.5 5 
Contact Questions 
Home tel. no. with country code 15.73 8.78 10.60 3 
Home address town 16.83 9.36 15 13.75 
House name or number 17.18 7.8 19.58 18.55 
Mobile number with country code 17.43 8.98 11.69 1.43 
Date Questions 
Date of birth 16.42 6.75 6.36 3.91 
Academic Questions: The relevance of questions to individuals is an important fac-
tor to inform efficiency. The completion time for academic questions that were 
relevant to users was short. For example, the completion time of answers to profile 
questions “Where did you find out about this course”, “Student number” and “Last 
school attended” was the shortest in the academic theme with a mean completion 
time of 14.14, 14.55 and 14.60 seconds, respectively, which indicates that relevance 
of questions has an influence on efficiency. 
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Providing hints and examples has been a useful and standard practice to enhance 
usability. Answer hint is another factor which may contribute to enhanced efficiency. 
The findings indicate that questions with embedded answer hints were answered in 
a short time. For example, the profile question “Where did you find out about this 
course” was answered in the shortest completion time, i.e. 14.4 seconds. It was pre-
sented with an answer hint, i.e. “Friend, Internet”, to help participants understand the 
context of the question. Although the completion time was efficient, detailed analysis 
of data revealed that 78% of the answers were identical and selected from the an-
swer hint “Friend, Internet”, which can be usable, but may lead to security risks.  
The use of both abbreviations and long descriptions in answers can translate into 
usability challenges. It was noted that in spite of efficient completion time, i.e. 14.60 
seconds, the length of answers to the question “Name of last school attended” was 
the largest for any question in the academic theme. To account for the length, further 
exploration revealed that 44% of the answers were abbreviations and 56% full 
school names; long school names resulted in increased answer length. Questions 
inviting long descriptive answers may have a longer completion time. This may also 
trigger memorability issues at a later stage during authentication. 
Question clarity is another important factor which influences efficiency. Ambiguous 
and unclear questions may take extra time to answer and also frustrate users. As an 
example, answers to the profile question “Grades in highest qualification” were 
completed in 15.14 seconds. This was the longest completion time for the shortest 
answer length, i.e. a mean 2 characters. Such questions may also stimulate the 
thinking process to recall the correct grades. The question did not explicitly describe 
the grade type, which resulted in variations in answers. Detailed sorting of answers 
revealed that participants submitted different grade types (letters, percentage and 
description). 64% of answers contained letters, e.g. “A, A*, A+”, 22% contained per-
centages (%) and 14% contained descriptive text. 
As discussed above, question context and relevance to individuals is also an im-
portant factor for usability. For example, the profile question “In which month did you 
start the current course” was completed in 15.61 seconds. Detailed analysis of an-
swers revealed that participants in this study were originally enrolled on different 
courses and programmes at their respective institutions. The question in the context 
of this study using a simulation course needed further clarity and participants were 
not clear that the “current course” referred to the simulation course, which contribut-
ed to a longer response time. Of the total answers to this question, 50% were 
incorrect. A similar response was noted to the profile question “Year started current 
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course”, with a mean completion time of 16.18 seconds. Detailed analysis of an-
swers revealed 28% “incorrect year” or unrealistic answers.  
Personal Questions: Questions in this theme were associated with an individual’s 
personal information. These questions are widely used and researched by AOL, Ya-
hoo, Google and Microsoft (Schechter et al., 2009). Given the increased use of 
personal questions, this was anticipated to be more usable than other themes. The 
findings indicate shorter completion time, which shows better efficiency. For exam-
ple, the mean completion times of answers to the profile questions “Father’s 
surname”, “Country of birth” and “Best friend’s surname” were 13.55, 13.78 and 
14.47 seconds, respectively, with answer length of 4.71, 7.20 and 5.79 characters. 
Personal questions requesting subjective information from the past resulted in a 
longer completion time. As an example, the profile question “Dream job as child” re-
sulted in a longer completion time and answer length – 18.03 seconds and 9.85 
characters. Mean completion time of all questions in the personal theme was 14.89 
seconds.  
Favourite Questions: Questions in this theme have been widely used for credential 
recovery (Schechter et al., 2009). The majority of favourite questions collect subjec-
tive information, which may change over time. For example, a student may have 
more than one favourite tutor. These questions need careful consideration at the de-
sign stage. Questions in this theme resulted in better response times. The 
completion times of the questions “Hero of childhood” and “Tutor” were 14.70 and 
15.06 seconds, respectively. 
Findings in this theme reinforce the argument discussed in the previous section re-
garding the influence of a question’s context and relevance on usability. The mean 
completion time of answers to the question “Favourite module on this course” was 
18.03 seconds. The simulation course was not modular and the question lacked 
clarity. The analysis of data revealed that 47% of answers contained unrealistic an-
swers, i.e. “NA, Nil and Unknown”. However, this question was incorrect in this 
context. 
Contact Questions: Questions regarding contact information were created in a 
more generic way, in order to cover addresses for a wide range of participants in 
different geographic locations. However, this led to clarity issues. The mean comple-
tion times of answers to “Telephone number including country code” and “Address 
town” were 15.73 and 16.83 seconds respectively, with answer lengths of 10.60 and 
15 characters. Detailed analysis of answers to “Address town” revealed that 33% 
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contained “full address” and 67% “address town” or “city name”. The variation in an-
swers indicates ambiguity in the question, which may be difficult to recall during 
authentication.  
The mean completion time of answers to “House name or number” was 17.18 sec-
onds with the largest mean answer length of 19.58 characters. Analysis of the 
answers revealed that the generalisation of the question created ambiguity and an-
swer lengths contained large variations. Answers contained 42% “full home 
address”, 25% “house number”, 17% “home phone number”, 8% “house name” and 
8% “city name”.  
Findings revealed ambiguity in the questions designed in this theme, which may al-
so influence effectiveness negatively – to be discussed later in this chapter. 
Date Questions: Date is often presented and stored in varied formats. Without 
specifying a format, users may submit their answers in different formats, which can 
influence usability. Detailed analysis of answers to “Date of birth” revealed that open 
and varied “date” formats were used by participants, i.e. “dd/mm/yyyy”, “dd-mm-
yyyy“, and descriptive month name, e.g. “October 2012”. Using a standard date for-
mat can enhance the efficiency of date type questions. 
Summary of Efficiency: In summary, participants’ understanding of questions and 
their ability to answer realistically has an influence on efficiency. Questions with de-
sign flaws may result in distraction and trigger a longer response time, which 
negatively influences the overall efficiency of the challenge questions method. This 
may lead to usability issues at a later stage during online examinations, which is 
discussed below. Questions providing answer hints for more clarity resulted in effi-
cient completion time; however, this approach can create security risks, as will be 
discussed later. The results suggest that question design should consider clarity, 
ambiguity, syntax and relevance. The potential intervening factors that can negative-
ly influence completion time include typing speed, phone calls, question relevance to 
an individual, question ambiguity, personal breaks, Internet connection speed, sys-
tem shutdown, power outages, privacy concerns, etc. The mean completion time of 
all questions was 15.7 seconds per question. A participant was required to read a 
question and enter a text reply. This is considered to be a reasonable time, and a 
user could answer three questions within a mean time of 47.1 seconds (just under a 
minute). Based on the findings discussed above, the following hypothesis was ac-
cepted.  
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H 6.1) Text-based challenge questions are efficient when implemented for the 
authentication of students in online examination. Accepted 
6.4.2 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is considered to be the degree of accuracy of participants’ responses. 
In the context of this study, it means that participants were able to submit correct 
answers during authentication effectively with a low error rate. It was analysed using 
data collected from participants’ answers during the online examination phase. The 
questions were divided into five common themes: academic, personal, contact, fa-
vourites and date. As discussed earlier, the equality algorithm was implemented for 
the comparison of answers. Results were also analysed to understand the impact on 
effectiveness of a more relaxed algorithm being implemented.  
The results of the relaxed algorithm were derived from the data collected in the 
online examination, disregarding capitalisation, white-spaces and minor spelling er-
rors using a combination of substring and distance algorithms as described in an 
earlier study (Schechter et al., 2009). Table 6-2 shows analysis of data using the 
equality and relaxed algorithms. Data in columns 5 and 6 presented in boldface 
shows an increase in effectiveness when results were computed using the relaxed 
algorithm. In order to test the significance of any differences in the means of correct 
answers between different themes, a one-way ANOVA test of significance was per-
formed on data shown in Table 6-2. The results of this analysis showed that there 
were no significant differences in the means F = 1.93, p = 0.15 (p > 0.05), eta-
squared 2 = 0.32. Post hoc comparisons of the groupings yielded no significant re-
sults. Answers were submitted by all participants during authentication prior to 
accessing to the online examination. Challenge questions were presented randomly 
to participants to simulate a real authentication scenario. Therefore, the sample dis-
tribution was not uniform. The effectiveness of challenge questions in different 
themes is discussed below. 
Academic Questions: In a string-to-string comparison, reproducing the exact an-
swer is important. Syntax of questions can be an important factor to reproduce 
answers when a user is authenticated. As discussed in the preceding section, it was 
anticipated that questions with an answer hint would be easy to recall during authen-
tication. The challenge question “Where did you find out about this course” received 
2 (67%) correct answers. Detailed analysis of answers revealed that 1 (33%) an-
swer was penalised for syntactic variation. 
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Table 6-2 Usability Analysis: Effectiveness of Text-Based Questions 
Question Themes Effectiveness 
Academic Questions N
2
 Equality Algo-
rithm 
Relaxed Algo-
rithm
1 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Student number 1 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 
Year started the current course 3 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 
Year of highest qualification 4 3(75%) 1(25%) 3(75%) 1(25%) 
Highest qualification 4 3(75%) 1(25%) 4(100%) 0(0%) 
Find out about this course 3 2(67%) 1(33%) 2(67%) 1(33%) 
Name of last school attended 5 3(60%) 2(40%) 4(80%) 1(20%) 
Grades in highest qualification 2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%) 
Month started the current course 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 
Total 15(65%) 8(35%) 18(78%) 5(22%) 
Personal Questions 
Best friend’s surname 6 6(100%) 0(0%) 6(100%) 0(0%) 
Country of birth 4 4(100%) 0(0%) 4(100%) 0(0%) 
Father’s surname 3 2(67%) 1(33%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 
Dream job as a child 2 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 
Total 13(87%) 2(13%) 
15(100
%) 
0(0%) 
Favourite Questions 
Tutor 6 1(17%) 5(83%) 5(83%) 1(17%) 
Hero of your childhood 3 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 
Module on this course 3 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%) 
Total 4(33%) 8(67%) 8(67%) 4(33%) 
Contact Questions 
Home Tel no with country code 2 1(50%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 
Home address town 4 1(25%) 3(75%) 2(50%) 2(50%) 
House name or number 4 0(0%) 4(100%) 1(25%) 3(75%) 
Mobile no. with country code 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Total 2(18%) 9(82%) 4(36%) 7(64%) 
Date Questions 
Date of birth 5 4(80%) 1(20%) 5(100%) 0(0%) 
Grand Total 66 38(58%) 28(42%) 50(76%) 16(24%) 
1
 Disregard capitalisation, whitespace and minor spelling errors 
2
 Number of Challenge Questions 
Question clarity, reported in the previous section, also has an impact on recall, when 
a user is required to reproduce the same answer during authentication. The chal-
lenge question “Month started current course” received 2 (100%) incorrect answers. 
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As reported in the efficiency results, the question was not relevant in the context of a 
simulation course, which led to usability issues. Questions reported with clarity is-
sues in the efficiency analysis translated into poor effectiveness.  
Using the equality algorithm, challenge questions in the academic theme received 
15 (65%) correct answers. However, there is potential to further improve this by ad-
dressing the issues reported here.  
The number of correct answers may improve if issues such as syntactic variation 
and capitalisation are addressed using a relaxed algorithm for answer comparison. 
Analysis of data revealed that a more relaxed algorithm increased the effectiveness 
of questions in the academic theme by 13%. Of the incorrect answers, 3 were penal-
ised for capitalisation, spelling mistakes and spacing, factors which could be 
addressed by using a relaxed algorithm. Implementation of a relaxed algorithm de-
creased error rate and increased effectiveness to 18 (75%).  
Personal Questions: Questions regarding personal information are more memora-
ble and therefore widely used for credential recovery (Schechter et al., 2009). Some 
challenge questions in the personal theme are reported with better effectiveness. 
The challenge questions “Best friend’s surname” and “Country of birth” received 
100% correct answers during authentication.  
Syntactic variations including capitalisation, spacing, spellings and writing syntax 
can affect the usability of challenge questions. Answers with syntactic variation were 
lexicographically correct; however, in using a string-to-string comparison such an-
swers were penalised during authentication.  
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions in the personal theme received 
13 (87%) correct answers. The use of the relaxed algorithm increased effectiveness 
in the personal theme by 13%. Manual sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers 
were penalised for capitalisation and spacing, which could be addressed by using a 
relaxed algorithm. Implementation of the relaxed algorithm decreased the error rate 
and increased the effectiveness to 15 (100%). 
Favourite Questions: Questions in the favourite theme are a subset of personal 
questions, which are associated with an individual’s favourites. Some questions per-
taining to favourites can be easy to recall. For example, the challenge question 
“(Favourite) hero of childhood” received 3 (100%) correct answers. This was also 
reported as efficient in the previous section. 
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As discussed earlier, syntactic variation can increase the usability challenges. The 
question “(Favourite) tutor” received 1 (17%) correct answer. The analysis revealed 
that 80% of answers were lexicographically correct; however, they were penalised 
for syntactic variations as described above. Similarly, the challenge question “(Fa-
vourite) module on this course” was also reported with 0 (0%) correct answers. The 
analysis revealed that participants produced entirely different answers from those 
registered in the learning phase. This was due to clarity issues described in the effi-
ciency analysis, and the difficulty for participants to recall and reproduce the 
registered answers.  
Using the equality algorithm, challenge questions in the favourite theme received 4 
(33%) correct answers. The relaxed algorithm increased effectiveness by 32%. 
Manual sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers were penalised for capitalisation, 
which could be addressed by using the relaxed algorithm. The implementation of the 
relaxed algorithm decreased the error rate and increased effectiveness to 8 (66%). 
Contact Questions: The ambiguous questions identified in the efficiency analysis 
had a knock-on effect and negatively influenced effectiveness. The challenge ques-
tions “Address town” and “House name or number” received 1 (25%) and 0 (0%) 
correct answers, respectively. The syntactic variation presented in the efficiency 
analysis increased the difficulty for participants to reproduce the exact answers in 
the authentication phase.   
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions in the contact theme received 
2 (18%) correct answers. Questions in the contact theme were also reported to have 
efficiency issues in the preceding section, which negatively influenced effectiveness. 
The use of a relaxed algorithm increased the effectiveness of questions in the con-
tact theme by 18%. Manual sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers were 
penalised for spelling mistakes, which could be addressed by using a relaxed algo-
rithm. The implementation of the relaxed algorithm decreased error rate and 
increased the overall effectiveness in the contact theme to 4 (36%).   
Date Questions: The challenge question “Date of birth” received 4 (80%) correct 
answers during authentication. Syntactic variation in the date format was reported in 
the efficiency analysis. There was 1 incorrect answer as a result of syntactic varia-
tion in the date format.  
Using the equality algorithm, challenge questions in the date theme received 80% 
correct answers; however, it increased to 100% using a relaxed algorithm. 
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Summary of Effectiveness: In summary, the mean of correct responses to all 
questions was 58% using the equality algorithm. This increased to 76% using the 
relaxed algorithm. In an earlier study conducted by Schechter (2009) and sponsored 
by the Microsoft corporation, participants answered 76% of their challenge questions 
in a laboratory-based environment with 24% incorrect answers. In another study, 
Just and Aspinall (2009b) reported 18% incorrect answers in the space of 23 days. 
Research indicates that challenge questions are fraught with memorability issues 
and users cannot reproduce 100% exact answers to all their questions. 
Results of this empirical study also revealed 42% incorrect answers citing usability 
issues. The results showed that the questions with more clarity were effective. 
Questions with low clarity, ambiguity and format issues had poor efficiency, which 
negatively influenced the effectiveness in the authentication phase. The effective-
ness of questions increased from 38 (58%) to 50 (76%) when using the relaxed 
algorithm to compensate for capitalisation, spacing and spelling mistakes. A paired-
sample t-test was performed to compare the mean of correct answers using equality 
and relaxed algorithms. There was a significant difference in correct answers be-
tween the equality algorithm (M = 53.3, SD = 39.2) and relaxed algorithm (M = 71.5, 
SD = 37.5) conditions; t (19) = -2.9, p = 0.007 (p < 0.01).  
According to the usability scale presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) and letter 
grades (i.e. 70-79% acceptable, 80-89% good, +90% exceptional) described by 
(Bangor et al., 2009), 76% correct answers using a relaxed algorithm is acceptable 
effectiveness for text-based challenge questions. Similarly, the use of the equality 
algorithm shows usability issues. Based on the above findings, the following hypoth-
esis was rejected when the equality algorithm (a string-to-string comparison) was 
implemented. However, it was accepted when a relaxed algorithm was implement-
ed. 
H 6.2) Text-based challenge questions are effective when implemented for the 
authentication of students in online examination.  
Accepted – relaxed algorithm; Rejected – equality algorithm 
In concluding this section, it is noted that question design needs particular consider-
ation to address clarity, ambiguity and relevance. Question design has an important 
role in the usability of challenge questions. 
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6.4.2.1 Usability and Traffic Light System  
To address the usability challenges posed by the question design, a traffic light ac-
cess control system was implemented. It was based on the criteria outlined in the 
“initial configuration" above (section 6.3.2). The data presented in Table 6-4 was col-
lected from the implementation of the challenge questions method, with and without 
the traffic light access control system. Each participant was presented with 3 chal-
lenge questions in a single authentication attempt. The findings revealed that, before 
using the traffic light system, 23% of the participants submitted correct answers to 
all their 3 challenge questions and were authenticated successfully. Another 38% 
participants provided correct answers to 2 out of 3, and 31% to 1 out of 3 challenge 
questions. However, 8% provided no correct answers to any of their challenge ques-
tions in the online examination phase. The reasons for providing incorrect answers 
were discussed in the preceding section. Before using the traffic light system, the 
participants who failed to provide correct answers to all of their 3 challenge ques-
tions were locked out. The participants who provided correct answers to 1 or 2 of 
their 3 challenge questions (i.e. 31% + 38% = 69%) were also penalised before im-
plementation of the traffic light access control.  
Table 6-3 Results of Traffic Light Access Control System 
Authentication Before Traffic Light System 
Attempt 0/3 Correct 1/3 Correct 2/3 Correct 3/ 3 Correct 
1 1(8%) 4(31%) 5(38%) 3(23%) 
Authentication After Traffic Light System 
 Red Amber Green 
 0/3 Correct 1/3 Correct 2/3 Correct         or         3/3 Correct 
1 1(8%) 4(31%)  8(61%) 
2 0(0%) 2(12%)  3(19%) 
3 0(0%) 0(0%)  2(12%) 
 
Authentication results were changed after implementation of the traffic light access 
control. This method compensated for usability issues and improved authentication 
success rate. A summary of data collected ‘before’ and ‘after’ the traffic light imple-
mentation is presented in Table 6-3. The number of correct answers is presented 
against the number of authentication attempts. Overall, effectiveness has increased 
from 23% to 92% (61% + 19% + 12%).   
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The traffic light access control improved the effectiveness of the challenge question 
approach. However, it is important to consider the security implications when allow-
ing multiple attempts to users providing incorrect answers. 
6.5 Security Results 
In a follow-up security abuse case test, 6 participants submitted answers to 24 chal-
lenge questions in an attempt to impersonate their friends and colleagues. The 
security analysis presented here is based on the data from the security abuse case 
scenario described above in the study method. 
6.5.1 Impersonation and Guessing by Friends 
Tables 6-4 and 6-5 show an analysis of the impersonation and guessing abuse case 
scenario. A total of 6 participants made 9 attempts to impersonate their friends and 
colleagues, and guessed answers to challenge questions. They were allowed to per-
form multiple attempts using the traffic light access control criteria described above. 
Table 6-4 Abuse Case Scenario: Traffic Light system 
Participants Attempt Correct Incorrect Authentication 
P1 1st  0 3 Failed (Red) 
P2 1st  0 3 Failed (Red) 
P3 1st  0 3 Failed (Red) 
P4 1st 1 2 Repeat (Amber) 
P5 1st  1 2 Repeat (Amber) 
P6 1st  1 2 Repeat (Amber) 
P4 2nd  0 3 Failed (Red) 
P5 2nd  0 3 Failed (Red) 
Table 6-4 shows analysis of the abuse case scenario in terms of participants’ at-
tempts with traffic light access control using the equality algorithm. Of the 6 
participants, 3 (50%) failed to guess correct answers to any of their challenge ques-
tions on the 1st attempt and were classified as red. The remaining 3 (50%) 
participants guessed correct answers to 1 out of 3 challenge questions and were 
classified as amber. Of the 3 participants’ classified amber, 1 abandoned the pro-
cess and the remaining 2 completed the abuse case scenario. In the second 
attempt, 2 participants were presented with more challenge questions. They failed to 
guess correct answers to any of these questions. 
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Table 6-5 Security Analysis: Guessing Abuse Case Scenario 
Question Themes Security Abuse Case 
N Equality Algorithm Relaxed Algorithm 
Academic Questions Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Student number 1 0(0%)  1(100%) 0(0%)  1(100%) 
Year started the current course 3 0(0%)  3(100%) 2(75%)  1(25%) 
Year of highest qualification 1 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 
Highest qualification 2 0(0%)   2(100%) 0(0%)   2(100%) 
Find out about this course 0 *NA    *NA *NA    *NA 
Name of last school attended 2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%) 
Grades in highest qualification 2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%) 
Month started the current course 2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%) 
Total 1(8%) 12(92%) 3(23%) 10(77%) 
Personal Questions 
Best friend’s surname 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Country of birth 2 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 
Father’s surname 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 
Dream job as a child 0 *NA *NA *NA *NA 
Total 1(25%) 3(75%) 3(75%) 1(25%) 
Favourite Questions 
Tutor 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Hero of your childhood 0 *NA   *NA *NA   *NA 
Module on this course 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Total 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%) 
Contact Questions 
Home tel. no. with country code 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Home address town 1 0(0%)    1(100%) 0(0%)    1(100%) 
House name or number 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 
Mobile number including country 
code 
1 1(100%)    0(0%) 1(100%)    0(0%) 
Total 1(25%) 3(75%) 1(25%) 3(75%) 
Date Questions 
Date of birth 1 0(0%)    1(100%) 0(0%)    1(100%) 
Grand Total 24 3(12%) 21(88%) 7(29%) 17(71%) 
Table 6-5 shows the crosstab analysis of the abuse case scenario using the equality 
and relaxed algorithms. Data presented in boldface in columns 5 and 6 show 
changes to security level when results were computed using the relaxed algorithm. 
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Participants were presented 24 challenge questions randomly on behalf of their 
friends and colleagues. Using the equality algorithm, answers to 3 (13%) questions 
were successfully guessed by participants, whereas 21 (88%) answers were incor-
rect. The use of a relaxed algorithm increased the number of correct answers to 7 
(29%). The abuse case scenario is discussed below to examine challenge questions 
in different themes. 
Academic Questions: Participants submitted answers to 13 challenge questions in 
the academic theme and correctly guessed 1 (8%). It was anticipated that academic 
information would be known to friends and colleagues. However, findings of the 
abuse case test show that a large number of answers were incorrect. Answers to 
questions associated with the current course were anticipated to be the same for all 
participants. However, the questions “Year started current course” and “Month start-
ed current course” were guessed incorrectly in all attempts.  
The analysis shows an increase in correct answers to 3 (23%) when a relaxed algo-
rithm was used. This indicates that certain questions may be guessed by friends and 
colleagues in multiple attempts. A review of the academic questions is recommend-
ed to mitigate any risks. 
Personal Questions: It was anticipated that answers to some personal questions 
would be correctly guessed by friends and colleagues. Schechter et al. (2009) indi-
cate that personal information can be found on many social media websites. Of the 
4 challenge questions, participants guessed 1 (25%) answer correctly. However, the 
detailed sorting of answers revealed that some were penalised for capitalisation and 
spaces. The use of a relaxed algorithm increased correct answers to 3 (75%). Fur-
thermore, the analysis of registered answers to “Father’s surname” in the learning 
phase revealed that 64% of participants had the same surname as their fathers, 
which may be easily guessed by friends and colleagues. 
Favourite Questions: Participants submitted a total of 2 answers to challenge 
questions in the favourite theme. The number of questions presented in this theme 
was small due to randomisation.  
A review of security analysis for challenge questions in the favourite theme is rec-
ommended in future studies. 
Contact Questions: Participants submitted a total of 4 answers to challenge ques-
tions in the contact theme; 1 (25%) was guessed correctly.  
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It is likely that challenge questions relating to home address, phone or mobile num-
bers, and town can be easily guessed by friends and colleagues. The analysis of 
data in the contact theme shows that there was no change in results when a more 
relaxed algorithm was implemented. 
Date Questions: Participants submitted one answer to challenge questions in the 
date theme. Although “date of birth” is likely to be known to friends and colleagues, 
participants failed to guess a correct answer. 
The analysis of data in the date theme shows that there was no change in results 
when a more relaxed algorithm was implemented. 
Summary of Security Analysis: In summary, some questions in the personal and 
academic themes were correctly guessed. 3 (12%) answers were correctly guessed 
when the equality algorithm was used. This increased to 7 (29%) when a relaxed 
algorithm was used. The use of a traffic light access control system can increase 
usability; however, it may provide multiple opportunities to an attacker in a real sce-
nario. Implementation of the traffic light access control system shows a usability and 
security trade-off. A guessing attack with 71% error rate will alert the course admin-
istrator or trigger a process to block access to an attacker. To conclude this section, 
informed guessing by friends and colleagues was not highly successful; however, 
security analysis is warranted on a larger sample size. Also, questions in the do-
mains of the public, friends and colleagues may be vulnerable to guessing. Based 
on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was accepted.  
H 6.3) Text-based challenge questions can mitigate impersonation by friends 
and colleagues using a guessing attack in online examinations. Accept-
ed 
6.6 Summary 
The findings reported in this chapter suggest that challenge question-based authen-
tication in online examinations can be an effective feature to prevent the attacks of 
adversaries. However, usability and security issues were reported due to flaws in 
question design. Questions reported to have clarity, ambiguity, relevance and format 
issues negatively influenced the efficiency and effectiveness results. Participants 
failed to provide correct answers to challenge questions in the favourite and contact 
themes due to clarity issues reported earlier. Implementation of the relaxed algo-
rithm to compensate for capitalisation, spelling mistakes and spacing improved 
usability. The findings suggest that participants were unable to provide correct an-
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swers to all of their 3 challenge questions in a single attempt, due to usability issues 
such as syntactic variation and memorability. Implementation of a traffic light system 
improved the authentication outcome from 23% to 92%, by allowing multiple chanc-
es. However, during the abuse case scenario, the traffic light access control granted 
2 out of 6 attackers a second chance to answer more challenge questions in order 
to re-authenticate. Multiple attempts may encourage attackers to repeat the attack 
pattern, which needs to be addressed. 
The security analysis showed that participants guessed correct answers to some 
questions on behalf of their friends and colleagues because of poor question design. 
The findings revealed that answers to questions known to friends, colleagues and in 
common public knowledge can be a security risk. The overall results showed the 
potential of using challenge questions for the authentication of students in online 
examinations. However, secure and usable implementation of the challenge ques-
tions method relies upon the quality of question design.  
The study was conducted as a proof of concept on a small sample size, conducted 
in a simulation environment to collect the benchmark data. Virzi’s empirical study 
(1992) on the number of subjects for usability identification indicates that as few as 5 
users can identify 80% of the usability issues. However, conclusions cannot be 
drawn reliably for challenge questions in security analysis due to a small number of 
participants and, therefore, it is imperative to verify the security results in a real edu-
cational context on a larger sample size. In the next study, question design will be 
revised to address the issues identified in the current study. The next chapter will 
report an empirical study to investigate the usability attributes of text-based and im-
age-based questions in a real online course on a larger sample size. 
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7 Study 2 – Image-Based and Text-Based Challenge 
Questions 
The previous chapter described the first empirical study using an initial prototype, 
which identified a number of issues, including questions ambiguity, relevance, syn-
tactic variation, spellings and spacing. These issues negatively influenced the 
usability of text-based questions. In order to address these issues, an image-based 
challenge question approach is proposed and evaluated using a real online course. 
This chapter presents an empirical study to investigate the usability of text-based 
and image-based challenge questions. Furthermore, the chapter describes the 
purpose, research questions, hypotheses and research method. The following 
sections explain participants’ recruitment, the design of an online course, and study 
phases, in order to describe how the problem was approached and the online 
course conducted. The study involved remote online students from nine countries. 
Finally, the chapter reports the efficiency and effectiveness analysis of text-based 
and image-based questions. 
7.1 Purpose 
The previous study described in Chapter 6 indicated usability and security issues in 
the use of text-based challenge questions due to weak question design (Ullah et al., 
2014a). The study evaluated the usability attributes of efficiency and effectiveness. 
These are common attributes defined by the ISO, which contribute to usability 
(ISO9241-11, 1998).   
In response to the risks and usability issues indicated in Chapter 6, the design of 
text-based questions was revised and multiple-choice image-based questions intro-
duced for use in this study. Research indicates that humans are better at 
remembering images than text (Shepard, 1967). Image-based authentication has 
been adopted for a number of online services. For example, the Bank of America 
utilises a site key image combined with text-based challenge questions to authenti-
cate users (Youll, 2006). Renaud and Just (Renaud and Just, 2010) reported 
enhanced usability while using association-based image questions for authentication 
purposes. This study will investigate the following: 
1. The usability attributes, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness of text-based and 
image-based questions in an online examination context. 
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7.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions identified in Chapter 1 are cascaded into more questions 
associated with the usability attributes of efficiency and effectiveness using text-
based and image-based questions. The research question RQ 3) is associated with 
the usability attributes of the proposed method. This study attempts to answer the 
following research questions, which are derived from RQ 3a) and RQ 3b): 
RQ 7.1) How does an increase in the interaction with text-based and image-
based questions influence efficiency when implemented in an online 
learning and examinations context? 
RQ 7.2) How effective are text-based challenge questions when implemented for 
authentication in online examinations? 
RQ 7.3) How effective are multiple-choice image-based challenge questions 
when implemented for authentication in online examinations? 
The following hypotheses were framed to answer the above research questions. 
Each hypothesis maps to a corresponding research question: 
H 7.1) An increase in interaction with text-based and image-based questions in-
creases efficiency when implemented for authentication in online 
examinations. 
H 7.2) Text-based challenge questions are effective when implemented for au-
thentication of students in online examinations. 
H 7.3) Image-based challenge questions are effective when implemented for 
authentication of students in online examinations. 
7.3 Study Method and Design  
The usability test method described in Chapter 5 was used to evaluate the usability 
attributes of efficiency and effectiveness. It is a usability inspection method, which 
tends to focus on the interaction between humans and computers (Corry et al., 
1997). Using this method, the representative users (i.e. students) interact with online 
learning and examinations using text-based and image-based challenge questions 
for authentication. The usability evaluation scale described in Chapter 5 (section 
5.2.1) was used for the effectiveness analysis. This scale translates usability of 
products in the 90s as exceptional, 80s as good, 70s as acceptable and anything 
below 70s indicates issues that are a cause for concern (Bangor et al., 2009).  
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The study design and methodology was approved by the University of Hertfordshire 
research ethics committee. The design of an online course, text-based questions, 
image-based questions and study phases are described below. 
7.3.1 Text-Based and Image-Based Questions Design 
In order to address the usability issues indicated in the first study, text-based ques-
tions were revised and replaced with alternatives giving careful design consideration 
to mitigate ambiguity and clarity issues (Ullah et al., 2014a). 31 text-based questions 
were designed and classified into 4 themes: academic, favourite, personal, and date 
as shown in Appendix A-I and presented in Table 7-2 below. 
  
Figure 7-1 Example of Image-based Questions 
Image-based questions were introduced, as shown in Appendix A-II and Table 7-3 
below. Figure 7-1 shows example of image-based questions. The use of image au-
thentication has been adopted for a number of reasons. Renaud and Just (2010) 
identified enhanced usability while using association-based image questions. Hu-
mans are better at memorising pictures than words (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005, 
Chiasson et al., 2007). De Angeli et al. (2005) state that pictures substitute the need 
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to memorise and recall text-based tokens. They indicated that image authentication 
may overcome issues related with text-based authentication. The security is related 
with the difficulty of sharing or recording images to promote insecure practices 
(Weinshall and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Given the anticipated benefits, this study imple-
mented multiple-choice image-based challenge questions. These questions were 
designed using the following two types: 
 Recall Image-Based Questions: Recall is the ability to remember something 
learned or experienced. Shephard (Shepard, 1967) indicates that humans are 
better at recalling images than words, which is driven by the “picture superiority 
effect”. The recall image-based method requires a user to recall and select their 
previously chosen images. For example, a user is initially required to register a 
choice from multiple images. Later, the user is presented with multiple images 
again to recall and identify his selection (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005).  
 Recognition Image-Based Questions: These rely upon an individual’s ability to 
judge whether he/she has seen or selected an image before (Hayashi et al., 
2011). The correct image is presented with a set of distraction images and the 
user is asked to recognise a previously viewed or chosen image.  
A total of 13 image-based questions were designed for this study, as shown in Ap-
pendix A-II and Table 7-3 below. These images were randomly searched from 
Google using “teaching”, “learning”, ”assessment”, “nature”, “birds” and “animals” 
keywords. These were selected using the following guidelines: 
 Images of the same type were selected for each multiple choice question as 
shown in Figure 7-1. 
 Images of the same type were chosen with different colours, and orientation. 
 Images with rich and contrasting colours were chosen for nature, birds and 
animals. 
7.3.2 Conducting the Study and Online Course 
The study was organised in multiple phases to provide learning opportunities to stu-
dents and achieve the research objectives. Study phases are described below: 
 PHP & MySQL Course Design: An online course in PHP and MySQL was set 
up and deployed in the MOODLE Learning Management System (LMS) on a 
remote web server. The course contents were released on a daily basis to en-
gage participants and increase their interest and number of visits. A weekly 
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online multiple-choice question (MCQ) quiz was set up as a summative online 
examination. Participants were recommended to invest 10 hours’ weekly learn-
ing effort for 25 days over a span of 5 weeks. 
 Participants Recruitment: In order to motivate and recruit participants, the 
course was offered free of charge on the University of Hertfordshire online por-
tal. Participants were required to have basic programming knowledge in order to 
enrol. A total of 70 students were recruited. The distribution of participants was 
not uniform across countries and cities, but there was a good level of represen-
tation from a diverse group of students from 9 countries. Of the 70 students, 
50 (71%) were from the United Kingdom. 11 (16%) students were from Pakistan, 
2 (4%) from Malta and Nigeria, plus 1 (1%) each from Ireland, Greece, India, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Togo. There was no repeated attendance of partici-
pants from the previous study presented in Chapter 6. 
 Student Registration: Guidance notes and an enrolment key for registration 
were emailed to all participating students. The course was only available to reg-
istered users. Registration was a standard MOODLE sign-up process, which 
was essential to create login credentials to access the online course. Upon suc-
cessful registration, participants received their login-identifier and password. The 
course was launched and made available to students after registration. 
 Online Coursework: The course was presented over a period of 5 weeks. To 
collect data for the evaluation of usability and security, the transactional infor-
mation, including completion time of profile questions and challenge questions 
authentication results, were stored in a database. Answers to profile questions 
were collected during the coursework to build and consolidate an individual stu-
dent’s profile. 
 Weekly Quizzes: The course contained 5 quizzes, which were released on a 
weekly basis, one by one, towards the end of each week on completion of the 
weekly coursework. The weekly course content was released to those partici-
pants who completed their weekly quizzes, e.g. week 2 content was released to 
participants who completed the week 1 quiz. Participants were authenticated us-
ing challenge questions stored in their individual profiles and recorded during the 
coursework. A total of three challenge questions were randomly presented dur-
ing the authentication process. 
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7.4 Usability Results 
A total of 70 participants answered 2315 profile questions during the course. The 
weekly quizzes were attempted by 48 participants, who answered 1347 challenge 
questions. A usability test analysis was performed to evaluate the usability attributes 
of efficiency and effectiveness, which are discussed below. 
7.4.1 Efficiency of Text- and Image-Based Questions 
Efficiency was analysed by computing the completion times of students answering 
their profile questions. The total number of profile questions collected was higher 
than the number of challenge questions posed for authentication. A student needed 
to access the course work recurrently and the completion time of profile questions 
presented during the course would be expected to relate to efficiency. Table 7-1 
shows mean and standard deviation scores of the completion time variable.  
Table 7-1 Usability Analysis: Efficiency 
Visit No. 
Completion Time in seconds 
Mean  SD N = Visitors 
1 74.87 59.48 70 
2 62.28 61.77 60 
3 53.22 63.52 54 
4 43.26 47.92 50 
5 32.07 15.13 44 
6 45.18 41.37 40 
7 43.05 38.15 38 
8 44.42 41.98 38 
9 46.11 34.20 35 
10 47.32 38.84 34 
11 37.93 23.43 29 
12 43.50 30.18 24 
13 42.50 67.65 23 
14 40.57 31.08 19 
 49.59 47.13 558 
A decrease can be seen in completion time of profile questions from 74.87 to 40.57 
seconds, which indicates increased efficiency with an increase in the number of vis-
its. In order to test the significance of any trend in the data presented in Table 7-1, a 
one-way ANOVA was performed with linear contrasts. A significant trend was con-
firmed for completion time in multiple visits F = 8.39, p = 0.004, eta-squared 2 = 
- 98 - 
0.02. A Pearson correlation was performed to assess the direction of the trend on 
each subsequent visit (r = -0.171, n= 558, p = 0.00). The findings indicate a de-
crease in completion time with an increasing number of visits. Figure 7-2 shows a 
graphical representation of analysis, which shows a linear and decreasing trend.  
A learning curve can be observed and participants were familiarised with the pro-
cess in subsequent visits. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis 
was accepted. 
H 7.1) An increase in interaction with text-based and image-based questions in-
creases efficiency when implemented for authentication in online 
examinations. Accepted 
7.4.2 Effectiveness of Text- and Image-Based Questions 
A total of 890 text-based and 457 image-based questions were answered by partici-
pants to authenticate their identity in five weekly quizzes. Findings of the 
effectiveness analysis are discussed in the following sections. 
7.4.2.1 Text-Based Questions 
To examine the effectiveness of text-based challenge questions, an analysis of cor-
rect answers during the weekly quizzes was performed. Capitalisation and spaces 
were treated programmatically and the equality algorithm (string-to-string compari-
son) was implemented for authentication purposes (Ullah et al., 2014a, Schechter et 
al., 2009). Results in Table 7-2 show that, of the 890 text-based challenge questions  
Figure 7-2 Trend Graph – Completion Time 
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Table 7-2 Usability Analysis: Effectiveness of Text-Based Questions 
Questions Theme 
 
 
Equality Algorithm Failure Reason Relaxed Algorithm 
Correct / In Correct N 
(%) 
Syntactic Var-
iation 
Recall Correct / In Correct 
N (%) 
Academic 
Student number 29 (81%)/ 7 (19%) 0(0%) 7(100%) 29 (81%) / 7 (19%) 
First school attended 21 (75%)/ 7 (25%) 4(57%) 3(43%) 25 (89%) / 3 (11%) 
Level achieved best 
grades 
18 (69%)/ 8 (31%) 1(12%) 7(88%) 19 (73%) / 7 (27%) 
Grades in highest qualifi-
cation 
13 (65%)/ 7 (35%) 2(29%) 5(71%) 15 (75%) / 5 (25%) 
Last school attended 15 (50%)/ 15 (50%) 8(53%) 7(47%) 21 (70%) / 9 (30%) 
Year of graduation  21 (48%)/ 23 (52%) 0(0%) 23(100%) 21 (48%) / 23 (52%) 
Total 117(64%)/67 (36%) 15 (22%) 52 (78%) 130 (71%) / 54(29%) 
Favourite 
Colour 26 (84%)/ 5 (16%) 1(20%) 4(80%) 27 (87%) / 4 (13%) 
TV programme 22 (79%)/ 6 (21%) 1(17%) 5(83%) 23 (82%) / 5 (18%) 
Website URL 16 (73%)/ 6 (27%) 1(17%) 5(83%) 17 (77%) / 5 (23%) 
Car Colour 13 (72%)/ 5 (28%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 15 (83%) / 3 (17%) 
Cousin name-3 letters 21 (72%)/ 8 (28%) 0(0%) 8(100%) 21 (72%) / 8 (28%) 
Bird 29 (71%)/ 12 (29%) 2(17%) 10(83%) 31 (76%) / 10 (24%) 
Animal 16 (70%)/ 7 (30%) 0(0%) 7(100%) 16 (70%) / 7 (30%) 
Car 20 (69%)/ 9 (31%) 4(44%) 5(56%) 22 (76%) / 7 (24%) 
Childhood place to visit 17 (65%)/ 9 (35%) 2(22%) 7(78%) 17 (65%) / 9 (35%) 
Academic course 20 (65%)/ 11 (35%) 5(36%) 6(55%) 21 (68%) / 10 (32%) 
Tutor 19 (63%)/11 (37%) 2(18%) 9(82%) 21 (70%) / 9 (30%) 
Movie 12 (63%)/ 7 (37%) 3(43%) 4(57%) 15 (79%) / 4 (21%) 
Holiday destination 19 (58%)/ 14 (42%) 1(7%) 13(93%) 19 (58%) / 14 (42%) 
Childhood hero 21 (58%)/ 15 (42%) 2(13%) 13(87%) 23 (64%) / 13 (36%) 
Food 21 (53%)/ 19 (47%) 0(0%) 19(100%) 21 (53%) / 19 (47%) 
Book 9 (33%)/ 18 (67%) 4(22%) 14(78%) 12 (44%) / 15 (56%) 
Total 301(65%)/ 162(35%) 31(19%) 131(81%) 321(69%) /142(31%) 
Personal 
Country of dream vaca-
tion 
29 (83%)/ 6 (17%) 2(33%) 4(67%) 31 (89%) / 4 (11%) 
Grandfather's surname 31 (74%)/ 11 (26%) 1(9%) 10(91%) 22 (67%) / 11 (33%) 
Best friend's surname 14 (64%)/ 8 (36%) 1(13%) 7(88%) 15 (68%) / 7 (32%) 
Dream job as a child 19 (58%)/ 14 (42%) 6(43%) 8(57%) 24 (73%) / 9 (27%) 
Best childhood friend 16 (48%)/ 17 (52%) 7(41%) 10(59%) 36 (86%) / 6 (14%) 
Total 109 (66%)/ 56 (34%) 17 (30%) 39 (70%) 128 (78%) /37 (22%) 
Date 
Date of birth 10 (50%)/ 10 (50%) 10(100%) 0(0%) 20 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Year of birth 13 (87%)/ 2 (13%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 26 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Day of birth 22 (85%)/ 4 (15%) 4(100%) 0(0%) 17 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Month of birth 11 (65%)/ 6 (35%) 6(100%) 0(0%) 14 (93%) / 1 (7%) 
Total 56 (72%)/ 22 (28%) 21 (96%) 1(4%) 77 (99%) / 1 (1%) 
Grand Total 583(66%)/307(34%) 84(27%) 223(73%) 656 (74%)/234(26%) 
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randomly presented to students, 583 (66%) were answered correctly during the au-
thentication process.  
Students submitted incorrect answers to 307 (34%) questions due to recall and syn-
tactic variation, which is discussed later. 
The text-based challenge questions were analysed into four themes. In order to test 
the significance of any differences in the means of correct responses to questions 
shown in Table 7-2, a one-way ANOVA test of significance was performed. The re-
sults of this analysis showed that there was no significant difference in the means of 
correct answers between different themes (p > 0.05). The mean effectiveness of 
text-based questions was 66%, which increased to 74% when the data was ana-
lysed using a relaxed algorithm to compensate for spelling mistakes and syntactic 
variation.  
According to the usability scale presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) and letter 
grades (i.e. 70-79% acceptable, 80-89% good, +90% exceptional) described by 
(Bangor et al., 2009), 66% correct answers using the equality algorithm indicates 
usability issues, whereas 74% correct answers using the relaxed algorithm is an ac-
ceptable level of effectiveness. Based on the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis was rejected using the equality algorithm and accepted using the relaxed 
algorithm. 
H 7.2) Text-based challenge questions are effective when implemented for au-
thentication of students in online examinations.  
Rejected – equality algorithm; Accepted – relaxed algorithm 
The findings are encouraging; however, the number of incorrect answers was 26% 
even if a more relaxed algorithm was implemented to compensate for spelling mis-
takes and incorrect syntax. This indicates memorability issues with some text-based 
questions.  
7.4.2.2 Effectiveness of Image-Based Questions 
The effectiveness analysis of both “Recall” and “Recognition” image-based chal-
lenge questions is shown in Table 7-3. Image-based questions used in this study are 
shown in Appendix A-II. As discussed earlier, the “Recognition” image questions 
were derived non-intrusively in the background while students answered their multi-
ple-choice image-based questions. A student’s answer was used with a random 
subset of distraction images. These distraction images were not shown to partici-
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pants previously. They were required to recognise their previously chosen image 
from a set of distraction images.  
 Of the total of 457 image-based challenge questions, 389 (85%) were answered 
correctly during authentication. The effectiveness result for the text-based questions 
described above was 66% using the equality algorithm and 74% using the relaxed 
algorithm. Implementation of multiple-choice questions addressed the issue of syn-
tactic variation, capitalisation, formatting and spelling mistakes, which increased 
effectiveness. Results in Table 7-3 show that “Recall” and “Recognition” image-
based questions received 192 (80%) and 197 (90%) correct answers, respectively.  
Table 7-3 Usability Analysis: Effectiveness of Image-Based Questions 
Question Description Type Correct / Incorrect 
n (%) 
n = number of an-
swers 
Recall-based image questions 
Pen Object 15 (79%) / 4 (21%) 
Book Object 7 (70%) / 3 (30%) 
Pen & Inkpot Object 10 (63%) / 6 (38%) 
Examination Logo 15 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Science Logo 18 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Online Learning Logo 16 (94%) / 1 (6%) 
Graduation Logo 24 (73%) / 9 (27%) 
Internet Security Logo 10 (53%) / 9 (47%) 
Peace Logo 17 (89%) / 2 (11 %) 
Fish Nature 20 (100%) / 0 (0%) 
Flower Nature 12 (86%) / 2 (14%) 
Deer Nature 20 (77%) / 6 (23%) 
Bird Nature 8 (62%) / 5 (38%) 
Total 192(80%)/47(20%) 
Recognition-based image questions 
Recognise image you have chosen 
before 
Mixed 197 (90%) / 21 (10%) 
Total  197 (90%) / 21 (10%) 
Grand Total 389 (85%) / 68 (15%) 
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The “recognition” image-based questions received 10% more correct answers than 
the “recall” questions. A participant was presented a previously chosen (seen) image 
with a set of distraction images. These distraction images were randomly extracted 
from a pool of 50 images, which were not seen by the participant before. This is like-
ly to have enhanced the implicit recall. Research in psychology suggests that implicit 
learning and memory of visual context can guide spatial attention (Chun and Jiang, 
1998). Implicit memory is unintentional retrieval of previously acquired information 
(Roediger, 1990, Schacter, 2016). The above results indicate that this phenomenon 
may be a factor which helped participants to provide an increased number of correct 
answers to “recognition” image-based questions, which enhanced the effectiveness. 
The following section presents a comparative analysis of text-based and image-
based questions. 
7.4.2.3 Comparison of Text-Based and Image-Based Questions 
The effectiveness of image-based questions was significantly better than that of the 
text-based challenge questions (p < 0.01). An independent sample t-test was per-
formed on the data shown in Tables 7-2 and 7-3 to compare the mean of correct 
answers between text- and image-based questions. There was a significant differ-
ence in effectiveness between text- (M=66.12, SD=12.6) and image-based 
questions (M=81.92, SD=13.95) conditions t (42) =-3.67; p = 0.001 (p < 0.01). The 
use of image-based questions resulted in greater effectiveness by minimising usabil-
ity problems such as syntactic variation, spacing, capitalisation, spelling mistakes 
and memorability. 
In order to test the significance of any differences in the means of correct answers 
between text and image questions, shown in Table 7-2 and 7-3 according to the 
equality and relaxed algorithms, a one-way ANOVA test of significance was per-
formed. The results of this analysis showed that there were significant differences in 
the means F = 6.11, p = 0.004 (p < 0.01), eta-squared2 = 0.14. Post hoc compari-
sons of the groupings yielded the following significant results. 
Text-based (equality algorithm) x Image-based, mean difference (MD) = -14.33, 
Standard Error (SE) = 4.94, p = 0.028 (p < 0.01) Text-based (equality algorithm) x 
Text-based (relaxed algorithm), MD = -9.2, SE = 3.39, p = 0.026 (p < 0.01). No other 
significant differences were found in the post hoc comparisons. The findings indicate 
that the use of image-based questions increased effectiveness by addressing the 
issues related with syntax, spellings, spacing and formatting. However, the use of a 
relaxed algorithm also increased effectiveness, which compensated the stated is-
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sues. There was no significant difference in effectiveness between image-based 
questions and text-based questions using a relaxed algorithm. 
The use of image-based questions is encouraging for better usability. In an earlier 
study, Renaud and Just (2010) reported a 13% increase in memorability while using 
association-based pictures in authentication. Multiple-choice image-based questions 
indicate more potential and increased answer recall. According to the usability scale 
described in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1), 82% correct answers indicates a good level 
of effectiveness. Based on the above findings the following hypothesis was support-
ed. 
H 7.3) The image-based challenge questions are effective when implemented 
for authentication of students in online examinations. Accepted 
7.4.2.4 Recall and Syntactic Variation 
This section discusses the proposed reasons, of recall and syntactic variation, for 
incorrect answers during the authentication process. Answer recall or memorability 
has been an ongoing issue with challenge questions (Schechter et al., 2009). Man-
ual sorting of the answers revealed that memorability was not the only reason for 
incorrect results. For the purpose of this analysis, recall and syntactic variation was 
identified based on manual sorting of answers. If a participant’s answers to profile 
and challenge questions were different, it was considered a result of recall. If a par-
ticipant’s answers to profile and challenge questions had a variation in syntax (e.g. 
“http://google.com” and “www.google.com”) or spelling mistakes, it was considered a 
result of syntactic variation. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7-2 for 
text-based questions only. Image-based questions were multiple-choice and there-
fore, the syntactic variation was not applicable. 
Of the total incorrect answers to text-based questions, 223 (70%) were a result of 
recall and 94 (30%) syntactic variation. 68 (100%) incorrect answers to image-based 
questions shown in Table 7-3 were attributed to answer recall.  
Answers to subjective questions such as individual favourites in the “Favourite” 
theme received 81% incorrect answers due to recall.  
Formatted answers were prone to syntactic variation. Of all the incorrect answers in 
the “Date” theme, 95% were a result of variation in date syntax. Students were ad-
vised to submit their answers to date questions in a British date format, i.e. 
“dd/mm/yyyy”. This indicates that formatted answers should be validated for better 
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usability. A standard syntax such as a calendar/date picker could be enforced from 
the user interface to counter this issue 
The use of the equality algorithm (string-to-string comparison) penalised answers 
with syntactic variation and spelling mistakes, which would otherwise be considered 
correct if a more relaxed algorithm was used. Data in Table 7-2 columns 2 and 3 
show the results of the equality algorithm. Similarly, data in Table 7-2 column 4 
shows the results of a more relaxed algorithm. This was compiled using a substring 
and distance algorithms (Schechter et al., 2009). It compensates for syntax variation 
such as date format and spelling mistakes. A paired-sample t-test showed a signifi-
cant difference in effectiveness between the equality (M = 66.12, SD = 12.6) and 
relaxed (M = 75.35, SD = 14.09) algorithm conditions t (30) = -4.33; p = 0.00 (p < 
0.01). This indicates that addressing issues relating to syntax, spellings and capitali-
sation can significantly enhance usability.  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter reported a comparative analysis of the usability attributes of both text-
based and image-based challenge questions in the context of online examinations. 
Text-based questions were reported to have syntactic variation and recall issues in a 
study reported in Chapter 6 with 38 (58%) correct answers. Questions reported to 
have ambiguity and usability issues were revised and the number of correct answers 
in this study was enhanced to 583 (66%) using the equality algorithm and 74% using 
the relaxed algorithm. The use of a relaxed algorithm improved usability of text-
based questions significantly (p < 0.01). Introduction of image-based questions fur-
ther increased the usability results. There was a significant difference (p < 0.01) in 
the effectiveness between recognition image questions 197 (90%), recall image 
questions 192 (80%) and text-based questions 583 (66%).   
While the usability findings are positive, it is important to investigate how the chal-
lenge question approach influences impersonation attacks. Text-based questions 
are associated with an individual’s personal information and students may be able to 
share the answers with third party impersonators in impersonation attacks. The next 
chapter will present a study to investigate these attacks using a risk-based security 
assessment method. 
 
- 105 - 
8 Study 3 – Impersonation and Text-based Challenge 
Questions 
Text-based challenge questions are associated with an individual’s personal infor-
mation. It is anticipated that students may be able to share this information with a 
third party impersonator to perform an impersonation attack. This chapter presents 
study three, which examines impersonation attacks using pre-defined text-based 
challenge questions. This study explores the influence of sharing questions with a 
third party impersonator. It investigates how the number of questions shared and the 
size of the database affect the success of an impersonation attack. This chapter 
provides the purpose, research questions, hypotheses and research method. The 
following sections explain the participants’ recruitment, the design of the challenge 
questions, and the study phases. This includes a description of an abuse case sce-
nario using a simulation web application to investigate impersonation attacks. The 
study involved sharing challenge questions with the participants, who simulated 
impersonation using different numbers of shared questions and database sizes. Fi-
nally, the chapter reports the findings of the impersonation abuse case scenario.  
8.1 Purpose 
This study investigates how the proposed challenge question method influences im-
personation attacks. The description of these attacks is provided in Chapter 3 – they 
could happen in two phases, if a challenge question approach were implemented. 
Firstly, a student would need to share his or her questions and answers with a third- 
party impersonator. Secondly, the third party impersonator would use the shared in-
formation to answer the challenge questions in order to impersonate the student and 
take the online test. Therefore, a successful attack would rely upon a student’s abil-
ity to share as many challenge questions with a third party as possible. Further, it 
would rely upon the impersonator’s ability to memorise or search and locate the cor-
rect answer from the shared information, in order to authenticate and impersonate a 
student. This study investigates the following:  
1. The influence of sharing challenge questions and database size on imper-
sonation attacks in a simulation abuse case scenario.  
The attacker may search and locate correct answers from the shared information 
using a printed or electronic copy. However, if an online examination process is 
monitored or if the authentication process is timed, the attacker would need to 
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memorise the shared challenge questions and answers.  This study also investi-
gates the following:  
2. The influence of using a printed or electronic source and memory, when an-
swering the challenge questions during the impersonation attack.  
8.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research question RQ 4) associated with collusion threats (see Chapter 1) is 
cascaded into further questions associated with impersonation attacks using text-
based challenge questions. This study attempts to answer the following research 
questions, which are derived from RQ 4a): 
RQ 8.1) How does an increase in the number of shared challenge questions in-
fluence the success of an impersonation? 
RQ 8.2) How does the size of a database influence the success of an imperson-
ation attack? 
RQ 8.3) How does a response of an impersonator influence the success of an 
impersonation attack, when challenge questions are memorised or cop-
ied for impersonation? 
The following hypotheses were framed in order to answer the above research ques-
tions. Each hypothesis maps to a corresponding question: 
H 8.1) The larger the number of challenge questions shared, the more success-
ful an impersonation attack will be. 
H 8.2) The larger the database size, the less successful an impersonation at-
tack will be. 
H 8.3) There is a measure difference in the success of an impersonation attack, 
when challenge questions are memorised or searched and copied for 
impersonation. 
8.3 Study Method 
The study was conducted in a controlled simulation environment.  The risk-based 
security assessment method described in Chapter 5 was adopted to perform imper-
sonation attacks. This method focuses on testing the features and functions of 
artefacts based on the risk of their failure using abuse case scenarios (McGraw, 
2004). An abuse case scenario was designed and simulated using a web-based ap-
plication to analyse the influence of sharing the number of questions and the 
database size. 
- 107 - 
 
The study was organised in the following phases: designing challenge questions, 
creating an online database, recruiting participants and finally simulating an abuse 
case scenario.  
 Designing Challenge Questions: A total of 50 text-based challenge questions 
were created as shown in Appendix B (I). Only pre-defined text-based questions 
were implemented in order to simulate the impersonation abuse case scenario. 
A subset of these questions was used in study two, described in Chapter 7. The 
questions were associated with personal, academic, and favourite themes. 
 Online Simulation Databases:  An online challenge question database and 
web-based application was set up to simulate impersonation. Fifty challenge 
questions and answers designed for this study (see Appendix B (I)), were up-
loaded to the web-based application. The application implemented three 
different database sizes, i.e. 20, 30, and 50, which were hosted on a web server. 
The answers to the questions in these databases were uploaded from the pro-
files of three different students who participated in study three, described in 
Chapter 7 above. 
 Participants Recruitment: A total of 15 participants from the University of Hert-
fordshire, Southampton University, Cardiff University, the University of South 
Wales and the Institute of Management Sciences Pakistan volunteered to partic-
ipate in the simulation abuse case tests. The majority of participants were 
researchers and programmers collaborating on different research projects. 
There was no repeated attendance of participants from the previous studies pre-
sented in Chapter 6 and 7.  
8.3.1 Simulating Impersonation Abuse Case Scenarios 
The following collusion abuse case scenario was simulated sharing different num-
bers of questions and database sizes: 
A student is registered on an online course. The course uses the challenge 
question approach for authentication of students in online examinations. The 
student is due to write his final semester online test. He or she wants to 
boost his/his grades and recruit a third party to impersonate and take the 
test. However, to satisfy the challenge questions authentication, the student 
is required to share his/her challenge questions and answers with the third 
party helper in order to help with the impersonation. The third party helper 
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would use the shared information to answer the randomly presented chal-
lenge questions for authentication. 
Given the above scenario, this study simulated the following sharing on database 
containing 20, 30, and 50 questions. Different numbers of profile questions and an-
swers were shared as shown in Table 8-1 below: 
Table 8-1 Impersonation Abuse Case: Sharing Questions 
Database size 50 
1) 0 or no sharing:   A student is unable to share any questions with a third- 
party helper. In an attempt to impersonate and access the 
online examination, the third party uses random guessing 
to answer the challenge questions. This attack was simu-
lated on the largest database size (50).  
 
Database size 20 
2) Share 8 A student shares 8 answers of his database size 20 with a 
third party helper.  
3) Share 12 A student shares 12 answers of his database size 20 with 
a third party helper.  
4) Share 20  A student shares 20 answers of his database size 20 with 
a third party helper.  
Database size 30 
5) Share 12 A student shares 12 answers of his database size 30 with 
a third party helper. 
6) Share 18 A student shares 18 answers of his database size 30 with 
a third party helper. 
7) Share 30 A student shares 30 answers of his database size 30 with 
a third party helper. 
Database size 50 
8) Share 20 A student shares 20 answers of his database size 50 with 
a third party helper. 
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9) Share 30 A student shares 30 answers of his database size 50 with 
a third party helper.  
10) Share 50 A student shares 50 answers of his database size 50 with 
a third party helper.  
The simulation process is described below starting from the guessing attack with no 
answers shared:  
1) A participant was asked to access the application and randomly guess an-
swers to 50 challenge questions as shown in Table 8-1. 
To understand the influence of sharing using different database sizes, different shar-
ing conditions were tested for all three database sizes (20, 30 and 50 respectively) 
in a sequence shown in Table 8-1 and described below. 
2) A total of 8 challenge questions and answers were shared with a participant 
via email to simulate impersonation (see Table 8-1).  
3) The participant accessed the database and answered 5 challenge questions 
randomly presented from database size 20 using the shared questions and 
answers.  
4) The number of shared questions was then increased to 12 and 20 respec-
tively. 
5) The above steps were repeated for databases size 30 and 50 and the num-
ber of questions shared.  
Of the total 15 participants simulating the above scenarios, 10 participants answered 
the challenge questions using an electronic or printed copy shared through email. 
The other 5 participants answered the challenge questions by memorising the an-
swers from the shared email. The participants were not allowed to copy or see the 
shared email while answering the questions from memory. Data from the study was 
stored in the respective database, which is analysed in the following section. 
8.4 Security Results  
This section presents the security analysis extracted from the simulation attacks. 
Tables 8-2 and 8-3 show the security analysis of the impersonation abuse case per-
formed by 15 participants using three different database sizes. The results of the 10 
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participants who answered challenge questions from an electronic or printed copy 
are presented in Table 8-2. The results of the 5 participants who memorised the an-
swers before responding the challenge questions are presented in Table 8-3. 
Detailed security analysis on the data is presented below: 
Table 8-2 Sharing: Answers Copied for Impersonation 
Database 
Size 50 
Database Size 20 Database Size 30 Database Size 50 
P# 
 
0 
n = 50 
8 
n = 5 
12 
n = 5 
20 
n = 5 
12 
n=5 
18 
n = 5 
30 
n = 5 
20 
n = 5 
30 
n = 5 
50 
n = 5 
Answers Copied for Impersonation 
1 3(6%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
2 1(2%) 1(20%) 5(100%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 4(80%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
3 1(2%) 3(60%) 4(80%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 
4 2(4%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 5(100%) 
5 1(2%) 2(40%) 4(80%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 0(0%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
6 1(2%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 
7 3(6%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
8 1(2%) 3(60%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
9 3(6%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 
10 1(2%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 5(100%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 5(100%) 
 17(3%) 21(42%) 33(66%) 50(100%) 18(36%
) 
25(50%) 50(100%) 15(30%
) 
22(44%) 50(100%) 
 
Table 8-3 Sharing: Answers Memorised for Impersonation 
Database 
Size 50 
Database Size 20 Database Size 30 Database Size 50 
P# 
 
0 
n = 50 
8 
n = 5 
12 
n = 5 
20 
n = 5 
12 
n=5 
18 
n = 5 
30 
n = 5 
20 
n = 5 
30 
n = 5 
50 
n = 5 
1 1(2%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 0(0%) 4(80%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 3(60%) 
2 1(2%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 
3 0(0%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 1(20%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 3(60%) 
4 2(4%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 
5 3(6%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 4(80%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 3(60%) 
 7(2.8%) 9(36%) 11(44%) 9(36%) 7(28%) 9(36%) 12(48%) 9(36%) 11(44%) 12(48%) 
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8.4.1 The Effect of “Number of Questions Shared” for Impersonation 
This section provides an analysis with a focus on the “number of questions shared” 
by a student with a third party impersonator and how this affects the success of an 
impersonation attack.  
In order to test the significance of any trend in the data presented in Table 8-2 using 
four sharing conditions in an impersonation attack using database sizes of 20, 30 
and 50, a one-way ANOVA was performed with linear contrasts. A linear trend was 
found for all sharing conditions on database size 20, F = 293.8, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), 
eta-squared2 = 0.88 database size 30, F = 507.6, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), eta-
squared2 = 0.89, and database size 50, F = 507.67, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), eta-
squared2 = 0.87. A Pearson correlation was performed on the data presented in 
Table 8-3 to test the direction of the trend for all sharing conditions on database size 
20, r = 0.94, n = 40, p = 0.00, database size 30, r = 0.94, n = 40, p = 0.00 and data-
base size 50, r = 0.93, n = 40, p = 0.00.  
The above results show that an increase in the number of shared questions in-
creases the number of correct answers in an impersonation abuse case. Figure 8-1 
shows a strong linear trend for all sharing conditions using all database sizes. 
The findings revealed that an impersonation attack is more successful if a student is 
able to share a large number of questions with a third party impersonator. In the ab-
sence of monitoring or timing the user response, an impersonator can answer 
challenge questions by copying from a printed or electronic source shared by a stu-
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dent in order to authenticate. In the abuse case simulation, challenge questions 
were randomised; however, the impersonator was able to search and copy the cor-
rect answers from the shared information. Figure 8-1 shows that an increase in 
sharing resulted in an increase in correct answers for all three database sizes (20, 
30, and 50). This shows that the impersonator may circumvent the challenge ques-
tion approach, irrespective of the size of database, if an online examination is not 
monitored or if students are not restricted to answer the questions in a limited time. 
Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis was accepted: 
H 8.1) The larger, the number of challenge questions shared, the more success-
ful an impersonation attack will be. Accepted 
 
 Table 8-4 Database Size: Answers Copied for Impersonation 
  
Table 8-5 Database Size: Answers Memorised for Impersonation 
 
P# Database 20 Database 30 Database 50 
Answers Copied for Impersonation 
1 12(80%) 9(60%) 9(60%) 
2 11(73%) 11(73%) 9(60%) 
3 12(80%) 8(53%) 9(60%) 
4 9(60%) 9(60%) 7(47%) 
5 11(73%) 10(67%) 7(47%) 
6 10(67%) 10(67%) 10(67%) 
7 9(60%) 8(53%) 9(60%) 
8 11(73%) 10(67%) 9(60%) 
9 10(67%) 9(60%) 8(53%) 
10 9(60%) 9(60%) 10(67%) 
 104(69%) 93(62%) 87(58%) 
P# Database 20 Database 30 Database 50 
1 7(47%) 6(40%) 5(33%) 
2 5(33%) 4(27%) 5(33%) 
3 6(40%) 6(40%) 8(53%) 
4 4(27%) 5(33%) 6(40%) 
5 7(47%) 7(47%) 8(53%) 
Total 29(39%) 28(37%) 32(43%) 
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8.4.2  The Effect of “Database size” on Impersonation Attacks 
This section provides an analysis of the database size and how this affects the suc-
cess of an impersonation attack. In order to test the significance of any trend in the 
data presented in Tables 8-4 using database sizes 20, 30 and 50, a one-way ANO-
VA was performed with linear contrasts. A trend was found for all database sizes: 20, 
30 and 50 F = 11.45, p = 0.045 (p < 0.01) , eta-squared2 = 0.31. A Pearson 
correlation was performed on the data presented in Table 8-4 to test the direction of 
the trend on all database sizes for r = -0.559, n = 30, p = 0.041 (p < 0.01). 
The above findings revealed that an impersonation attack was less successful with 
an increase in the database size. The trend line in Figure 8-2 for all sharing condi-
tions shows a decrease in the number of correct answers with an increase in the 
database size. Also, an increase in the database size decreases the probability of 
randomly having the same subset of questions shared by a student for impersona-
tion. It is anticipated that an increase in the database size would mitigate a student 
from being able to share all of the answers with a third party impersonator. Based on 
the above discussion, the following hypothesis is accepted: 
H 8.2) The larger the database size, the less successful an impersonation at-
tack will be, when attempted from written or printed source. Accepted 
If answers to challenge questions are timed or monitored, this would increase the 
difficulty, and make it harder for an impersonator to search for the correct answers 
from a shared source, especially with an increase in the database size. As shown in 
Figure 8-2, the impersonation attack was less successful when the participants had 
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to memorise and answer the challenge questions. This is discussed in more detail in 
the following section. 
8.4.3 The Effect of Answering Challenge Questions from Memory 
In a practical situation, it is anticipated that students would answer challenge ques-
tions in a limited time. In the above scenario, the participants were allowed to search 
for the shared information in order to answer the questions with no time constraints. 
However, if answers to challenge questions are timed or if the authentication pro-
cess is monitored, an impersonator would be required to memorise the shared 
information. In order to test the significance of any trend in the data presented in Ta-
ble 8-3 for four sharing conditions in an impersonation attack using database sizes 
20, 30 and 50, a one-way ANOVA was performed with linear contrasts. A linear trend 
was found for all sharing conditions on database size 20, F = 17.8, p = 0.001 (p < 
0.01), eta-squared 2 = 0.31, database size 30, F = 13.5, p = 0.002 (p < 0.01), eta-
squared 2 = 0.44, and database size 50, F = 30.09, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01) eta-
squared2 = 0.56. A  
Pearson correlation was performed on the data presented in Table 8-3 to test the 
direction of the trend for all sharing conditions on database size 20, r = 0.61, n = 20, 
p = 0.004 (p < 0.01), database size 30, r = 0.66, n = 20, p = 0.001 (p < 0.01) and 
database size 50, r = 0.75, n = 20, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01). 
The above findings show an increasing trend in correct answers with an increase in 
the number of shared answers for impersonation. However, the number of correct 
answers decreased when the impersonator answered the questions from memory. 
Figures 8-3, 8-4 and 8-5 show a difference in the correct answers for all sharing 
conditions using different database sizes and the way that the impersonator an-
swered these questions. It shows that for all sharing conditions and database sizes, 
answers were less successful when attempted from memory. In order to test the 
significance of any differences in the means of correct answers between “Answers 
copied” and “Answers Memorised”, a one-way ANOVA test of significance was per-
formed on the data shown in Table 8-4 and 8-5.  The results of this analysis showed 
that there were significant differences in the means for database size 20 conditions 
F = 47.4; p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), eta-squared 2 = 0.78 database size 30 conditions F = 
43.18; p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), eta-squared 2 = 0.76, and database size 50 conditions F 
= 12.47; p = 0.004 (p < 0.01), eta-squared 2 = 0.49. This indicates that if answers to 
challenge questions are timed or if an online examination process is monitored, it 
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will discourage the impersonator from searching a printed or electronic source for 
answers and will require them to memorise the shared challenge questions.  
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The above findings show that the success of a collusion attack was different when 
the participants answered questions from an electronic or printed source and 
memory. Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis was accepted. 
H 8.3) There is a measure difference in the success of an impersonation attack, 
when challenge questions are memorised or searched and copied for 
impersonation. Accepted 
8.5 Summary 
The study described in this chapter was based on a collusion abuse scenario testing 
different sharing conditions and database sizes. The findings revealed that an in-
crease in the number of shared questions for impersonation increases the success 
of an impersonation attack. There was a significant linear trend, when impersonators 
answered their challenge questions from a printed or electronic copy of the shared 
questions. The number of correct answers decreased when impersonators memo-
rised and answered the challenge questions. The study also revealed that an 
increase in the database size decreases the number of correct answers during a 
collusion attack. This indicates that an increase in the database size increases the 
difficulty of finding correct answers from shared information. It also increases the 
randomness of challenge questions extracted from a larger database. 
The above findings indicate that the success of an impersonation attack depends 
upon a student’s ability to share challenge questions. While text and image-based 
challenge questions are usable, students are required to register their answers to 
pre-defined questions. This enables them to store or memorise these questions for 
sharing with a third party impersonator. It may be challenging to discourage students 
from storing or memorising pre-defined challenge questions with the intention of in-
viting impersonators.  
In order to address the above issue and to deter students from sharing questions, 
the next chapter will propose a dynamic profile question approach. 
- 117 - 
9 Study 4 –Impersonation and Dynamic Profile Ques-
tions 
The previous study in Chapter 8 reported an impersonation abuse case scenario, 
when a student shares different numbers of challenge questions with an impersona-
tor using different database sizes. The results of the study indicated that an increase 
in the number of shared questions increases the success of an impersonation at-
tack. To discourage students from sharing their pre-defined text-based challenge 
questions with third party impersonators, this chapter presents study four, which 
proposes dynamic profile questions. The chapter presents the purpose,  research 
questions, hypothesis and method. The following sections explain the participants’ 
recruitment and the design of the online course. This includes impersonation abuse 
case scenarios, which investigate attacks when students and impersonators 
communicate asynchronously (via email) and in real time (through mobile phones). 
Finally, the chapter reports the effectiveness analysis and outcome of phone and 
email driven impersonation attacks. 
9.1 Purpose 
This study proposes dynamic profile questions, which are created when a student 
performs learning activities. Using this method, a student’s profile is built and con-
solidated non-intrusively, non-distractively, in the background during the learning 
process. Dynamic profile questions are associated with students’ learning activities. 
This implies that students are not aware of which questions will be asked for authen-
tication. As discussed in the previous chapters, the usability analysis is important for 
evaluating how effectively security measures can be implemented. The effective-
ness is a usability metric, which is considered to be the degree of accuracy of the 
participants’ responses. In the context of a challenge question approach, it means 
that users are able to provide correct answers to their questions effectively with a 
low error rate. 
The traditional text-based questions are associated with personal information and 
students can share these with a third party for impersonation in an online examina-
tion. The proposed dynamic profile questions attempt to discourage a student from 
sharing the questions with impersonators. The threats classification presented in 
Chapter 3 suggests that students can share their challenge questions with an im-
personator via email or mobile. Dynamic profile questions attempt to influence such 
attacks. This study will investigate the following: 
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1. The usability attributes of the proposed dynamic profile question approach. 
2. Whether a student could share dynamic profile questions with a third party 
impersonator using asynchronous and real-time communication methods 
(i.e. email and mobile phone) and successfully perform impersonation.  
9.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions RQ 3) and RQ 4) described in Chapter 1 are cascaded into 
more research questions with a focus on usability attributes and impersonation 
attacks via email and phone. The reseach question RQ 3c) is associated with the 
usability attributes of the dynamic profile questions. Similarly, the research question 
RQ 4b) is associated with the use of dynamic profile questions and their influence 
on collusion attacks. This study attempts to answer the following research 
questions, which are derived from RQ 3c) and RQ 4b): 
RQ 9.1) How effective are dynamic profile questions for authentication in online 
examinations? 
RQ 9.2) How can dynamic profile questions influence impersonation attacks us-
ing asynchronous sharing (email) in online examinations? 
RQ 9.3) How can dynamic profile questions influence impersonation attacks us-
ing real-time sharing (mobile phone) in online examinations?  
RQ 9.4) What is the measured difference in response time between a genuine 
student and a third party impersonator during impersonation attacks 
(phone/email), when dynamic profile questions are implemented?  
RQ 9.5) Can the response rate of dynamic profile questions be used to indicate 
impersonation?  
The following hypotheses were framed to answer the above research questions. 
Each hypothesis maps to a corresponding research question: 
H 9.1) Dynamic profile questions provide effective authentication in online ex-
aminations. 
H 9.2) Dynamic profile questions can positively influence impersonation attacks, 
when a student shares access credentials with a third party impersonator 
using asynchronous sharing through email. 
H 9.3) Dynamic profile questions can positively influence impersonation attacks, 
when a student shares access credentials with a third party impersonator 
in real time using instant messaging on a mobile phone. 
H 9.4) The measured differences in the security performance of dynamic profile 
questions in impersonation attacks (phone/email) are due to an attacker 
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taking extra time to retrieve answers from shared information sources, 
compared to a genuine student. 
H 9.5) The response rate to dynamic profile questions will be quicker “when 
there is no impersonation” than “when there is impersonation”. 
9.3 Study Method and Design 
The usability test and risk-based security assessment methods described in Chapter 
5 were adopted to evaluate the dynamic profile questions. As discussed in the pre-
vious chapters, the usability test is a usability inspection method, which tends to 
focus on the interaction between humans and computers (Corry et al., 1997). Using 
this method, the representative users, i.e. students, interact with online learning and 
examinations using dynamic profile question authentication in a real online course, 
which is described later in this chapter. The usability evaluation scale described in 
Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) was used to translate the effectiveness analysis (Bangor et 
al., 2009).  
The risk-based security assessment approach focuses on the test of features and 
functions of artefacts based on the risk of their failure using abuse case scenarios 
(McGraw, 2004). An abuse case scenario was simulated to analyse impersonation 
attacks when students and impersonators communicated asynchronously (via email) 
and in real time (via a mobile phone) to share dynamic profile questions. The study 
was conducted in multiple phases, which are described in the following sections.  
9.3.1 Dynamic Profile Questions 
This section provides a background and description of the dynamic profile ques-
tions. Babic et al. (2009) proposed a theoretical approach for activity-based security 
questions, which programmatically generates a security profile based on an individ-
ual’s network and search activities. Babic et al. proposed this for authentication of 
users in web applications.  In another study, Jortberg and Baile (2009)  implemented 
challenge questions from a US consumer database for identification of online stu-
dents in online examinations. However, the database is limited to the US 
consumers’ market and does not hold information about prospective students from 
across the world.  
Dynamic profile questions are an adaptable method. A student profile is created dy-
namically based on learning activities. Questions are created non-intrusively and 
non-distractingly in the background during the learning process. These questions 
are extracted from a student’s learning activities, content submissions, grades, les-
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sons, and forum posts in order to build and consolidate a student’s profile. In order 
to access an online examination, the student is required to answer a subset of ques-
tions randomly presented from his or her profile. This study implemented multiple 
choice questions using a combination of distractors and correct answers. A total of 
18 dynamic profile questions were utilised in this study as shown in Appendix C (II). 
9.3.2 Online Course Design and Study Phases 
An online course was conducted in multiple phases to provide learning opportunities 
to students and achieve the research objectives. The study phases are described 
below: 
 Designing PHP & MySQL Course: Online course design plays an important 
role in setting up learning goals and assessment for students. The dynamic pro-
file question approach utilised a student’s learning interactions during the course 
work to create and consolidate a profile; therefore, the course design was highly 
relevant.  A remote “PHP and MySQL” online course was organised in five week-
ly modules, which included lessons, forum submissions, assignments and 
students’ reflections at the end of each week. The course was set up and de-
ployed in the MOODLE Learning Management System (LMS) on a remote web 
server accessible on the Internet. The course content was released on a daily 
basis to maximise participants’ engagement and learning interactions. A total of 
five weekly quizzes were set up for summative assessment. The participants 
were recommended to invest 10 hours weekly learning effort over a span of five 
weeks. A detailed course outline is given in Appendix C (I). 
 Participants Recruitment: In order to motivate and recruit participants, the 
course was offered free of charge and advertised on the University of Hertford-
shire online portal (StudyNet). A total of 31 students were enrolled onto the 
course; however, only 21 completed the five-week course. Of the 21 students, 
the majority (n =17, 80%) were students from United Kingdom and 1(5%) each 
were from Slovakia, Kenya, Malta, and Trinidad and Tobago. They were already 
enrolled in different programmes at the University of Hertfordshire as distance 
learners. This was helpful for the participants’ engagement due to their existing 
knowledge of using a remote online learning environment. There was no repeat-
ed attendance of participants from the previous studies presented in Chapters 6, 
7 and 8. 
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 Registration: The students were required to email a short introduction before 
registration. Guidance notes on the registration process and an enrolment key 
were emailed to all participants as shown in Appendix C (III). It was a standard 
MOODLE sign up process, which was essential to create login credentials to ac-
cess the learning material. Upon successful registration, the participants 
received a confirmation email to access the course. The course was only availa-
ble to registered users. 
 Online Coursework: An instructor-led course was taught over a period of five 
weeks. To collect pertinent data for the evaluation of usability and security, au-
thentication results were stored in the database. Participants were required to 
submit their weekly assignments in order to access their weekly quizzes. Each 
assignment was associated with the weekly course content. 
 Creating Dynamic Profile Questions: Dynamic profile questions were created 
manually for each individual student and uploaded to the database in their pro-
files via the user interface in MOODLE. These questions were created on a daily 
basis for each participant after access to course content and lessons, assign-
ment submissions, assignment grades, quiz completions, feedback and 
reflection, and forum discussions. 
 Weekly Quizzes: The participants were required to complete a quiz at the end 
of each week. The course content of the following weeks were conditionally re-
leased to those participants who completed their quizzes – e.g. week 2 content 
was released to participants who completed the week 1 quiz. The conditional re-
lease was implemented to encourage participants to complete their coursework 
and assessments in order to generate dynamic profile questions. In order to ac-
cess the weekly quizzes, the participants were authenticated using the dynamic 
profile questions stored in individual profiles created during the coursework. 
9.3.3 Simulating Abuse Case Scenarios 
The following collusion abuse case scenario was simulated towards the end of week 
five in order to evaluate impersonation attacks using email and phone: 
A student is registered on a PHP & MySQL programming course, which is 
delivered in an online learning environment. The course uses dynamic profile 
questions for the authentication of students in summative assessments, 
which are accessible on a secure browser with no access to unwanted soft-
ware e.g. Internet browser, chat sessions, etc. The student is due to write 
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his/her final semester online test. He or she wants to boost his/her grades 
and recruits a third party impersonator to help him to take his test. However, 
to satisfy the authentication, the student needs to share his/her dynamic pro-
file questions and answers (access credentials) with the impersonator. The 
impersonator would use the shared information to answer the randomly pre-
sented dynamic profile challenge questions during authentication in order to 
access the online test. 
Given the above scenario, this study simulated two types of collusion attacks:  i) a 
student shares dynamic profile questions with a third party impersonator through 
email before an online examination session; and ii) a student shares dynamic profile 
questions with a third party impersonator in real time through the mobile phone dur-
ing an online examination session. Before simulating the abuse case scenarios: 
 Two impersonators were recruited to attempt to impersonate students in an 
online examination session.  
 Each impersonator was assigned a group of 10 students to simulate the abuse 
cases in allocated time slots.  
 Skype accounts and email addresses for each impersonator were shared with 
his/her allocated students.  
 Each impersonator was required to access a simulation quiz (online examina-
tion) created on the “PHP & MySQL” on behalf of each allocated student in the 
scheduled time slot.  
 Each impersonator was required to answer all 18 dynamic profile questions as-
sociated with each of his/her allocated students in order to complete the 
simulation. 
9.3.3.1 Credential Sharing with an Impersonator Asynchronously via Email 
When students are discouraged from sharing information and communication during 
an online examination session, they may attempt to share questions and answers 
with a third party impersonator before an online examination session via email. This 
type of attack was simulated as described below: 
1) Students were asked to share their dynamic profile questions using a template 
shown in Appendix C (V). 
2) Students emailed their dynamic profile questions and login details to their allo-
cated impersonator. 
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3) The impersonator accessed the online course using the allocated student’s login 
details. 
4) In order to access the online quiz on behalf of a student, the impersonator was 
randomly presented with three dynamic profile questions. 
5) The impersonator answered the dynamic profile questions using the shared in-
formation. The impersonator was required to search and locate the correct 
answer from the shared information and to guess answers to questions if they 
were not shared. The authentication results were stored in the database for 
analysis. 
6) Steps 4 to 5 were repeated until all of the 18 dynamic profile questions were an-
swered by the impersonator. 
9.3.3.2 Credential Sharing With an Impersonator Using Real-time Communication 
Via Phone 
A student may share answers to his dynamic profile questions with a third party im-
personator in real time during an online examination session using Skype on a 
smart phone. The participants were emailed the guidance notes on impersonation 
using Skype as shown in Appendix C (VI). The impersonator was taking the test on 
a PC computer and communicated with the student using Skype messenger in-
stalled on a smart phone. The attack was simulated as described below: 
1) At a scheduled time, an impersonator and a student started a chat session on 
the phone using the Skype instant messaging service. 
2) A student shared his login details with the impersonator to enable him/her to ac-
cess the online course. 
3) The impersonator accessed the online course on a PC using the shared login 
details. 
4) In order to access the simulation online quiz, the impersonator was randomly 
presented with three dynamic profile questions on behalf of the student. 
5) The impersonator shared these questions and multiple choice options with the 
student on a mobile phone using Skype in real time to collect the correct an-
swers. 
6) The student identified and shared a correct answer on Skype. The impersonator 
answered the questions and the authentication results were stored in the data-
base for analysis. 
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7) Steps 5 to 6 were repeated until all of the 18 dynamic profile questions were an-
swered by the impersonator. 
9.4 Usability Results 
This section presents the usability analysis of dynamic profile questions in the con-
text of online learning and examinations. A total of 21 participants answered 378 
questions for authentication in five weekly quizzes. The response time to questions 
was not recorded as they were created non-intrusively, non-distractingly in the 
background. This shows an increased efficiency compared to pre-defined text-based 
and image-based questions which require students to register their answers. The 
effectiveness analysis is presented in the following section. 
9.4.1 Effectiveness of Dynamic Profile Questions 
The effectiveness is considered to be the degree of accuracy of the participants’ re-
sponses. In the context of this study, it means that participants were able to submit 
correct answers to dynamic profile questions effectively with a low error rate. This 
was analysed from the data collected from the participants’ answers to dynamic pro-
file questions during weekly quizzes.  Table 9-1 shows the analysis of dynamic 
profile questions and the mean correct and incorrect answers. The results show that 
a large number of answers were correct. Out of 378 questions answered by 21 par-
ticipants, 376 (99.5 %) were correct, which shows an increased effectiveness. 
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Table 9-1 Usability analysis: Effectiveness of Dynamic Profile Questions 
Questions  Correct Incorrect 
1 Course objectives 1 21(100%) 0(0%) 
2 Course objectives 2 21(100%) 0(0%) 
3 Course objectives 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
4 Assignment 1 21(100%) 0(0%) 
5 Assignment 2 21(100%) 0(0%) 
6 Assignment 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
7 Assignment 4 21(100%) 0(0%) 
8 Assignment 5 20(95.2%) 1(4.8%) 
9 Forum Post 1 21(100%) 0(0%) 
10 Forum Post 2 21(100%) 0(0%) 
11 Forum Post 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
12 Assignment content 1 20(95.2%) 1(4.8%) 
13 Assignment content 2 21(100%) 0(0%) 
14 Assignment content 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
15 Assignment content 4 21(100%) 0(0%) 
16  Student Reflection 21(100%) 0(0%) 
17  Grades 1 21(100%) 0(0%) 
18 Grades 2 21(100%) 0(0%) 
Total  376(99.5%) 2(0.5%) 
 
As shown in Table 9-1, the dynamic profile questions were based on the introduction 
and objectives, assignment submissions, forum discussions, assignment content, 
student reflection and grades. Each question was presented with five multiple choice 
options i.e. four distraction and a correct answer. For example: 
Which one of the following statements below were written by you as a course 
objective? 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement 
3. Distraction statement  
4. Correct Answer 
5. None of the above 
 
The participants were required to recognise the correct answer amongst the multiple 
choice options in order to authenticate. The multiple choice options provided cues to 
the participants in order to identify their answers, which resulted in 99.5% correct 
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answers. We recall that in Chapter 7 (section 7.4.2.2), 90% of the recognition-based 
image questions were correct, which was significantly (p < 0.01) different to the pre-
defined text-based questions. The current results for dynamic profile questions show 
further improvement on image-based questions. This was a result of using multiple 
choice options and creating questions associated with the students’ learning activi-
ties.  
According to the usability scale presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) and letter 
grades (i.e. 70%-79% acceptable, 80%-89% good, more than 90% exceptional) 
described by (Bangor et al., 2009), 99.5% correct answers to dynamic profile ques-
tions is an exceptional effectiveness. Based on the above findings, the following 
hypothesis was accepted. 
H 9.1) Dynamic profile questions provide effective authentication in online ex-
aminations. Accepted 
9.5 Security Results 
This section reports the security analysis of dynamic profile questions to evaluate 
impersonation attacks when students and impersonators communicate through 
email and mobile phone.  The analysis was performed on the data collected from 
simulation abuse case scenarios. In total, 21 participants performed email and 
phone collusion attacks with two impersonators. The findings of impersonation using 
email resulted in 29 (8%) correct answers. The findings of impersonation using a 
mobile phone (Skype) resulted in 351 (93%) correct answers. A detailed discussion 
on the findings of the abuse case scenarios is presented below: 
9.5.1 Impersonation Using Asynchronous Sharing via Email 
The security analysis of an impersonation attack in this section is based on the 
number of correct answers received when third party impersonators answered dy-
namic profile questions on behalf of allocated students and the information was 
shared asynchronously through email. Table 9-2 shows the list of participants and 
the mean of correct and incorrect answers submitted by an impersonator. The email 
attack was performed before the phone attack to evaluate participants’ ability to re-
call and share their dynamic profile questions, which would help a third party to 
impersonate them in an online examination. 
Dynamic profile questions implemented five multiple choice options and the proba-
bility of a correct answer by chance would be 1/5th or 20%. In the abuse case 
scenario, the impersonators answered 29 (8%) challenge questions correctly. This 
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was largely based on information shared via email and guessing by the impersona-
tors. 
 
Table 9-2 Security analysis: Impersonation via Email/Phone 
 
Of the 21 participants, only 7 were able to share at least one correct question and 
answer with a third party impersonator. In order to test the significance of any differ-
ences in the means of correct answers between students (during authentication) 
and third party impersonators in an email abuse case scenario on the data shown in 
Table 9-1 and 9-2, a paired-sample t-test was performed. There was a significant 
difference in the correct answers by students (M = 99.5, SD = 2.4) and impersona-
tors in email abuse case attack (M = 7.8, SD = 14.9) conditions t (20) = 28.41, p = 
0.00 (p < 0.01). This indicates that students were unable to share their dynamic pro-
file questions with a third party impersonator; however, they recognised their correct 
Participants Email Impersonation Phone Impersonation 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 9(50%) 9(50%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
2 0(0%) 18(100%) 12(67%) 6(33%) 
3 0(0%) 18(100%) 13(72%) 5(28%) 
4 1(6%) 17(94%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
5 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
6 1(6%) 17(94%) 14(78%) 4(22%) 
7 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%) 
8 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
9 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
10 5(28%) 13(72%) 16(89%) 2(11%) 
11 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
12 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
13 0(0%) 18(100%) 17(94%) 1(6%) 
14 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%) 
15 5(28%) 13(72%) 16(89%) 2(11%) 
16 1(6%) 17(94%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
17 0(0%) 18(100%) 17(94%) 1(6%) 
18 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%) 
19 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
20 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
21 7(39%) 11(61%) 18(100%) 0(0%) 
Total 29 (8%) 349 (92%) 351(93%) 27 (7%) 
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answers when presented with multiple choice options during weekly quizzes report-
ed in the effectiveness analysis (see section 9.4.1). Based on the above findings, 
the following hypothesis was accepted. 
H 9.2)  Dynamic profile questions can positively influence impersonation at-
tacks, when a student shares access credentials with a third party 
impersonator using asynchronous sharing via email. Accepted 
9.5.2 Impersonation Using Real-time Sharing via Phone 
The security analysis of an impersonation attack in this section is based on the 
number of correct answers received when third party impersonators answered dy-
namic profile questions on behalf of allocated students and the information was 
shared in real time through a mobile phone. Table 9-3 shows the analysis of the dy-
namic profile questions and the mean correct and incorrect answers. 
Table 9-3 Security Analysis: Impersonation Abuse Case via Mobile Phone 
Question# Content Type Authentication 
Correct Incorrect 
1 Course objectives 1 20(95%) 1(5%) 
2 Course objectives 2 20(95%) 1(5%) 
3 Course objectives 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
4 Assignment 1 20(95%) 1(5%) 
5 Assignment 2 20(95%) 1(5%) 
6 Assignment 3 20(95%) 1(5%) 
7 Assignment 4 21(100%) 0(0%) 
8 Assignment 5 19(90%) 2(10%) 
9 Forum Post 1 18(86%) 3(14%) 
10 Forum Post 2 20(95%) 1(5%) 
11 Forum Post 3 21(100%) 0(0%) 
12 Assignment content 1 17(81%) 4(19%) 
13 Assignment content 2 18(86%) 3(14%) 
14 Assignment content 3 20(95%) 1(5%) 
15 Assignment content 4 19(90%) 2(10%) 
16  Student Reflection 18(86%) 3(14%) 
17  Grades 1 (Assignment) 21(100%) 0(0%) 
18 Grades 2 (Quiz) 18(86%) 3(14%) 
Total  351(93%) 27(7%) 
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The findings revealed that a third party impersonator answered 351 (93%) questions 
correctly. This shows a 93% success as a percent of total answers. Students were 
able to recognise correct answers from the multiple choice options when asked on 
the mobile phone in real time. In order test the significance of any difference be-
tween correct answers submitted by students (during authentication) in weekly 
quizzes and third party impersonators using mobile phone, a paired-sample t-test 
was performed on the data shown in Table 9-1 and Table 9-3. There was a signifi-
cant difference in the correct answers by students (M=99.47, SD=2.4) and 
impersonators by phone (M=92.8, SD=10) conditions t (20) = 3.49, p = 0.002 (p < 
0.001). However, the mean of correct answers by phone (M=92.8) indicates a high 
percentage of the total answers. This identified a vulnerability of the dynamic profile 
questions when a student interacts with a third party impersonator via mobile 
phones in real time. A student can circumvent this approach if an online examination 
process is not monitored or the response to questions during authentication is not 
timed. Based on the above findings the following hypothesis was rejected: 
H 9.3) Dynamic profile questions can positively influence impersonation attacks, 
when a student shares access credentials with a third party impersonator 
using real-time sharing via instant messaging on a mobile phone. Re-
jected 
9.5.3 Security Performance and Response-time Factor 
Traditional online examinations are often required to be completed in an allocated 
time. Students are expected to authenticate and complete their online tests on or 
before the allocated time. In a practical situation, when a third party impersonator 
communicates with a student to share answers to dynamic profile questions using a 
mobile phone or email, the response time may change. It is anticipated that the re-
sponse time of a genuine student and an impersonator may be different when 
answering these questions.   
In order to test the significance of any differences in the mean response time to dy-
namic profile questions between a genuine student and a third party impersonator, a 
paired-sample t-test was performed on the data shown in Tables 9-1 and 9-3. There 
was a significant difference in the scores for the response time of a genuine student 
during authentication (M=39.69, SD=104.07) and a third party during impersonation 
by phone (M=290.47, SD=90.39) conditions t (377) = -35.55, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01). 
Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis was accepted: 
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H 9.4) The measured differences in the security performance of student’s dy-
namic profile questions in impersonation attacks (Skype/email) are due 
to an attacker taking extra response time to retrieve answers from shared 
information sources compared to a genuine student. Accepted 
The impersonation abuse case scenario via phone was simulated using Skype in-
stant messaging. It is anticipated that verbal communication via phone may be 
quicker than texting. However, reading a question with 5 multiple choice options may 
still require extra time for an impersonator, compared to a genuine student who 
could choose a correct answer in a shorter time. Furthermore, dependent upon the 
question design, some questions may be challenging to describe verbally such as: 
 
In order to test the significance of any trend in the response time on the data pre-
sented in Table 9-1 and Table 9-3, a one-way ANOVA was performed with linear 
contrasts. A trend was found for response time by students and a third party imper-
sonator F = 1250.96, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01), eta-squared 2 = 0.62. A Pearson 
correlation was performed on the data presented in Table 9-1 and Table 9-3 to test 
the direction of the trend in response time by a student and a third party r = 0.79, n = 
756, p = 0.00 (p < 0.01). This indicates an increasing trend with r = 0.79. The above 
findings show that the response time of a genuine student is shorter than that of a 
third party impersonator. Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis was 
supported. 
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H 9.5) The response rate of dynamic profile questions will be quicker “when 
there is no impersonation” than “when there is impersonation”. Accepted 
9.6 Summary 
The study reported in this chapter implemented dynamic profile questions in a real 
online course. These questions were created non-intrusively and non-distractingly in 
the background during a student’s learning period. This increased the efficiency 
compared to text-based and image-based questions. The findings revealed a signifi-
cantly increased effectiveness, i.e. 99.5% correct answers. These questions are 
usable and positively influence impersonation when a student and impersonator 
communicate asynchronously via email. The security analysis revealed that dynamic 
profile questions may negatively influence impersonation attacks when a student 
and an impersonator use a smart phone to communicate in real time during the ex-
am session. However, there was a significant difference (p < 0.01) in response time 
between a genuine student and a third party impersonator. This may be implement-
ed as an additional factor on which to base reports of impersonation attacks. The 
response time factor can discourage students from sharing access credentials with 
impersonators in real time to perform collusion attacks.  
The current study involved online students as an important user group. However, it 
is essential to collect feedback from other important stakeholders such as online 
programme tutors on security threats, usability, and the proposed dynamic profile 
question approach. The following chapter will present a focus group study involving 
online programme tutors. 
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10 Study 5: Focus Group with Online Programme Tu-
tors 
Students, online programme tutors, and educational institutions are the key stake-
holders in online learning programmes. With teaching and assessment 
responsibilities, online programme tutors have a central role in an online learning 
and examination context, and it is important to understand their views on security 
threats and the proposed methods to counter them. Previous chapters indicated the 
usability and security of the challenge question approach involving students. This 
chapter presents feedback obtained from a focus group of online programme tutors, 
who were chosen as experts in this field. They were invited to provide their views on 
potential threats, authentication methods, usability and applicability of the proposed 
challenge question approach against identified threats with a focus on collusion at-
tacks, remote proctor, and secure examination browsers.   
The following sections explain the process before, during, and after expert review. 
This includes how the questions were developed and piloted, characteristics of the 
experts and why they were chosen, how the process was conducted and the feed-
back received, how the data were analysed, and the findings. 
10.1 Purpose 
An online examination is a high-stake process, which faces many security threats. 
These threats are classified into two main categories: intruder and non-intruder at-
tacks, as described in the threats classification presented in Chapter 3. Non-intruder 
threats include collusion and non-collusion threats. Collusion is further classified into 
impersonation and abetting categories. Impersonation threats are difficult to identify 
and mitigate, because such threats involve legitimate students inviting third parties 
to impersonate them in their online tests. This research developed and empirically 
evaluated a challenge question approach for deterrence of this type of collusion 
threat. Five empirical studies were conducted in simulation, as well as real online 
courses involving both online and on-campus students. To understand the perspec-
tive of online programme tutors as important stakeholders, a focus group study was 
conducted. The purpose of this study was to: 
1. Explore the views of online programme tutors around collusion threats to remote 
online examinations. 
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2. Explore the views of online programme tutors around the usability and security 
of dynamic profile questions in order to mitigate collusion attacks. 
3. Explore the views of online programme tutors around a secure browser, remote 
proctoring, and dynamic profile questions to influence collusion in online exami-
nations. 
10.2 Study Method and Design 
This study adopted a mixed methods approach, comprising a focus group (qualita-
tive research technique) and a questionnaire (quantitative technique). Several 
definitions for a focus group are available in the literature review, including collective 
activity (Powell and Single, 1996), organised discussion (Kitzinger, 1995), and social 
events and interaction (Goss and Leinbach, 1996). According to Powell et al. (1996), 
a group of representative individuals are chosen and gathered by researchers to 
discuss their personal experience and comment on the topic under research. This is 
a form of group interview performed collectively with a focus on questions and re-
sponses between researchers, moderators and participants. However, it relies upon 
interaction with the group on the subject under research. The primary objective of 
the focus group was to determine participants’ perceptions of security threats, in-
cluding collusion, authentication methods, usability, and security of the proposed 
challenge questions method. Data from this study were collected on video from a 
moderator-led discussion and a paper-based questionnaire. The focus group dis-
cussion was analysed using a content analysis approach. The study was performed 
in multiple phases, which are described below. 
 Table 10-1 Focus Group: Participant characteristics
Categories Focus Group (n=9) 
Gender Male: 5 (55%) Female: 4 (45%) 
Role Online Programme Tutors 
Summary of background Online programme tutors with expert level ex-
perience in course design, teaching online and 
face-to-face courses, proctoring, supervision, 
and assessment. Participants were also expert 
in usability, security, HCI, and research. 
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10.2.1 Format of the Focus Group Sessions 
The focus group study was conducted over two sessions. In the first session, partic-
ipants were given a presentation to provide them with an overview of the research 
problems and proposed solutions. After the presentation, participants were asked for 
their feedback on a paper-based questionnaire. In the second session, a moderator-
led discussion was conducted. Participants’ feedback was recorded on a video for 
analysis. The duration of the session was two hours. The structure of the study is 
described below: 
 Participants Recruitment: In this study, a group of online programme tutors 
from the University of Hertfordshire was invited. A total of nine participants 
attended the study. They were highly experienced and experts in the area of 
online teaching, face-to-face teaching, course design, examinations design, 
invigilation, research supervision, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), usabil-
ity, security, and assessment of students. The session was also attended by 
authors, research supervisors, and the moderator. The characteristics of the 
focus group participants are presented in Table 10-1 above. Online pro-
gramme tutors are key stakeholders in the online examination process and 
therefore, interested in research related to security threats, usability and au-
thentication approaches to mitigate threats. There was no repeated 
attendance of participants from the previous studies presented in Chapters 
6, 7, 8 and 9. 
 Presentation on Threats and Challenge Question approach: Before the 
group discussion, participants were given a power point presentation (see 
Appendix D (I)) on remote online examinations, authentication, collusion at-
tacks, and the challenge question approach. Findings of the empirical 
studies using pre-defined text-based, image-based, and dynamic profile 
questions were also presented to provide a background to an online exami-
nation context, threats, and mitigation methods. At the end of the 
presentation, participants were handed the paper-based questionnaire for 
their feedback, as described in the following section.  
 Questionnaire: As shown in Appendix D (II), a 19-question paper-based 
questionnaire was produced to collect participants’ feedback on security 
threats and collusion, usability of authentication methods, effectiveness of 
question types, and overall usability and security of the challenge question 
approach. 5- and 10-point scales were used for all questions. The question-
naire was distributed to participants after the first presentation described 
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above. They were asked for feedback based on their experience associated 
with the information provided in the first presentation. The questionnaire was 
filled in and returned by all participants after the focus group discussion. 
 Presentation on Remote Proctor and Secure Browser: Participants were 
given a second presentation on the use of a secure browser and remote 
proctoring tool,  ProctorU (Eisenberg, 2013), to deter collusion attacks. This 
method has been offered by a number of service providers to conduct proc-
tor-led examinations remotely. This approach was presented as a potential 
candidate for mitigation of abetting attacks. 
 Focus Group Discussion: After the presentations, seats were arranged in a 
circle to facilitate group discussion. The moderator welcomed all participants 
and asked for their consent to record the session on a video. After setting up 
video cameras, the moderator gave a brief introduction about the research 
aim and problems. He started the discussion by describing a scenario fol-
lowed by probes, shown in Appendix D (III). He posed relevant probes one 
by one and steered the discussion. Participants responded to each probe in 
a group discussion, which is analysed later in this chapter. 
 
10.3 Questionnaire Analysis 
In this section, the results and discussion from the data analysis are presented. The 
analysis is derived mainly from three sources to ensure triangulation and validity 
(Creswell, 2012). One source is participants’ feedback to questionnaires, as shown 
in Table 10-2, and the second source is findings from the empirical enquiries pre-
sented in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. The third source is analysis of the focus group 
discussion shown in Table 10-3. 
The following sections present an analysis of the feedback about security threats 
and collusion, usability of authentication approaches, usability of the different ques-
tion types, i.e. text-based, image-based, and dynamic profile questions, and usability 
and security of the challenge question approach in an online examination context. 
Security Threats and Collusion: The threat of collusion in online examinations has 
been a rising concern for educational institutions and tutors. There is a prevailing 
view that online examinations pose a higher threat than face-to-face examinations. 
Numerous studies (Vician et al., 2006, Olt, 2002, Colwell and Jenks, 2005, Wielicki, 
2006, Jung and Yeom, 2009, McMurtry, 2001) report that online learning offers more 
opportunities for cheating. Chiesel (p.330, 2009) identifies that 64% of university 
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professors perceive cheating in online examinations to be easier. Table 10-2 shows 
an analysis of the questionnaire regarding security threats, including collusion at-
tacks, in the section “Security Threats and Collusion”. Online programme tutors 
have been actively involved in designing and conducting examinations for both on-
campus and online students. They were asked about their concerns regarding 
threats and authentication approaches in online examinations. As shown in Table 
10-2, in response to Q1 and Q2 regarding “Online examinations” and “Authentica-
tion approaches”, the majority of participants reported their concern and scored M = 
4 and M = 3.7 respectively (1 – No concern at all; 5 – Strong concern). In response 
to Q3 and Q4, participants felt that it is less difficult to cheat in online examinations 
(M = 2.1) compared to face-to-face examinations (M = 3.6). While cheating in an 
online examination has been reported as a risk, collusion is seen as a main concern. 
Participants were requested for feedback in Q5-8 regarding different types of collu-
sion attacks including “copying from books and other resources”, “copying from the 
Internet”, “abetting” and “impersonation”. In response to these questions, the majori-
ty of participants reported high concern regarding impersonation and abetting, which 
scored M = 4.1 and M = 4.2 respectively. 
Table 10-2 Focus Group Analysis: Survey Questionnaire 
 Questions M Med SD 
 Security Threats and Collusion    
1 How concerned are you about the security of a re-
mote online examination? 4 4 0.7 
2 How concerned are you about the authentication 
methods implemented for the security of a remote 
online examination? 3.7 4 1.1 
3 In your view, how difficult is it for a student to cheat 
in a remote online examination? 2.1 2 1 
4 In your view, how difficult is it for a student to cheat 
in face-to-face invigilated examination? 3.6 4 1.3 
5 Consider the threat of a student copying answers 
from a book or other course material. Please rate 
the seriousness of this threat in a remote online ex-
amination where there is remote student 
authentication but no invigilation. 3.8 4 0.8 
6 Consider the threat of a student copying answers 3.8 4 0.8 
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from the Internet. Please rate the seriousness of 
this threat in a remote online examination where 
there is remote student authentication but no invigi-
lation. 
7 Abetting – Consider the threat of a student getting 
help from someone else, based in the same loca-
tion. Please rate the seriousness of this threat in a 
remote online examination where there is remote 
student authentication but no invigilation. 4.2 4 0.6 
8 Impersonation – Consider the threat of a student 
getting help from a third party, based in a remote 
location. Please rate the seriousness of this threat 
in a remote online examination where there is a re-
mote student authentication but no invigilation. 4.1 4 0.7 
 Existing Authentication Methods    
9 Login Identifier and Password Authentication 3.4 3 0.8 
10 Graphical Password Authentication 3.4 3 0.8 
11 Security/Challenge Questions Authentication 3.6 4 1.1 
 Effectiveness of Different Question Types 
12 How effective would the challenge question ap-
proach  be to mitigate impersonation attacks? 3.3 3 0.7 
13 Pre-defined Text-Based Questions 3.0 3 0.5 
14 Pre-defined Image-Based Questions 3.4 3 0.5 
15 Dynamic Profile Questions 3.8 4 0.8 
 Overall Usability and Security of Challenge Questions 
16 How usable is the challenge question approach? 3.6 4 0.8 
17 How secure is the challenge question approach in 
terms of non-collusion based intruder attacks? 3.6 3 0.7 
18 How secure is the challenge question approach in 
terms of collusion attacks? 2.9 3 0.6 
19 Given that security and usability may be considered 
to be a trade-off, on a scale of 1 to 10, please indi-
cate where you think the best option should be. 3.6 3 1.9 
Knowledge-based authentication approaches: The knowledge-based approach 
is the simplest technique employed to fulfil the security requirements. This is an 
easy to use method, and expected to provide secure authentication. It is a low-cost, 
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accessible, widely acceptable and preferred authentication method (Hafiz et al., 
2008). 
Participants were asked for their feedback on the usefulness of existing knowledge-
based authentication approaches in the context of online examinations. These ap-
proaches include ‘Login Identifier and Password’, ‘Graphical Passwords’ and 
‘Challenge Questions’. Participants rated the ‘Challenge Questions’ approach as M 
= 3.6 (1 - Not useful at all to 5 - Very useful). 
Usability of Challenge Questions: Braz and Roberts (2006) state that the usability 
of security systems has become a major issue in research on efficiency and user 
acceptance. It is important to investigate usability attributes, i.e. the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the proposed challenge question approach. This method imple-
mented text-based, image-based and dynamic profile questions. In the empirical 
studies reported in Chapters 6, 7, and 9, the effectiveness of different question types 
was analysed by computing correct answers during authentication. Dynamic profile 
questions were the most usable of all question types, with 99.5% correct answers. 
Unlike other question types, this was the most efficient method as questions and 
answers were generated dynamically in the background during the learning process 
to build profiles, and students were not required to register their answers. 
In response to survey questions 13, 14 and 15, participants rated the effectiveness 
of text-based, image-based and dynamic profile questions as 3, 3.4, and 3.7 respec-
tively (1 - Not useful – 5 - very useful). A one-way ANOVA was performed on the 
data shown in Table 10-2: questions 13, 14, and 15, with linear contrasts to find a 
difference in participants’ responses to the usability of different question types. A 
significant trend was found in participants’ responses to the usability of different 
question types (F = 6.64, p = 0.016, eta-squared 2 = 0.22). A Pearson correlation 
was performed on participants’ feedback to questions regarding the usability of 
question types to test the direction of the trend. The result of the test shows a signif-
icant correlation p = 0.014, and r = 0.46 indicates a positive trend in the usability of 
questions from text-based, image-based, and dynamic profile questions. Figure 10-1 
shows a linear graph of different question types, which indicates an increasing trend. 
It is important to consider that, a one-way ANOVA on a small sample size may not 
have sufficient power. The power depends on the error variance, the selected signif-
icance (alpha-) level of the test, and the sample size. However, findings of the test 
here yielded significant value. 
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Security of Challenge Questions: Mitigation from all types of threat is a priority; 
however, based on the feedback to questions associated with threats, collusion is 
reported as a rising concern for online examinations. Participants were requested for 
feedback on the security of the proposed method to mitigate non-collusion and col-
lusion attacks. There was an agreement on the security of challenge question 
approach to influence non-collusion threats. However, some participants reported 
concerns when this approach is implemented to mitigate collusion attacks. Question 
18, regarding the security of challenge question approach to mitigate collusion at-
tacks, scored M = 2.9. 
In summary, participants felt that impersonation and abetting are challenging threats 
to online examinations. The proposed method is usable when dynamic profile ques-
tions are implemented. There was an agreement that this method could influence 
impersonation attacks; however, some participants showed concern about abetting 
attacks, which are discussed in the focus group analysis. 
10.4 Focus Group Analysis 
The data analysis of the focus group was performed using a qualitative content 
analysis approach (Berg and Lune, 2004). It is a systematic and reliable technique 
Figure 10-1Usability – Trend Graph 
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for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit 
rules of coding (Berelson, 1952). The recording from the focus group discussion was 
transcribed for detailed analysis. Categories of the main themes associated with this 
research were identified in the transcription. Phrase analysis was carried out and  
data were organised into subcategories for further analysis. 
Table 10-3 Content Analysis: Focus Group Discussion 
Categories 
Raters Score 
1 2 Mean 
Collusion Threats 
   A user will share access credentials with a third party for 
a bank account 1.25 1.5 1.4 
A user will share access credentials with a third party for 
an online examination 3.3 3.3 3.3 
1
 The risk of sharing bank credentials for a user is… 5.0 5.0 5.0 
1
 The risk of sharing online examination credentials for a 
student is… 2.0 2.3 2.2 
1
 The risk of Mobile/Instant Messaging/SMS is… 5.0 5.0 5.0 
1
 The risk of Desktop Sharing is… 5.0 4.0 4.5 
1
 The risk of inviting third party to exam location is… 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Challenge questions method using dynamic profile questions 
Secure against collusion 3.3 3.3 3.3 
It can make it hard to collude 4.5 5.0 4.8 
As a programme tutor, I will use the dynamic profile 
question approach  in an online exam for my students 4.5 4.4 4.5 
Mitigates mobile collusion when answers are timed 4.0 3.5 3.8 
1
 Risk of using time factor to penalise students 3.0 2.6 2.8 
Timing answers make it hard to collude 5.0 4.0 4.5 
Course Design to Prevent Collusion via Mobile SMS 5.0 4.3 4.7 
Secure browser and remote proctoring (ProctorU) 
  Secure against collusion 4.0 4.5 4.3 
Secure against screen sharing 4.3 4.3 4.3 
It can make it hard to collude 4.0 3.5 3.8 
As a programme tutor, I will use ProctorU in an online 
exam for my students 4.5 4.7 4.6 
1
 1-Very Low Risk to 5-Very High Risk 
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The data collected during the study were rated by two independent raters on a scale 
of 1-5 (1 - Strongly Disagree – 5 - Strongly Agree) and (1 - Very Low Risk – 5 - Very 
High Risk) as shown in Table 10-3. The data were evaluated for inter-rater reliability 
using Cohen’s kappa test. The kappa value of 0.583 shows moderate agreement 
between the raters. The results are discussed in the following section. 
10.4.1 Participants’ Perception of Collusion Threats 
To understand the perception of online tutors regarding collusion attacks, it was 
made a central point of the focus group discussion. While there has been ongoing 
debate around threats to online examinations and face-to-face invigilated exams, 
there is agreement that collusion is a potential threat and it is challenging to verify 
that a student signed up for the course is the same person who is taking the online 
examination. There was a good discussion on the difference of stakes in online ex-
aminations and other web-based applications like online banking. It was discussed 
that collusion attacks are unique and pose a threat to remote online examinations as 
well as face-to-face invigilated exams. A participant reported that: 
Participant 4: 
“There have been occasions when students have colluded and imper-
sonated in the invigilated exams, where both parties were from the 
university” 
Collusion is classified in different types and each type poses a different threat level 
in an online examination context. A student copying answers from a book or the In-
ternet is not considered collusion because a third party is not involved. Discussion 
on collusion and types of collusion threats are discussed below. 
10.4.1.1 Impersonation in Online Examinations Vs Online Banking 
Impersonation is seen as a larger threat to the security of an online examination 
compared to online banking. There was collective agreement that impersonation 
poses a different threat to both because of the difference in stakes. As a user of an 
online bank account, an individual is less likely to share their login credentials or as-
sociated information with a third party as it may expose their monetary assets to 
risk. There was strong disagreement from participants, if they were asked to share 
their credential for an online banking system, where stakes are different. As shown 
in Table 10-3, participants perceived sharing of access credentials in online banking 
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as a high security risk for the account holder and scored M = 5. According to a par-
ticipant: 
Participant 2: 
“The potential risk you are exposing yourself to by giving people your 
banking details is enormous”  
Unlike online banking, users of an online examination would share their access cre-
dentials with third party impersonators. These users have different stakes than in 
online banking, and individuals may be tempted to collude in order to boost their 
grades or qualify a test. The absence of invigilation or monitoring creates more op-
portunities and students are not challenged. According to many participants, there is 
a lower risk for a student to collude and share credentials for his online examination 
with a third party M = 2.2 (1 - Low Risk to 5 - Very High Risk). According to some 
participants: 
Participant 1: 
“If you are trying to collude, you would be interested to share your infor-
mation” 
Participant 2: 
“Whereas if you giving your detail to some person who can impersonate, 
the risk is, I suppose is potentially quite large, but essentially it is not as 
large as giving out your bank details” 
In summary, there was an agreement that students in online examinations are more 
likely to collude with third parties and share their access credentials, which is dis-
cussed in the following section. 
10.4.1.2 Impersonation 
Students employing someone else to take their test instead of them would willingly 
share their credentials with impersonators, regardless of any rules or regulations 
(Frank, 2010). Recall in Chapter 3, the collusion between a student and a third party 
impersonator can happen using different communication approaches. A student may 
share credentials with a third party in real-time or asynchronously before an exami-
nation session using email, mobile phone for SMS (Short Messaging Service), or 
Instant Messaging. Access credentials can be shared using an email before a test, if 
the authentication method uses simple credentials which are easy to share. Also, a 
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student may use email if an online examination is monitored or proctored remotely. 
For example, password for logging into an online examination and answer to memo-
rable challenge questions can be shared through email before the test session. 
However, authentication approaches which implement dynamic and interactive 
mechanisms may discourage sharing access credentials beforehand. Results from 
the empirical study reported in Chapter 9 show that students may find it difficult to 
share dynamic profile questions though email. These questions are non-intrusive 
and created dynamically based on individuals’ learning activities, and students 
would not know the questions beforehand. Another example is a dynamically-
created security code sent to a mobile phone through SMS. However, the study re-
ported in Chapter 9 indicated that students may share information via mobile phones 
in real-time. Participants in the focus group discussion identified that mobile phones 
pose a potential threat to share access credentials or answers to exam questions in 
real time. According to participants: 
Participant 5: 
“If I want to share a code, I would use my mobile phone” 
“If I have a mobile phone I can receive text with the answers” 
As shown in Table 10-3, participants in the focus group perceived sharing of access 
credentials using a mobile phone during an examination as a high security risk and 
scored M = 5. 
Another potential threat is when a student colludes with a third party using remote 
desktop sharing. As in (Frank, 2010), remote desktop sharing software can be used 
to share the screen with someone remotely to impersonate and take the test. In an 
online examination scenario, where there is no invigilation, a student may share a 
screen or access credentials with a third party for impersonation. This was per-
ceived as a serious threat and scored M = 4.5 (1 - Not serious at all – 5 - Very 
serious). According to a participant in the focus group: 
 
Participant 5: 
“I can easily share my screen with someone sitting somewhere else, 
who can see the same screen as I do” 
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There was agreement that a student may share access credentials via email, phone, 
instant messaging, and remote desktop with an impersonator to cheat in an online 
examination. The potential solution to this will be discussed later in the thesis. 
10.4.1.3 Abetting 
In a non-proctored exam, students may receive help from a third party to answer the 
test questions. In their study, Tindell et al. (2012) surveyed 269 students, with 10% 
admitting to the use of mobile phone for abetting during exams. Absence of remote 
proctoring or monitoring creates opportunities for students to ask third parties for 
help. As outlined in Chapter 3, this type of collusion was classified as abetting. A 
student and a third party could collaborate and answer the test questions based in 
the same location or communicate remotely. Participants of the focus group per-
ceived this as a serious threat as there is always a possibility that a student may get 
someone to sit close by, or in a remote online examination, who is an expert. Ac-
cording to a participant: 
Participant 9: 
“I would imagine the trick would be to prevent people sitting next to you 
and doing the test with, and I think that is the biggest problem” 
The content analysis in Table 10-3 shows that participants perceived this a high risk 
and scored M = 5, if a student invites a third party to the exam location for abetting. 
The potential solution to this will be discussed later in the thesis. 
10.4.2 Security Analysis and Discussion 
While it is established that collusion is a rising concern in remote online examina-
tions, authentication approaches alone may not provide adequate security to 
mitigate both impersonation and abetting threats. Different types of collusion threat 
may need different deterrence approaches. 
A challenge question approach, as well as ProctorU (secure browser and proctoring 
tool), were proposed to influence impersonation and abetting attacks. The focus 
group discussion on the proposed methods is presented in the following sections. 
10.4.2.1 Dynamic Profile Questions to Influence Impersonation 
The dynamic profile question approach was proposed as a solution to positively in-
fluence impersonation attacks in the first presentation. In order to explore 
participants’ perception of the use of dynamic profile questions, the moderator asked 
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whether they would use this approach in an online examination for their students. 
The majority of participants agreed and understood that it would make an impact on 
impersonation. The content analysis in Table 10-3 on the use of dynamic profile 
questions for mitigation of impersonation shows participants’ agreement and scored 
M = 3.8. According to participants in the focus group: 
Participant 6: 
“Yes, I agree!” 
Participant 7: 
“Yes, it is better than what we do now” 
Participant 8: 
“Yes, it is that extra level of security” 
Participant 5: 
“Yes!” 
Dynamic profile questions may influence impersonation attacks using phone and 
email. The empirical study reported in Chapter 9 shows that these questions can 
positively influence impersonation via email. The study also revealed that imperson-
ation attacks using mobile phones were successful; however response times could 
be implemented to discourage such attacks. The study reported a significant differ-
ence (p < 0.01) in the response time of a third party impersonator using a mobile 
phone and a genuine student during an online examination. Students are often ex-
pected to complete their tests in an allocated time and this can be used as a factor 
to positively influence the use of mobile phones in online examinations. Participants 
in the focus group provided positive feedback on the use of a response time factor 
for use against impersonation. The content analysis in Table 10-3 shows partici-
pants’ perception that timing answers may impact impersonation using a mobile 
phone, which scored M = 3.8. There was agreement that timing answers will deter 
students from colluding (M = 4.5). According to some participants: 
Participant 1: 
“If the answers are coming slowly, slower than what you would expect, 
or in some strange way, we can just say that we are not accepting this, 
because there is a problem” 
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Participant 4: 
“It makes it very hard for somebody who pretends to be you or collude” 
In a practical situation, if a student is taking noticeable time to respond to authenti-
cation and questions in an online examination, it could be noticed by the course 
administrator/tutor.  According to some participants, response time could be used as 
a factor for assessing test questions as well. 
Participant 4: 
“If they cannot get through the test in time. Time can be used as a factor 
to minimise the looking” 
Course and online examination design is another important factor to discourage stu-
dents from taking help. As an example, if an online test consists of multiple choice 
questions, an expected response time can be easily determined. However, for an 
open text descriptive question, this may vary. A participant suggested that course 
and examination design may discourage students from searching the Internet. 
Participant 8: 
“That’s what we have done on the JAVA module. Because some student 
came and said, I can just search the answer on the Internet and can find 
the correct answer. I replied, if you do, you won’t get enough time to fin-
ish the majority of the questions. Basically, those questions cost the 
time” 
However, there are risks associated with the implementation of response time factor 
for reduction of collusion. This may be challenging to prove a slow response time as 
the only evidence of a collusion attack. Some participants raised their concerns 
about using a response time factor to penalise students: 
Participant 6: 
“I think it is a bit of a hassle to try and prove whether a student has col-
luded or cheated” 
In a practical scenario, students may challenge a decision if they were penalised 
due to a longer response time, and ask to redo their test. Another participant raised 
concerns for penalising students based on a response time factor: 
Participant 1: 
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“What if the student wants to protest? If you say, well, I don’t accept this 
answer, and the student says, why not, I dint do anything wrong” 
However, the majority of participants agreed to implement additional security factors, 
including response time, to deter collusion. 
Participant 4: 
“If we are confident that someone has cheated, we know that the test in 
invalid, we ask the student to go back and do it again” 
10.4.2.2 Secure Browser and Proctoring (ProctorU) to Influence Abetting 
The majority of traditional authentication approaches may not detect abetting attacks 
to ensure that a student is taking an online test without getting help from someone 
sitting close by or in a remote location. Live invigilation or monitoring may mitigate 
abetting and discourage a student from communicating with a third party during an 
online examination session. Participants in the focus group agreed that remote proc-
toring may positively influence abetting. According to a participant: 
Participant 8: 
“I think the remote proctoring possibility sorts out the person sitting next 
to you to some extent anyway” 
A remote proctor and secure browser can be implemented to prevent the use of un-
wanted software e.g. Skype, remote desktop sharing, Internet browser and invigilate 
an online examination session. One such example is ProctorU, a remote proctoring 
system for online tests. Trained invigilators at ProctorU watch test-takers by using 
screen sharing and webcam feeds at offices in Alabama and California (Eisenberg, 
2013). An invigilator verifies the identity of an online student and monitors the exam-
ination process. This may be an expensive approach for online tests with a large 
number of students. In order to explore their feedback on using ProctorU, partici-
pants were asked if they would use this approach in an online examination for their 
students. A large number agreed and understood that it would impact collusion.  
Participants suggested that the use of dynamic profile questions and ProctorU to-
gether would enhance the security of online examinations to mitigate impersonation 
and abetting. 
Participant 9: 
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“And by making it harder with challenge questions could have another 
additional layer. Ok! The name did match, and the photo looks all right, 
however, how come this part (dynamic profile question) of the authenti-
cation did not occur” 
10.5 Summary 
The study investigated a group of experienced online programme tutors from the 
University of Hertfordshire. Based on their feedback, impersonation using mobile 
phone, email, remote desktop sharing, and abetting were identified as common 
cause for concern. The empirical results in previous studies and feedback from the 
focus group suggest that dynamic profile questions are more usable than text-based 
and image-based questions. This method may positively influence impersonation 
attacks using email and mobile phones if an additional factor, such as response 
time, is also considered. However, dynamic profile questions may not detect abet-
ting attacks, when a third party helps a student sitting close by or remotely during an 
online examination session. A secure browser and remote proctoring tool (ProctorU) 
may countermeasure abetting attacks to monitor the location of a test taker.  
There has been an increase in the use of online learning and examinations across 
the world. Many course providers use 100% coursework in remote online environ-
ments, and rely upon online examinations for assessment purposes. This increases 
the importance of a secure examinations environment. This study recommends the 
use of challenge questions (dynamic profile questions) and remote proctoring with a 
secure browser that will improve the situation. It was agreed by the online pro-
gramme tutors that the use of these proposed methods could influence and 
discourage students from perpetrating impersonation and abetting attacks. 
The implementation of dynamic profile questions and proctoring tools will make it 
more difficult for students to use mobile phones or chat services on a computer for 
real-time information sharing. However, students may attempt to share answers to 
dynamic profile questions, learning experience with a third party impersonator be-
fore an online examination session through email, phone, or a face-to-face meeting 
to circumvent the proposed method and impersonate. To investigate students’ ability 
to share dynamic profile questions with a third party offline, before an examination 
session, the following chapter will report the final study.  
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11 Study 6: Dynamic Profile Questions and Proctoring 
In the focus group study described in the previous chapter, online programme tutors 
recommended the use of dynamic profile questions, remote proctoring (Mahmood, 
2010), and a secure browser to influence impersonation and abetting attacks. How-
ever, students may still attempt to circumvent this approach. A student may share 
information about their learning experience and activities with a third party imper-
sonator before an online test via email, phone, instant messaging, or face-to-face 
meeting. This chapter presents Study 6, which simulates an impersonation abuse 
case scenario, when a student shares information about his learning experience 
with another individual who attempts impersonation in the presence of live 
proctoring.  
The chapter describes the purpose, research questions, hypotheses, and research 
method. The following sections explain participants’ recruitment and their character-
istics, design of an online course, and study phases. This includes a description of 
an abuse case scenario using a three-week online course to investigate 
impersonation attacks. The study involved campus students for pairing and simulat-
ing the abuse case in a controlled lab based environment. Finally, the chapter 
reports the effectiveness and outcomes of the impersonation abuse case. Feedback 
from a post-study questionnaire is also reported to conclude the chapter. 
11.1 Purpose 
The focus group study presented in Chapter 10 indicates that the use of dynamic 
profile questions with a secure browser and proctoring (ProctorU) (Mahmood, 2010) 
can positively influence collusion attacks. As described in Chapter 9, dynamic profile 
questions are created non-intrusively and non-distractingly in the background when 
a student performs learning activities. Using this method, a student’s profile is built 
and consolidated in the background during the learning process. Students are not 
aware of which questions will be asked for authentication. This attempts to verify 
that the person who is taking the online test is the same individual who completed 
the coursework. The use of a secure browser and proctoring monitors an online ex-
amination, and attempts to ensure that a student is not taking help from the Internet 
or an abettor sitting close by or remotely. However, a student may still circumvent 
the system and share access credentials with an impersonator before the test ses-
sion.  
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As discussed in the previous studies, effectiveness is an important attribute defined 
by the ISO which contributes to the usability (ISO9241-11, 1998). In the context of 
this study, effectiveness means that participants were able to answer dynamic pro-
file questions correctly with a low error rate. This study will investigate the following: 
1. The effectiveness of dynamic profile questions in a proctored examination. 
2. Whether a student can share information about learning activities and experi-
ence with a third party impersonator using email, instant messaging, phone, or 
face-to-face meeting before an online test session, and how successful the im-
personator is in answering the dynamic profile questions.  
11.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions RQ 3) and RQ 4) identified in Chapter 1 are cascaded into 
more questions associated with usability and collusion, in order to approach the 
research problems. The research question RQ 3c) is associated with the usability 
attributes of dynamic profile questions. Similarly, the research question RQ 4b) is 
associated with the use of the dynamic profile question approach and its influence 
on collusion threats. This study attempts to answer the following research questions, 
which are derived from RQ 3c) and RQ 4b) : 
RQ 11.1) How effective are the dynamic profile questions for authentication in a 
proctored online examination? 
RQ 11.2) How can authentication based on dynamic profile questions influence a 
third party impersonation attack in a proctored online examination?  
The following hypotheses were framed to answer the above research questions. 
Each hypothesis maps to the corresponding research question: 
H 11.1) Dynamic profile questions are effective when implemented for authenti-
cation in a proctored online examination. 
H 11.2) Dynamic profile questions can positively influence impersonation attacks 
in a proctored online examination, when a student shares dynamic profile 
questions with a third party before an online examination session. 
11.3 Study Method and Design 
This study was conducted in a real online course and a controlled laboratory-based 
simulation environment. The usability test and risk-based security assessment 
methods described in Chapter 5 were adopted to evaluate the usability and security 
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of dynamic profile questions. The usability test method is a usability inspection, 
which tends to focus on the interaction between humans and computers (Corry et 
al., 1997). Using this method, the representative users – i.e. students – work on typ-
ical system tasks on an online course and examination, which implements dynamic 
profile questions in a proctored test. In this study, the system tasks were simulated 
in a laboratory-based environment. The usability evaluation scale described in 
Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) was used to translate the effectiveness analysis. This 
scale describes the usability of products in the 90s as exceptional, 80s as good, 70s 
as acceptable, and anything below 70 indicates usability issues that are cause for 
concern (Bangor et al., 2009).  
As discussed earlier, the risk-based security assessment approach provides rapid 
quantification of security level risks associated with processes (Ni et al., 2003). This 
method focuses on the test of features and functions of artefacts based on the risk 
of their failure using abuse case scenarios (McGraw, 2004). An abuse case scenario 
was simulated to investigate impersonation attacks, when dynamic profile questions 
are implemented for authentication of students in a proctored examination. 
This study was conducted in a remote online learning environment and face-to-face 
sessions involving on-campus students. It was organised into two phases: Phase I - 
online course and Phase II - abuse case simulation. Study phases are described 
below. 
11.3.1 Phase I – Online Course and Student Pairing 
In Phase I of the study, an online course was conducted to provide learning oppor-
tunities for students and facilitate the collusion abuse case scenario. The structure 
of Phase-I is described below. 
 PHP & MySQL Course Design: A ‘PHP and MySQL’ online course was organ-
ised with three weekly modules, which included lessons, forum discussions, 
assignments, quizzes, grades and student reflection at the end of each week. 
The course was set up and deployed in the MOODLE Learning Management 
System (LMS) on a remote web server accessible on the Internet. Students 
were required to invest 10 hours weekly learning effort for 15 days in a span of 
three weeks. A detailed course outline is given in Appendix E (I). 
 Participants Recruitment: On-campus students from the School of Computer 
Science, University of Hertfordshire, were recruited to participate in the study 
and the online course. The course was advertised on the StudyNet. To motivate 
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students the course was offered free of charge. Participants were selected on 
the basis that they knew each other already. They were also required to have 
basic programming knowledge in order to enrol. A total of 12 students were en-
rolled and completed the three-week course. There were 7 (58%) male and 5 
(42%) female participants. They were also enrolled in BSc/MSc programmes 
which were helpful in setting up face-to-face meetings to present the study struc-
ture and research objectives, and perform the abuse case scenario in a 
laboratory. There was no repeated attendance of participants from the previous 
studies presented in Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
 Presentation and Students Registration: Participants were required to attend 
a face-to-face 15 minute presentation (see Appendix E (II)) on the course struc-
ture and research objectives, before registration. They were also provided 
detailed information on an impersonation abuse case scenario. It was essential 
for participants to understand the purpose of the research and how to perform 
impersonation attacks. They were provided an enrolment key and the course 
was made available to registered users. After the presentation, all participants 
signed the consent forms mandated by the University ethics regulations. 
 Pairing up of Participants for Impersonation: In order to perform the imper-
sonation, each participant was paired up with a fellow student (classmate), 
where both participants confirmed that they were familiar already. All participants 
consented to share learning experience and activities with their pairs. They were 
informed about the format of an impersonation abuse case scenario, which was 
conducted towards the end of the course. 
 Online Course Work: The instructor-led course was conducted over a period of 
three weeks. Participants were required to submit their weekly assignments in 
order to access their weekly quizzes. Each assignment was based on the week-
ly course content, which ensured participants’ engagement. It was mandatory for 
each participant to take their weekly quizzes and provide a ‘reflection feedback’ 
towards the end of each week. 
 Creating Dynamic Profile Questions: Dynamic profile questions were created 
manually during the course for each individual student and stored in a Microsoft 
Word file in a secure location. These questions were created on a daily basis for 
each participant after access to course content including lessons, assignment 
submission, assignment grades, quiz completion, feedback and reflection, and 
forum discussion. This helped with creating and consolidating a profile for each 
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participant. A total of 28 dynamic profile questions were created for each partici-
pant, which were based on questions shown in Appendix E (III). Dynamic profile 
questions created during the coursework were not shown to any participant dur-
ing the online course until the abuse case scenario described in the following 
section. 
11.3.2 Phase II – Impersonation Abuse Case Scenario 
In Phase II, the following impersonation abuse case scenario was simulated towards 
the end of a three-week course described above in order to evaluate impersonation 
attacks: 
“A student is registered on an online course. The course utilises dy-
namic profile questions, a remote proctor and a secure browsing tool 
for authentication of students in online examinations. The student is 
due to write his/her final online test. He or she wants to boost his/her 
grades and recruits a third party impersonator to take his test. The 
online test is monitored by a proctor remotely on a live web cam. In 
order to satisfy the dynamic profile questions authentication, the stu-
dent needs to share his/her learning experience, learning activities 
and cues with the impersonator before the online test. The imperson-
ator uses the shared information to answer the randomly presented 
dynamic profile questions for authentication in presence of a live 
proctor” 
Given the above scenario, this study simulated an impersonation abuse case sce-
nario described below: 
1. Participants were paired up before registration as described above in Phase I 
(section 11.3.1).  
2. Dynamic profile questions for each participant were manually created and stored 
in their respective profiles. These questions were extracted from student activi-
ties on a daily basis, as described above in Phase I (section 11.3.1). 
3. Participants were asked to share their learning experience, learning activities, 
and cues with their pairs during the course. They were allowed to share this in-
formation using any communication means, e.g. email, phone, WhatsApp, 
Skype, face-to-face meeting, Facebook, Facetime, SMS, printed paper, etc. 
They were required to memorise the shared information for simulating imper-
sonation in a proctored examination. 
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4. At the end of week three, participants attended a laboratory-based simulation 
session. 
5. Participants were informed about the format of simulating the laboratory-based 
proctored session. They were required to answer the questionnaire from 
memory and were not allowed to use an electronic or printed copy of the infor-
mation shared by their pairs for impersonation. Also, they were not allowed to 
communicate or share information when answering the two questionnaires in the 
following order: 
a. Questionnaire 1 (Effectiveness): Participants were asked to answer 
paper-based Questionnaire 1 with a total of 10 dynamic profile questions 
randomly extracted from their profiles created during the course work in 
Phase I (section 11.3.1). 
b. Questionnaire 2 (Impersonation): After answering Questionnaire 1, the 
participants were asked to answer a paper-based Questionnaire 2 with a 
total of 5 dynamic profile questions randomly extracted from their pair’s 
profile to simulate impersonation. 
11.4 Results 
The usability analysis of dynamic profile questions was initially performed and re-
ported in Chapter 9. This section aims to evaluate the usability of dynamic profile 
questions in the presence of a live proctor. At the end of week three, 12 participants 
answered 120 dynamic profile questions which were created during the course. Re-
sults of the abuse case scenario is also analysed to determine the outcome of an 
impersonation attack. 
11.4.1 Effectiveness 
The effectiveness is considered to be the degree of accuracy of participants’ re-
sponses. It is an important usability factor which indicates a degree of completeness 
with which users achieve a specified task in a certain context (Seffah et al., 2001). In 
the context of this study, it means that participants were able to provide correct an-
swers to their dynamic profile questions correctly with a low error rate. It was 
analysed on the data collected from participants’ answers on paper-based question-
naire 1 in a laboratory-based session. Table 11-1 shows the mean of correct 
answers to dynamic profile questions in order to analyse effectiveness. The findings 
show 114 (95%) correct answers, which indicates better effectiveness compared to 
text-based and image-based questions reported in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Table 11-1 Usability Analysis: Effectiveness  
Participants Correct 
1 10 (100%) 
2 10 (100%) 
3 9 (90%) 
4 9 (90%) 
5 10 (100%) 
6 9 (90%) 
7 10 (100%) 
8 9 (90%) 
9 9 (90%) 
10 9 (90%) 
11 10 (100%) 
12 10 (100%) 
Total 114 (95%) 
According to the usability scale presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) and letter 
grades (70%-79% acceptable, 80%-89% good, more than 90% exceptional) 
described by (Bangor et al., 2009), 95% correct answers is an exceptional effective-
ness. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was accepted. 
H 11.1) Dynamic profile questions are effective when implemented for authenti-
cation in a proctored online examination. Accepted 
11.4.2 Impersonation in Presence of Live Proctoring 
The abuse case scenario was performed to decide if dynamic profile questions can 
mitigate impersonation in a proctored exam. In a laboratory-based session, partici-
pants answered paper-based Questionnaire 2 consisting of five dynamic profile 
questions on behalf of their pairs. They memorised the shared information during 
pairing and answered the questionnaire from memory. These questions implement-
ed five multiple choice options and the probability of a correct answer to a random 
guessing would be 1/5th or 20%. In the impersonation abuse case scenario, partici-
pants answered 26 (22%) of the questions correctly on behalf of their pairs. These 
questions were not shown to any participant during the online course and presented 
at the final stage of the study to evaluate their ability to circumvent the dynamic pro-
file question approach and impersonate students in the presence of a live proctor. 
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The findings in Table 11-2 show that the sharing of information associated with indi-
viduals’ learning experience led to correct answers just above 1/5th of the total 
questions. 
Table 11-2 Security Analysis: Answers by Impersonator 
Participants Correct 
1 2 (20%) 
2 1 (10%) 
3 3 (30%) 
4 3 (30%) 
5 2 (20%) 
6 1 (10%) 
7 2 (20%) 
8 2 (20%) 
9 3 (30%) 
10 2 (20%) 
11 2 (20%) 
12 3 (30%) 
Total 26 (22%) 
To determine the significance of difference in the means of correct answers to dy-
namic profile questions by a student and a third party impersonator, a one-way 
ANOVA was performed on the data shown in Tables 11-1 and 11-2, which shows a 
significant difference F = 596; p = 0.00 (p < 0.01); eta-squared 2 = 0.97. An ANOVA 
test on a small sample size may not produce significant values due to insufficient 
power. However, findings of the test here yielded significant value. 
 In a practical situation, this may fail the authentication and alert the proctor or invigi-
lator. This shows that students were able to answer their own challenge questions 
presented in the previous section (see section 11.4.1); however, collusion between 
students and impersonators was not successful. Based on the above findings, the 
following hypothesis was accepted. 
H 11.2) Dynamic profile questions can positively influence an impersonation at-
tack in a proctored test, when a student shares dynamic profile questions 
with a third party before an online examination session. Accepted 
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The data shared by participants with their pairs for impersonation could not be rec-
orded for analysis. However, to collect information about data sharing, a post-study 
questionnaire was developed and is discussed below. 
11.4.3 Information Sharing Frequency and Method 
In a post-study survey, participants were asked for feedback on the communication 
method, frequency, and type of information shared during the abuse case simula-
tion. Table 11-3 shows a summary of feedback received, which is discussed in the 
Table 11-3 Information Sharing: Frequency, Type and Method of Sharing 
Question Options Feedback 
Q.1 How did you share information with your pair during collusion? 
 Email 10 (66.7%) 
 WhatsApp 3 (20%) 
 Skype 0 (0%) 
 Facetime 0 (0%) 
 Facebook 0 (0%) 
 Face-to-face meeting 2 (13.3%) 
 SMS 0 (0%) 
 Printed Paper 0 (0%) 
 Other 0 (0%) 
Q.2 How many times did you share information in the three weeks? 
 On a daily basis 0 (0%) 
 On completion of each session 4 (33.3%) 
 On a weekly basis 2 (16.7%) 
 Once through the entire course 2 (16.7%) 
 Twice through the entire course 3 (25%) 
 Towards the end of the course 1 (8.3%) 
Q.3 What kind of information did you share with your pair during the collu-
sion? 
 Titles of the completed course sessions  11 (42.3%) 
 Details of the completed course sessions 3 (11.5%) 
 Assignment score 4 (15.4%) 
 Assignment questions completed 5 (19.2%) 
 Quiz score 1 (3.8%) 
 Reflection Information 1 (3.8) 
 Email Information 1 (3.8%) 
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following sections. 
Communication during Collusion: To understand a preferred communication 
method, participants were asked for their feedback to Q.1 shown in Table 11-3. It 
was anticipated that phones and face-to-face meetings would be the preferred 
communication methods to share information. However, the majority of participants 
10 (66.7%) used email for information sharing. Face-to-face meetings were held by 
2 (13.3%) participants and another 3 (20%) used mobile chatting application 
‘WhatsApp’. The above results indicate that email was a preferred and convenient 
method of communication for students to share information. 
Frequency of Information Sharing: Frequency of communication in a timely man-
ner is important to share relevant information for the success of an impersonation 
attack. In order to understand how frequently students communicated to share in-
formation, participants were asked for their feedback to Q.2 shown in Table 11-3. 
The online course contained multiple daily and weekly learning sessions, and partic-
ipants shared information on completion of their relevant learning activities. A large 
number of participants (4: 33.3%) shared information about their learning experience 
with a partner at the end of “each session”. The majority of participants shared in-
formation at least once, twice or three times a week. As shown in Table 11-3, 2 
(16.7%) communicated “once through the entire course” and 1 (8.3%) “towards the 
end of the course” which implies that 2 (16.7%) + 1 (8.3%) = 3 (25%) communicated 
only once through the entire course duration. A total of 3 (25%) communicated twice. 
The above results indicate that the frequency of communication for sharing learning 
experience and information about learning activities was at least once a week during 
a three-week course. This may enable a student to share learning activities per-
formed in the week. 
Type of Information Sharing: In order to understand what type of information was 
shared for impersonation, participants were asked for their feedback to Q.3 shown in 
Table 11-3. A large number of participants (11: 42.3%) shared “titles of the lessons” 
completed. Results of the impersonation attack discussed in the previous section 
indicated that “titles of the lessons” was not helpful to inform answers to the dynamic 
profile questions. These questions were extracted from the content and associated 
with individuals’ submissions. 5 (19.2%) participants shared assignment questions 
and 4 (15.4%) shared assignment scores, which were associated with the actual 
dynamic profile questions and resulted in 22% correct answers in the impersonation 
abuse case reported in the previous section (see section 11.4.2). The findings indi-
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cate that sharing relevant information increases the success of an impersonation 
attack. 
11.5 Summary 
This study examined the use of dynamic profile questions in a proctored examina-
tion. Participants shared information using mobile phones, emails, chat, and face-to-
face meetings at their own convenience before an online examination in pairs. They 
memorised the shared information and answered the questionnaire on dynamic pro-
file questions on behalf of their pairs in the presence of a proctor. The results show 
that dynamic profile questions decreases impersonation attacks when implemented 
with live proctoring. Participants’ sharing helped the impersonators to provide 26 
(22%) correct answers in the impersonation attack, which is just above 20%, which 
is the percentage of correct answers by chance. There was a significant difference 
(p < 0.01) in the correct answers between a student (114: 95%) and an impersona-
tor (26: 22%). In participants’ feedback taken from the post-study online 
questionnaire, email was reported as the preferred way of sharing information with a 
third party impersonator. Students were able to share titles of the learning activities, 
which was not enough for impersonators to answer all their dynamic profile ques-
tions. Although, the frequency of sharing was at least once a week during a three-
week course, the information shared was not relevant to the actual questions. This 
implies that sharing of relevant information increases the success of an impersona-
tion attack. Furthermore, dynamic profile questions extracted from course content 
and submissions makes sharing harder for students. 
 
The above findings indicate the use of dynamic profile questions and proctoring 
tools recommended in the focus group study can positively influence impersonation 
and abetting in online examinations. 
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12 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summarises the findings and conclusions of this research work. The 
following sections represent the summary of the work, and the research outcomes. It 
provides a summary of the main contributions and the future outlook of this re-
search. 
12.1 Summary of Research 
This research focused on the security and usability of authentication by challenge 
questions in online examinations. In this work, I undertook the following research 
studies. 
This research work investigated security threats and proposed a profile-based chal-
lenge question authentication approach to mitigate them. The first empirical study 
described in Chapter 6 was organised to examine the usability attributes: the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the proposed challenge question approach. This study 
implemented pre-defined text-based questions, which are associated with individu-
als’ personal information. It was anticipated that a friend or colleague may be able to 
guess correct answers on behalf of the user. Therefore, this study also performed a 
security investigation using a guessing abuse case scenario. The first study was 
performed using an initial prototype for the collection of benchmark data.  
Based on the findings of the first study, pre-defined text-based and image-based 
questions were implemented in the second study presented in Chapter 7. This study 
investigated usability attributes: the efficiency and effectiveness of text-based and 
image-based questions in a real educational context using an online course.  
The third study presented in Chapter 8 investigated impersonation attacks using 
pre-defined text-based challenge questions. The study examined the influence of 
sharing different numbers of questions with a third party impersonator. It investigat-
ed how the number of questions shared and the size of the database affects the 
success of a collusion attack. 
Based on the findings of the third study, dynamic profile questions were proposed. 
The fourth study presented in Chapter 9 investigated usability attributes: the effec-
tiveness of dynamic profile questions in an online course. The study examined 
impersonation attacks, when a student and a third party impersonator share access 
credentials using an email (asynchronously) or a mobile phone (real time). 
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The fifth study presented in Chapter 10 invited online programme tutors as important 
stake holders to participate in a focus group session. Participants in the study were 
security and assessment experts, scientists, tutors, and examinations designers. 
They were asked for their feedback on security threats including collusion, the pro-
posed solution and relevant usability attributes. 
The sixth and final study presented in Chapter 11 investigated the usability and se-
curity of dynamic profile questions in a proctored online examination. The study 
simulated an impersonation attack in an online course and face-to-face laboratory- 
based sessions. 
The above studies were conducted to achieve the following aims and objectives. 
This thesis aimed to design and analyse an authentication approach, understand the 
essential usability attributes and impact of the proposed method on collusion attacks 
in a remote online examination. In order to achieve the above aim, a list of the fol-
lowing research objectives was generated to: 
Objective 1) Investigate security threats to online examinations. 
Objective 2) Investigate and design an authentication approach, and under-
stand its influence on the potential security threats to online 
examinations. 
Objective 3) Evaluate usability and its influence on the security of the pro-
posed authentication method. 
Objective 4) Evaluate the security of the proposed method. 
To achieve the above objectives, this research attempted to answer the following 
research questions and sub-questions: 
RQ 1) What are the potential security threats to online examinations? 
 a. What are the potential collusion and non-collusion threats to online ex-
aminations? 
RQ 2) What method can be used to support the secure authentication of 
students in online examinations?  
 a. How can the challenge question approach be used for the authentication 
of students in online examinations? 
RQ 3) How does the usability of the proposed authentication method in-
fluence the security? 
 a. How does the usability of text-based questions influence the security of 
the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
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 b. How does the usability of image-based questions influence the security 
of the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
 c. How does the usability of dynamic profile questions influence the securi-
ty of the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
RQ 4) How does the proposed authentication method influence security 
threats? 
 a. How does the use of text-based questions influence the collusion threats 
in online examinations? 
 b. How does the use of dynamic profile questions influence the collusion 
threats in online examinations?  
12.2 Summary of Research Outcomes 
The research problems were approached with a focus on the research questions, 
which were derived from the research objectives. In order to achieve this, the re-
search work was organised into two phases. In the first phase, the research 
problems and a proposed solution were identified. In the second phase, the empiri-
cal evaluation of the proposed solution was performed in multiple studies. These 
studies were conducted in simulation and real educational contexts using a combi-
nation of quantitative and qualitative methods. These two phases aimed to answer 
the four research questions and sub-questions identified in Chapter 1, which were 
further cascaded into more research questions as the work progressed. These 
questions were answered in the following manner. 
RQ 1) What are the potential security threats to online examinations? 
The first research question focused on determining the weaknesses and vulnerabili-
ties that create potential threats to online examinations. A threat is the potential for 
misuse or abuse that will cause harm or exploit online examinations (assets) (Haley 
et al., 2004). Weak authentication and the absence of face-to-face interaction create 
numerous threats to the high-stake examination process. To understand the poten-
tial harm that a security breach may cause, it is important to recognise the likelihood 
and description of a threat (Miguel et al., 2015a). Identifying potential threat scenari-
os may help us to understand what can go wrong if a threat scenario occurs. To 
achieve this, multiple abuse case scenarios were created using the risk-based as-
sessment method presented in Chapter 5.  
Threats to online examinations were identified from the literature review and experi-
ence. The threat classification presented in Chapter 3 provided a description of 
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potential threats, which include intrusion and non-intrusion attacks. Intrusion attacks 
are performed by cyber attackers, criminals and hackers (Hugerat et al., 2013). 
These attacks are carried out to exploit information without causing any harm to the 
online learning and examination system (Hugerat et al., 2013). The attacker may not 
destroy data in an online course; however, this causes distrust and affects the credi-
bility of an online system.  
RQ 1a) What are the potential collusion and non-collusion threats to online examina-
tions? 
The sub-question RQ 1a) was related to collusion and non-collusion attacks. These 
attacks may come from a legitimate student individually or in collusion with a third 
party. There are a number of factors that influence the cheating behaviour of stu-
dents in general. They often cheat to qualify or to enhance their grades. This 
stimulates many threats that may be further classified in two categories: collusion 
and non-collusion.  In general, these threats are open-ended and widespread due to 
the fact that students access learning and examinations on the Internet, and there 
are weak authentication mechanisms. Collusion was further classified into imper-
sonation and abetting threats. Impersonation happens when a student willingly 
shares access credentials with a third party to impersonate him in an online exami-
nation (McGee, 2013). These attacks are pre-planned and consensual, involving 
legitimate students with valid access credentials. It is difficult to detect such attacks 
once an online test is completed (Kerka and Wonacott, 2000). These are evolving 
with the increasing use of new communication technologies. The potential imper-
sonation scenarios include: impersonation using mobile phone, email, remote 
desktop sharing, and instant messaging. In abetting, a legitimate student takes an 
online test; however, he or she obtains help from a third party. This is described as 
panic cheating, when a student is struggling to answer a question during the test. 
Stuber-McEwen et al. (2009) state that aiding and abetting is a common practice in 
both online and classroom cheating. Regardless of whether students were online or 
in on-ground classes, aiding and abetting with exams were the most frequently re-
ported forms of cheating (Dietz-Uhler and Hurn, 2011). In the absence of proctoring, 
live invigilation or remote monitoring, it may be challenging to ensure that the test 
taker is not getting help from someone sitting next to them or in a remote location.  
While the literature review provided an understanding of the threats, experts were 
asked for their perception of the identified threats in a focus group study. The study 
described in Chapter 11 presented feedback from online programme tutors, who 
were experts in course design, examinations, assessment design, invigilation, 
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teaching and scientific research. A paper-based questionnaire and a focus group 
discussion were used for the collection of feedback in two phases (see Table 12-1).   
Table 12-1 Evidence: Threats Classification  
Items Method Section Outcome 
1.  Questionnaire 10.3 Online programme tutors participated 
in a focus group study. They identified 
impersonation and abetting as serious 
threats. 
2.  Focus Group 10.4 Online programme tutors agreed that 
collusion is a major threat and that the 
use of technology creates more oppor-
tunities for impersonation and abetting. 
In the first phase, the experts provided their feedback on the questionnaire (see Ta-
ble 12-1 item 1). They showed strong concern regarding the security threats to 
online examinations. The majority of the participants were concerned about “Online 
examinations” and “Authentication approaches”, and their feedback scored M = 4 
and M = 3.7 respectively (1 = no concern at all and 5 = strong concern). There was 
an agreement that cheating in online examinations is less difficult than in a face-to-
face invigilated exam. They expressed high concern for security threats including 
“impersonation” and “abetting”, which scored M = 4.1 and M = 4.2 respectively (1 = 
no concern at all and 5 = strong concern).  
In the second phase, the focus group discussion was held (see Table 12-1 item 2). 
The participants agreed that the absence of invigilation or monitoring creates more 
opportunities for cheating, and that students’ actions are difficult to monitor in a re-
mote environment. There was an agreement that collusion is a major threat and the 
use of technology (mobile phones, email, instant messaging, and remote desktop 
sharing) creates more opportunities for impersonation and abetting attacks. The ma-
jority expressed concern that “it is challenging to verify that a student signed up for a 
course is the same person who is taking the online examination”. 
In response to these threats, an authentication method was needed, which could 
countermeasure impersonation and abetting attacks in online examinations. It was 
followed up in the next research question below. 
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RQ 2) What method can be used to support secure authentication for 
online examinations?  
The existing authentication features are not sufficient to ensure that the correct stu-
dent takes an online examination. These features provide different levels of security 
assurances and usability. Their cost of implementation and accessibility in dispersed 
geographical locations vary. Many of the existing features may have varying issues 
including costs of implementation, infrastructure constraints, accessibility, usability 
and security. 
RQ 2a) How can the challenge question approach be used for the authentication of 
students in online examinations? 
 In order to answer the second research question and sub-question, a profile-based 
authentication was proposed (Ullah et al., 2012a). The proposed method was de-
scribed in Chapter 4; it utilises challenge questions for the authentication of students 
in online examinations (see Table 12-2). Using this method, a student profile is built 
and consolidated during the learning process. Information in a student profile is 
stored in the form of questions and answers. A subset of these questions is used for 
authentication. A student registers n profile questions, and presented with t chal-
lenge questions upon authentication, where t ≤ n. To an individual r = t or r ≤ t 
questions must be answered correctly in order to authenticate (r = number of correct 
answers). This approach aimed to discourage students from sharing their access 
credentials with third party impersonators. It attempts to help ensure that the student 
taking an online test is the same one who completed the course work. The initial 
prototype of the proposed method was designed in PHP and implemented in a 
MOODLE learning management system. The architecture of the proposed design, 
including a presentation layer, business logic layer and data layer, were presented 
(see Table 12-2 items 1-2). This is a knowledge-based feature, which is accessible 
Table 12-2 Evidence: Proposed Authentication Approach 
Items Method Section Outcome 
1. Design 4.2 A conceptual design of the proposed profile- 
based authentication system. 
2. Architecture 4.4.2 A three-tier architecture design of MOODLE 
and integration of the proposed profile-based 
authentication method. 
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on standard input devices. Unlike biometrics and object-based features, this method 
does not require dedicated input devices or infrastructure. 
The traditional challenge questions feature an important fall back and credential re-
covery approach  (Just and Aspinall, 2009a). The security and usability of this 
method are reliant upon the quality of the question design. Therefore, this thesis 
proposed and examined different types of questions, including text-based, image-
based and dynamic profile questions. The proposed method was evaluated for usa-
bility and security in six studies using different question types. The outcomes of the 
usability investigations are presented in the following section. 
RQ 3) How does the usability of the proposed method influence the securi-
ty? 
Usability is an important quality of software systems. It is a measure of useful inter-
actions between a system and target users in a specified context. It is not a single 
component but multiple attributes applied to systems in different contexts. Many re-
searchers argue that secure systems are compromised through human errors and 
that “ease of use” is essential in order to make users behave securely (Adams and 
Sasse, 1999, Yee, 2002, Poulsen, 2000). Security techniques are only effective 
when usable (Sasse et al., 2001). It is essential for security designers to understand 
the user behaviour in order to build usable and secure systems. Authentication pro-
vides access to many secure systems and it is successful when security and 
usability are aligned. Di Raimondo and Gennaro (2005) state that authentication is a 
main goal when security is implemented, whereas usability is the main goal of sys-
tem implementation. Therefore, this research investigated the usability attributes of 
the proposed challenge question approach in multiple studies. 
In order to answer the third research question, a review of the literature associated 
with methodologies to evaluate usability attributes was undertaken. The usability 
test method described in Chapter 5 was implemented to examine usability attributes: 
efficiency and effectiveness recommended by ISO/9241-11 (Jokela et al., 2003). 
The efficiency is a usability attribute, which can be evaluated by measuring the 
completion time of each task and sub-tasks separately (Seffah et al., 2001). A sys-
tem is considered efficient if users are able to complete tasks in a reasonable time. 
The effectiveness is considered to be the degree of accuracy of the participants’ re-
sponses. In the context of a challenge question approach, it means that the 
participants were able to provide answers to their questions correctly with a low er-
ror rate. The effectiveness was evaluated using a scale defined by Bang et al. 
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(2009) based on the standard letter grade scale. This scale provides an adjective 
description of the effectiveness, i.e. products that scored in the 90s were exception-
al, those that scored in the 80s were good, and those that scored in the 70s were 
acceptable. The usability attributes were investigated for text-based, image-based 
and dynamic profile questions in empirical studies presented in Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10 
and 11.  
Table 12-3 Evidence: Usability Investigations 
Items Method Section Outcome 
1.  Simulation 6.4 The effectiveness was 58% using an 
equality algorithm and 76% using a 
relaxed algorithm. The mean comple-
tion time was 15.7 seconds per 
response. 
2.  Simulation 6.4.2.1 The effectiveness increased using a 
traffic light access control system. 
This allowed multiple authentication 
attempts. 
3.  Statistical Analysis 7.4.1 The efficiency increased with an in-
crease in the number of visits. 
4.  Statistical Analysis 7.4.2 The effectiveness of image-based 
questions (85%) was better than text-
based questions 
5.  Statistical Analysis 9.4.1 The effectiveness of dynamic profile 
questions was 99.5% 
6. Questionnaire 10.3 Participants’ feedback ranked ques-
tions effectiveness as 1) dynamic 
profile 2) image-based and 3) text-
based questions. (1 most effective) 
RQ 3a) How does the usability of text-based questions influence the security of the 
challenge question approach in online examinations? 
The first empirical study is presented in Chapter 6, which examined the usability at-
tributes: efficiency and effectiveness using an initial prototype of the challenge 
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question method. A total of 20 text-based questions were implemented in the first 
study. These questions were organised into different themes: academic, contact, 
personal, date and favourite. These are traditional personal security questions, 
which are utilised by many email service providers, websites and online banks (Just 
and Aspinall, 2012, Schechter et al., 2009). The study was conducted in a simulation 
online learning and examination environment. The initial findings revealed some us-
ability challenges (see Table 12-3 items 1-2). The mean completion time of all 
questions was 15.7 seconds, which implies that a user could answer three questions 
within a minute. There was a significant correlation between answer length and re-
sponse time (p < 0.01). The use of challenge questions creates an interruption in the 
normal learning process. The mean correct responses to all questions were 58% 
using a string-to-string comparison or equality algorithm (see Table 12-3 item 1). 
Questions with clarity, ambiguity and format issues had poor efficiency, which influ-
enced the effectiveness during authentication. This algorithm penalised answers 
with syntactic variation, spacing, capitalisation and spelling mistakes, which led to 
incorrect answers. The use of a relaxed algorithm (Schechter et al., 2009) compen-
sated for these issues and increased the correct per cent to 76%. There was a 
significant difference in the correct answers between equality and relaxed algorithms 
(p < 0.01). To compensate for the identified usability issues, a traffic light access 
control system was also implemented. This allowed multiple attempts to users, who 
provided correct answers to some questions out of the total presented on pre-set 
criteria. This increased the success rate of authentication from 23% to 92%.   
RQ 3b) How does the usability of image-based questions influence the security of 
the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
To address the usability issues identified in Chapter 6, image-based questions were 
implemented. The second empirical study presented in Chapter 7 utilised image-
based and text-based questions. This study examined the usability attributes: effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Image-based authentication substitutes the need to 
memorise and recall text-based tokens (2005). A five-week online course was or-
ganised involving remote students from nine countries interacting with the learning 
and examination processes. The findings of the study showed an increase in the 
usability (see Table 12-3 items 3-4). The efficiency analysis showed a significant lin-
ear trend (p < 0.01) in the completion time of the challenge questions with an 
increase in the number of visits by the participants. The direction of the trend was 
negative, which showed that completion time decreased with an increasing number 
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of visits. The mean correct answers to determine effectiveness of text-based ques-
tions was 66%, which increased to 74% using a relaxed algorithm to compensate for 
spelling mistakes and syntax variation. The mean correct answers to image-based 
questions were 85% (see Table 12-3 item 4). This showed that the use of image-
based questions increased the effectiveness and that there was a significant differ-
ence in the mean correct answers between text-based and image-based questions 
(p < 0.01). The implementation of the multiple choice image-based questions ad-
dressed the usability issues reported with the text-based questions, which resulted 
in better effectiveness. The use of multiple choice options provided clues to the par-
ticipants in order to recall the correct answers and they also addressed usability 
issues: capitalisation, spacing, spellings and syntax variation. 
RQ 3c) How does the usability of dynamic profile questions influence the security of 
the challenge question approach in online examinations? 
The fourth empirical study presented in Chapter 9 implemented dynamic profile 
questions and examined the usability attributes: efficiency and effectiveness. In or-
der to implement these questions, a five-week online course was used, involving 
remote students from five countries interacting with the learning and examination 
processes. The findings of the study showed an increase in the usability (see Table 
12-3 item 5). Unlike pre-defined text-based and image-based questions, which re-
quired students to register their answers, dynamic profile questions were created 
non-intrusively and non-distractively in the background, which resulted in better effi-
ciency. Information was extracted from the students’ learning activities, the content 
of submissions, grades, lessons and forum posts in order to build and consolidate 
his or her profile. These questions implemented five multiple options using correct 
and distraction choices. The mean correct answers during the authentication pro-
cess were 99.5% (see Table 12-3 item 5). This was significantly different than both 
text-based and image-based questions (p < 0.01). 
Online programme tutors are important stakeholders in the online learning and ex-
aminations process. The focus group study presented in Chapter 10 was organised 
with experienced online programme tutors to provide their views on different points 
for discussion, including the usability and applicability of the proposed challenge 
question approach. The participants of the focus group also provided their feedback 
on the usability of the proposed challenge question method (see Table 12-3 items 6-
7). In response to the survey questions regarding the effectiveness of text-based, 
image-based and dynamic profile questions, the participants rated them as 3, 3.4, 
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and 3.7 respectively (1 = not useful, 5 = very useful). There was a significant linear 
trend (p < 0.01) in their responses to questions associated with the usability of the 
three question types. Their feedback supported the findings of the empirical studies 
on effectiveness. 
While usability is important, security is critical to maintain the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of systems. A security analysis of the challenge question approach is 
presented in the following section. 
RQ 4) How does the proposed authentication method influence security 
threats? 
The risk-based assessment method described in Chapter 5 was adopted to evaluate 
the security of the proposed challenge question approach in order to answer the 
fourth and final research question. It is a quantitative method that provides rapid 
quantification of security level risks associated with processes (Ni et al., 2003). It 
focuses on the testing of features and functions of artefacts based on the risk of 
their failure (McGraw, 2004). Using this method, i) functions and features are identi-
fied; ii) threats and risks are identified; and iii) an abuse case scenario is created. 
Multiple abuse case scenarios were created to evaluate the collusion attacks of dif-
ferent types using text-based and dynamic profile questions in five studies 
presented in Chapters 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11.  
Table 12-4 Evidence: Security Investigations 
Items Method Section Outcome 
1.  Simulation 6.5.1 The guessing attack was not successful. 
2. Statistical Analysis 8.4.1 An increase in the number of shared 
questions increased the success of an 
impersonation attack. 
3.  Statistical Analysis 8.4.3 There was a difference in the number of 
correct answers when answered from a 
printed source or memory. 
4. Statistical Analysis 8.4.2 An increase in the database size de-
creased the success of an 
impersonation attack. 
5. Simulation / Statis- 9.5.1 The findings of sharing using email 
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tical Analysis asynchronously showed that impersona-
tor was not successful 
6. Simulation / Statis-
tical Analysis 
9.5.2 The findings of sharing using a phone in 
real time showed that the impersonator 
was successful 
7.  Simulation / Statis-
tical Analysis 
9.5.3 The response time of students to dy-
namic profile questions was quicker 
“when there was no impersonation” 
compared to “when there was imper-
sonation” 
8.  Focus Group 10.4.2.1 
10.4.2.2 
The response time factor can be used 
for mitigation of impersonation when the 
challenge question approach is imple-
mented 
9. Focus Group 10.4.2.2 Dynamic profile questions, a secure 
browser and remote proctoring can be 
used to mitigate collusion attacks 
10. Simulation / Statis-
tical Analysis 
11.4.2 The impersonation attack was not suc-
cessful when dynamic profile questions 
were implemented in a proctored exam. 
RQ 4a) How does the use of text-based questions influence collusion threats in 
online examinations? 
Text-based challenge questions are associated with an individual’s personal infor-
mation which can be vulnerable to blind, focused and informed guessing attacks by 
adversaries, acquaintances, friends and colleagues (Schechter et al., 2009, Just 
and Aspinall, 2009b). The study presented in Chapter 6 investigated the security of 
text-based challenge questions when a friend or colleague attempts to impersonate 
a student using a guessing attack. The findings of the study showed that the guess-
ing may not succeed in a practical situation (see Table 12-4 item 1). The mean 
correct answers in a guessing abuse case scenario were 13% using an equality al-
gorithm. This increased to 29% if a relaxed algorithm was implemented. In a 
practical situation, 71% incorrect answers would alert the course administrator and 
the guessing attack may not be successful. The difference in the number of correct 
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answers using equality and relaxed algorithms showed usability and security trade-
off. 
Since text-based questions are associated with an individual’s personal information, 
students may be able to share them with third parties for impersonation. The third 
empirical study presented in Chapter 8 investigated the influence of sharing different 
numbers of challenge questions for impersonation using varying database sizes. 
The study was simulated sharing different numbers of questions using three differ-
ent databases of size 20, 30 and 50. The results showed that an increase in the 
number of shared questions increased the number of correct answers with a signifi-
cant linear trend (p < 0.01) (see Table 12-4 item 2). In the simulation attack, the 
challenge questions were randomised; however, the impersonators were able to 
search and copy the correct answers from an electronic or printed source of the 
shared information. The mean correct answers decreased when the impersonators 
were required to memorise and answer the challenge questions. There was a signif-
icant difference in the mean correct answers when impersonators copied answers 
from printed information and memorised information (p < 0.01) (see Table 12-4 item 
3). This implies that an impersonator can circumvent the text-based challenge ques-
tions irrespective of the size of the database, if an online examination is not 
monitored or the students are not restricted to answering their challenge questions 
in a limited time. Also, an increase in the database size decreased the success of an 
impersonation attack. A significant linear trend with a negative direction was found 
for all database sizes (p < 0.01) (see Table 12-4 item 4). This showed that the larger 
the database size, the less successful the impersonation attack. An increase in the 
database size also increased the randomisation of questions, the difficulty of memo-
rising a large number of shared questions and answers, and the difficulty of 
searching for answers in a shared source. 
The threat classification described in Chapter 5 identified impersonation as a serious 
threat. Students invited third parties to take their online tests for extra benefit. Rowe 
(2004) stated that individuals share credentials with impersonators, who take the 
online test on behalf of the intended test taker. Based on the findings of the study 
presented in Chapter 8, it was appropriate to mitigate the issue of credential (ques-
tions) sharing. To achieve this, a dynamic profile question method was proposed 
and implemented.  
RQ 4b) How does the use of dynamic profile questions influence the collusion 
threats in online examinations? 
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The fourth empirical study presented in Chapter 9 used dynamic profile questions in 
a five-week online course. Students can make use of modern technology and share 
these questions using email asynchronously or with a mobile phone in real time. To 
evaluate the effect of these threats, the study investigated impersonation abuse 
case scenarios using email and mobile phones. The findings of impersonation using 
email showed that the impersonator was not successful. In this study, dynamic pro-
file questions implemented five multiple choice options and the probability of a 
correct answer by chance would be 1/5th or 20%. In the impersonation using email, 
the impersonator answered 8% of challenge questions correctly (see Table 12-4 
item 5). In a practical situation this may not be sufficient to impersonate a student. In 
the second abuse case scenario, when a student and an impersonator shared in-
formation using a mobile phone in real time, the impersonator answered 92% of 
challenge questions correctly (see Table 12-4 item 6).  This is an increased number 
of correct answers and indicates that an impersonator can succeed if they com-
municate with a student in real time. There was a significant difference (p < 0.01) in 
the mean correct answers between an email and a mobile phone attack. However, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.01) in the response time between a genuine 
student and a third party impersonator (see Table 12-4 item 7). This indicated that 
the response time factor can be used to discourage students from sharing their ac-
cess credentials with impersonators in real time.  
The focus group study described in Chapter 10 presented the feedback of online 
programme tutors. The majority of the participants recommended a response time 
factor for mitigation of real-time impersonation attacks (M = 3.8) (see Table 12-4 
item 8). There was an agreement that dynamic profile questions can influence im-
personation attacks (M = 3.8). However, they recommended proctoring or 
monitoring of the online examination process to mitigate abetting attacks (see Table 
12-4 item 9). However, students may still attempt to circumvent the system by shar-
ing login details and dynamic profile questions with an impersonator before an 
online examination session. 
In order to evaluate the security of dynamic profile questions and live proctoring, an 
abuse case scenario was simulated in a real online course and a face-to-face labor-
atory-based session. The final empirical study presented in Chapter 11 investigated 
an impersonation attack, when a student shares their learning experience, access 
credentials and associated information with a third party impersonator before an 
online examination session. Students were paired at the beginning to share infor-
mation with their partner for impersonation towards the end of the study. The 
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participants were allowed to reveal their credentials and dynamic profile questions 
with their pairs face-to-face or through any convenient communication method. The 
findings of the study showed that impersonation was not successful in a proctored 
exam. In this study, dynamic profile questions implemented five multiple choice op-
tions and the probability of a correct answer by chance would be 1/5th or 20%. 
Impersonators answered 22% of the questions correctly in a proctored exam (see 
Table 12-4 item 10). In a practical situation, 78% incorrect answers would alert a 
proctor and it is unlikely that an impersonator would succeed. 
To conclude, the use of dynamic profile questions, a secure browser and proctoring 
can influence impersonation and abetting attacks. 
12.3 Summary of Contributions 
This work is a continuation of previous research in the field of the authentication and 
identity verification of students in online examinations. The contributions of this re-
search will add to the existing body of research. It provides an understanding of 
threats, usability, mitigation methods and the profile-based challenge question ap-
proach in the context of online examinations. This research has made the following 
contributions: 
12.3.1 Understanding of Threats 
Identifying potential threats may help us to understand what can go wrong if a threat 
occurs. Threats to online examinations have been identified in numerous research 
studies. The threats classification presented in this thesis provides a better under-
standing of weaknesses in a clear hierarchical structure. It has attempted to 
describe a distinction between intrusion and non-intrusion attacks. Threats in these 
two categories originate from different sources with varying motivations. Most im-
portantly, there are different security approaches to provide different levels of 
deterrence against these threats. Intrusions are traditional threats to many web-
based systems, including online learning and examinations. There are many securi-
ty approaches to deter them; however, security approaches that mitigate intrusion 
attacks may not influence non-intrusion attacks.  
Non-intrusion attacks are posed by genuine students, and they include collusion and 
non-collusion threats. Collusion is categorised on the basis of a person taking an 
online test, to distinguish between abetting and impersonation, which require differ-
ent security approaches. A detail description of these threats was provided in 
Chapter 3. 
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The threat classification may help the experts, practitioners, tutors and educational 
institutions to align their security models in line with the potential threat model. 
12.3.2 Usability Evaluation 
Usability is essential in the design of authentication methods (Braz and Robert, 
2006).   These methods may fail to protect critical information if users are unable to 
use them correctly. This research approached usability in the context of authentica-
tion and online examination systems. Many research studies have previously 
examined the usability of the challenge question approach. This thesis added to the 
existing body of knowledge and contributed a usability investigation of text-based, 
image-based and dynamic profile-based challenge questions. The analysis was per-
formed on the data collected from simulation and real online learning and 
examinations contexts. The results of the usability analysis revealed usability issues 
with text-based questions, such as ambiguity, syntax variation, and spelling mis-
takes. Image-based questions compensated for these issues and were more usable 
than text-based questions. Dynamic profile questions were the most usable of all 
question types, providing minimal distraction to students during the learning pro-
cess. 
12.3.3 Usability and Security Trade-off 
A trade-off between security and usability has been an issue; both are important for 
the authentication process (Braz and Robert, 2006). The usability and security anal-
ysis of challenge questions also indicated a trade-off. The findings described in 
Chapter 6 showed that the use of a relaxed algorithm increased the effectiveness of 
questions compared to the equality algorithm. However, this had security implica-
tions in a guessing attack. The use of a relaxed algorithm increased the success of 
a guessing attack from 13% to 29%. Similarly, the usability of image-based and dy-
namic profile questions reported in Chapters 7 and 8 was significantly better than 
text-based questions. Besides other factors, one of the important reasons for in-
creased usability was the implementation of multiple choice answers. However, this 
has security implications. The probability of a successful guess using multiple choice 
questions is 1/n (n = number of choices). Both image-based and dynamic profile-
based questions implemented 5 multiple choice options and the probability of a suc-
cessful guess was 1/5 or 20%.  
The design of a usable and secure system is challenging when it comes to aligning 
these two competing and essential factors. This is more important in the context of 
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online examinations and collusion, where a more usable system may be circum-
vented by a student and a third party impersonator. Designing challenge questions 
that are difficult to guess, may be less usable for users due to recall. Similarly, the 
use of strict security parameters may be less usable, such as the use of an equality 
algorithm. This adds to the existing knowledge, which may be useful for security and 
usability experts. 
12.3.4 Security Evaluation 
In studies involving security analysis it is logistically challenging to access the actual 
resource assets for research and evaluation. Empirical evaluation is a useful method 
to evaluate the security of artefacts. It has a fundamental role in scientific research 
to help us understand how and why things work (Perry et al., 2000). However, real-
world empirical research in security design can be difficult logistically (Fléchais, 
2005). Security experts responsible for a real-world system may not be willing to 
disclose their secret system security model and data for empirical evaluation.  
While security has always been a challenge for researchers and practitioners, this 
thesis has attempted to answer questions associated with security issues. This work 
created both simulation and real online learning contexts to examine the identified 
security threats with a focus on collusion. Impersonation abuse case scenarios were 
simulated involving students. Online programme tutors were invited for their feed-
back on the research problems and the proposed solutions. Impersonation abuse 
case scenarios were organised with remote online students as well as in face-to-
face laboratory sessions. The results showed that dynamic profile questions can in-
fluence impersonation attacks. The use of a secure browser and proctoring can 
impact abetting attacks. This contribution may be useful for educational institutions, 
students, tutors, practitioners and the security experts. 
12.3.5 Profile-based Challenge Question Authentication 
The existing authentication provides adequate security to deter intrusion attacks in 
online examinations. However, it is essential to address collusion attacks. The work 
in this thesis contributed knowledge and the practical application of using a profile- 
based challenge question method. This method has a practical advantage over the 
use of conventional authentication methods in remote online settings, where stu-
dents can use it in varying time zones and dispersed geographical locations. The 
integration of learning and examination processes provides an additional factor to 
influence security threats. 
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12.3.6 Dynamic Profile Questions 
One of the key security challenges of online examinations is to ensure that the per-
son taking an online test is the same who completed the learning. The majority of 
existing methods rely upon a code of honour and the assumption that a genuine 
student is taking the test. However, research studies discussed in Chapter 3 indicat-
ed that impersonation is on the rise.  
It is important that the use of technology does not interrupt or distract a student from 
learning. Thus, the dynamic profile question approach was designed. This is a more 
adaptable method, as it creates a student’s profile based on his/her learning activi-
ties and content submissions. Unlike text-based and image-based questions, 
dynamic profile questions are created non-intrusively in the background when a stu-
dent performs his/her course work. These questions are based on students’ learning 
activities e.g. assignments, submissions, lessons, forum interactions, forum post-
ings, reflections, grades, quizzes and interaction with other learning resources. They 
are not aware of which questions will be asked for authentication. This approach im-
plements multiple choice answers and students are required to recognise a correct 
answer from the given choices, which results in increased usability compared to the 
traditional text-based questions. Results from the experiments presented in Chap-
ters 9, 10 and 11 showed that the use of dynamic profile questions increased the 
relevant usability attributes and influenced the success of impersonation attacks.  
12.4 Discussion 
Collusion is one of the key challenges to online examinations today. Approaching 
this problem, providing an understanding of the influence of such attacks on online 
examinations, discussing the problems and motivating factors, and the proposed 
solutions are important. Evaluating the solution involving students and tutors in re-
search studies contributes to key areas in security and usability in the online 
examinations context. 
This research provided a detailed understanding of the threats to online examina-
tions. In response to these threats a profile-based challenge question authentication 
method was designed. The usability findings of the three different question types 
showed that dynamic profile questions were more usable. The security analysis pro-
vided an increased understanding of security issues and countermeasures. It 
showed that the use of these questions provides an additional security factor. To 
circumvent the proposed method, a student was required to share dynamic profile 
questions with an impersonator in an impersonation attack. The successful attack 
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was reliant upon the number of questions shared. Unlike text-based and image-
based questions, dynamic profile questions were created in the background and 
asynchronous sharing of these questions with third party impersonators was not 
successful. Also, sharing of these questions in real time may be difficult if the user 
response is timed. 
The findings of this research will benefit tutors, students and research communities. 
In the focus group session, online programme tutors provided positive feedback, 
highlighting the important security threats including collusion and investigating po-
tential countermeasures. The use of a secure learning environment may help with 
organising a fair learning and examination process. The research findings will help 
the research community by promoting further work on providing a usable and secure 
environment in order to improve the online learning experience. 
This research work has a potential social impact described below:  
 Cost Effective: Due to increasing cost of traditional universities, online courses 
have become increasingly attractive for learners (Christensen and Eyring, 2011). 
The use of online learning and examinations reduces the cost of travelling, infra-
structure, and resources. Students can learn on demand from any location in 
their own time. This research work investigated a knowledge-based approach, 
which is likely to be cost effective compared to biometrics and object-based ap-
proaches.  
 Accessibility: The rapid growth and expansion of the Internet and technology in-
creased the use of online learning and examinations internationally. This also 
appealed to those learners who are unable to access traditional education. This 
mode of teaching and learning offers more convenient access to all students in-
cluding people with limited access. This research contributed a knowledge-
based method to reduce the accessibility challenges.  
 Academic institutions: As described in chapter 3, security of online examinations 
has been a common issue for academic institutions. There are a number of 
open-ended threats to such exams. Collusion is identified as a major concern for 
stake holders including academic institution (McGee, 2013). This research work 
highlighted those concerns and investigated potential threats in more detail. This 
work investigated and proposed potential solutions to mitigate these threats in 
order to enhance the creditability of online learning and examinations, which will 
enhance the trust of academic institutions. 
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 Availability: The learners are able to access the online resource at any time that 
suit them due to availability on the Internet (Arkorful and Abaidoo, 2015). Online 
learning environments can be accessed from dispersed geographical locations, 
which enables the access of less privileged communities’ to education. This re-
search helps the use of secure and usable approaches to such environments. 
This work contributed to the literature, which may help researchers who wish to fur-
ther investigate the evolving threats to online examinations and propose 
countermeasures.  
12.5 Future Work 
This research concluded that the use of dynamic profile questions and remote proc-
toring may positively influence security threats including collusion attacks. 
Suggestions to extend this work and its application in other contexts are described 
in the following sections. 
12.5.1 Empirical Evaluation of Secure Browser and Proctoring 
The current research proposed dynamic profile questions, a secure browser and a 
proctoring approach to deter impersonation and abetting in online examinations. The 
challenge question method was evaluated in multiple empirical studies. The secure 
browsing and remote proctoring method was simulated using a laboratory-based 
experiment with a small group of students. Future work is warranted to investigate 
this in a real scenario using a larger sample size.  
Remote proctoring could be an expensive option when implemented for a large 
number of students. According to Eisenberg (2013), the cost of remote proctoring 
per student is $60 to $90. Eisenberg states that trained proctors at computers can 
monitor faraway students via webcams. A multi-student proctoring method may po-
tentially reduce the cost of monitoring online tests. Using this method, a proctor will 
schedule online tests with multiple students simultaneously. 
There is a potential for designing an automated proctoring method for use with dy-
namic profile questions. Using this method, a student will attend a scheduled online 
examination session which is recorded remotely using a web cam. A special pur-
pose system will implement a secure browser, dynamic profile questions, and record 
the exam session. Furthermore, the use of a 360° web cam will further enhance the 
security of online examinations to mitigate abetting attacks. 
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12.5.2 Continuous Authentication 
User authentication is often performed as a one-off process during the initial interac-
tion with a system. However, one time validation of users’ is becoming insufficient. 
Using continuous authentication, a user is required to validate their identity continu-
ously. This type of authentication is often implemented by smartphones (Xu et al., 
2014). Some studies (Moini and Madni, 2009, Flior and Kowalski, 2010, Monaco et 
al., 2013) suggest the use of continuous authentication in online examinations. 
These studies proposed biometrics such as face-recognition and keystroke analysis. 
The current research evaluated the use of challenge question approach as a single 
sign on authentication method to access online examinations. This implies that once 
a student is in, someone else can take over and complete the online test. To miti-
gate such threats, a continuous authentication is necessary. A user will be asked to 
answer challenge questions in order to access examinations and intermittently dur-
ing the exam session. This will enhance the security. However, this will create 
usability issues and increase interruptions.  
Further research is necessary in the future to implement continuous authentication 
using the challenge question approach, in order to understand its impact on usability 
and security. 
12.5.3 Implementation as an Assessment Component 
Assessment is a core component of teaching and learning. With the development of 
learning techniques, assessment or examination has also evolved and become an 
integral part of many learning environments (Joosten-ten Brinke et al., 2007). Ac-
cording to Hargreaves (2008), assessment measures students’ learning at the end 
of an instructional unit, end of a course, or after some defined period. Challis (2005) 
states that it aims to ascertain that the desired learning goals have been met or cer-
tifying that the required levels of competence have been achieved. In general, 
summative assessment includes scoring for the purposes of awarding a grade or 
other forms of accreditation. Online assessment has reconceptualised the pedagogy 
in order to achieve the assessment goals effectively. In their study, Gikandi et al. 
(2011) recommended the integration of teaching and learning in order to support 
learners to develop deep knowledge and understanding. This can be implemented 
using the course and assessment design.  
The proposed challenge questions approach may support the integration of learning 
and examinations. The profile-based authentication method implements dynamic 
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profile questions, which collects information about students’ learning activities to 
build their profile. The profile represents a student’s learning description, built and 
consolidated over a period of time. This information could potentially be implement-
ed as an assessment component. Furthermore, a student’s learning profile could be 
reconciled with the outcomes of assessment activities, in order to verify that a genu-
ine student has undertaken the learning and examination activities. Further work is 
needed to investigate the use of dynamic profile questions as an assessment com-
ponent with the outcomes recorded in the gradebook.  
12.5.4 Research Impact on Other Applications 
The profile-based challenge questions could be implemented in many traditional 
web-based applications for the deterrence of attacks: 
 Online Banking: Banking is a fast growing business, which utilizes the In-
ternet for marketing and delivery of services. Rapid growth and advances in 
information technology have increased user acceptance of technology driven 
methods of handing daily banking affairs (Pikkarainen et al., 2004). One 
such method is online banking. Many banks offer a wide range of retail ser-
vices over the Internet. Beside the anticipated benefits, these banks are a 
target of many security threats. According to Aladwani (2001), authentication 
is one of the key security features to deter these threats.  
Many banks implement strong password authentication. However, users tend 
to forget strong passwords. To address this, banks couple strong passwords 
with challenge questions. The use of challenge questions in online banking 
has been identified in many research studies recently. Rabkin (2008) investi-
gated 15 online banks using challenge questions, which were implemented 
for customer verification. Rabkin identified that answers to roughly 12% of 
the challenge questions were available on social media websites. The stakes 
for the users of online banking are higher than students in online examina-
tion environments. The traditional challenge questions approach, which 
utilizes pre-defined text-based questions, is prone to many threats. In his 
study, Smyth (2010) identified security vulnerabilities in the text-based ques-
tions used by Bank of Scotland and Halifax, Natwest, and Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Ulster. Smyth revealed that information required for an adver-
sary to commit fraud in these banks, may likely be available in public 
domain. 
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The dynamic profile questions could be implemented to build and consoli-
date a customer’s profile during their interactions with an online bank 
account. Information in the profile will be used for authentication in many 
ways e.g. when the customer requests a transfer of funds through online 
banking, a customer requests to retrieve password etc. For example, “which 
of the following transaction was made by you in the last two weeks?” This 
will likely increase the security. As discussed earlier, using the conventional 
text-based questions,  adversaries can learn, guess or retrieve answers from 
different sources (Rabkin, 2008). However, the dynamic profile questions are 
associated with individual’s activities, transactions and profile which may 
likely be known to the genuine customer. This will address the issues related 
with the text-based challenge questions. More work is warranted to investi-
gate this in the future. 
 Email Service Providers: Challenge questions became a popular fall back 
authentication method when used by leading email providers such as Yahoo, 
Google, Microsoft and AOL (Schechter et al., 2009). These service providers 
use it for authentication when a user needs to reset or retrieve lost creden-
tials. It is identified as a cost-effective method, which minimises the 
administration cost when a user needs to recover his/her lost credentials 
(Just, 2004). However, some studies have reported usability and security is-
sues associated with this method. Just and Aspinall (2009a) reported 
usability issues with the challenge questions. They stated that, of the 117 
questions asked in their study, 88 (75%) answers were recalled exactly, while 
21 (18%) had different punctuation/capitalisation (typically performed when 
registering answers). 8 (7%) of the answers were completely different, citing 
a memorability issue in a span of 28 days. In the security evaluation, partici-
pants believed that 88% of the questions would be “somewhat difficult” for a 
stranger to answer; however, this reduced to 46% when considering the case 
of a friend or family member. To address the memorability, Renaud and Just 
(2010) proposed associative picture-based cues with multiple choice an-
swers. The authors of the study reported a 13% increase in memorability. 
Schechter et al. (2009) evaluated the security of challenge questions used 
by four mail service providers – Google, Yahoo, AOL and Microsoft. The au-
thors of the study reported that acquaintances of participants were able to 
guess 10% of their answers and 13% of answers could be guessed within 
five attempts. The authors state that participants forgot 20% of their own an-
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swers within six months. Rabkin (2008) discovered that a significant number 
of questions were either insecure or difficult when he analysed administra-
tively chosen challenge questions. Schechter et al. (2009) reference Sarah 
Palin (the Republican vice-presidential candidate in the 2008 US election), 
whose Yahoo email account was compromised, as the answer to her secret 
question had been figured out (Bridis, 2008). 
The use of dynamic profile questions approach will potentially address the 
usability and security issues reported in the above studies. The usability find-
ings reported in chapters 9 and 11 showed 95% and 99% effectiveness. 
Using the approach a user profile is built in background during interactions 
with emails e.g. “which of the following email subject was sent by you?” As 
identified in the online examination context, the usability and security of the 
dynamic profile questions improved significantly compared to conventional 
text-based questions. However, further work is needed to investigate this in 
an “email service” experimental or real context.   
 Social Media: The use of social media websites has been growing fast. For 
example Facebook is a famous social media site that has 1.59 billion users 
as of September, 2015 (Kohen, 2016). Similarly, Instagram has 400 million, 
Twitter 300 million and Google+ 300 million active users. With the large 
number of users, the security of these websites is critical as it stores person-
al information for millions of users. Passwords are the most widely used 
method for authentication of users in the majority web applications including 
social media (Hafiz et al., 2008). However, when users forget passwords, fall 
back authentication are used to help users regain access. A commonly used 
method for fall back authentication is the email-based password reset. When 
a user requests a new password, a reset link is sent to the user’s email ad-
dress. This approach is reported with issues such as single point of failure, 
out of date email address, and email interception (Garfinkel, 2003). The chal-
lenge question is another popular fall back method by social media websites. 
Given the security and usability issues with the use of text-based challenge 
questions, Hang (2015) proposed location based security questions. These 
questions utilize personal information and associate it with a location e.g. 
“where did you first meet your girlfriend?” Users are asked to pick up a loca-
tion on a map to answer the question. The study reported issues such as 
answer precision, and answer distance issues.   
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The dynamic profile-based challenge question approach could be used to 
build a user’s profile during day to day interactions with a social media web-
site e.g. Facebook, Twitter or Instagram. The profile information will be used 
to authenticate users when a password change is requested. For example, 
“which of the following comments did you like?” or “which of the following 
message did you post on your timeline?” This will potentially increase the 
security and mitigate adversary attacks. Further work is needed to investi-
gate the security and usability impact of this approach. 
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Appendix A – Text and Image-based Questions 
A –I Text-based questions 
Text-based questions designed study 2 usability analysis reported in chapter 7. 
No. Academic 
1 What is your student number? 
2 What is the name of your first school attended 
3 In which class/level you achieved the best grades? 
4 What were your grades in the highest qualification before this course? 
5 What is the name of your last school attended? 
6 What year did you graduate from high school? 
 Favourite 
7 What is your favourite colour? 
8 What is your favourite TV program? 
9 What is your favourite website URL? 
10 What is your favourite “colour car”? 
11 Write the first three letters of your favourite cousin’s name? 
12 What is your favourite bird? 
13 What is your favourite animal? 
14 What is your favourite car? 
15 What is your favourite place to visit as a child? 
16 What is your favourite academic course? 
17 What is the first name of your favourite tutor? 
18 What is your favourite movie? 
19 What is your favourite holiday destination? 
20 Who is your favourite childhood hero? 
21 What is your favourite food? 
22 What is your favourite book? 
 Personal 
23 What is the country of dream vacations?   
24 What is your grandfather's surname? 
25 What is your best friend's surname? 
26 What was your dream job as a child? 
27 What is the name of your best childhood friend? 
 Date 
28 What is your date of birth? 
29 What is your year of birth? 
30 What is your “Day” of birth? 
31 What is your “Month” of birth? 
 
A –II Image-based questions 
Image based questions designed for study 2 usability analysis reported in chapter 7. 
1) Please select your favourite “book” image from the following options. 
 
A. B. C. 
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2) Please select your favourite “Pen” image from the following options. 
 
A. B. C. 
  
 
 
3) Please select your favourite “Pen & ink pot” image from the following options. 
 
A. B. C. 
  
 
 
4) What is your choice of a logo representing “Science”? 
 
A. B. C. 
   
 
5) What is your choice of a logo representing “online learning”? 
 
A. B. C. 
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6) What is your choice of a logo representing “graduation”? 
 
A. B. C. 
 
 
 
 
7) What is your choice of a logo representing “examination”? 
 
A. B. C. 
 
 
 
8) Which one of the following is your favourite “bird”? 
 
A. B. C. 
 
 
 
9) Which one of the following is your favourite “fish”? 
 
A. B. C. 
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10) Which one of the following is your choice of a logo representing “peace”? 
 
A. B. C. 
   
 
11) Which one of the following is your favourite “flower”? 
 
A. B. C. 
    
 
 
12) Which one of the following is your favourite “deer”? 
 
A. B. C. 
 
 
 
 
13) Which one of the following is your choice of a logo representing "internet se-
curity”? 
 
A. B. C. 
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Appendix B – Text-based Questions and Impersona-
tion 
B –I Text Based questions 
Text-based questions designed for collusion and guessing abuse case scenarios 
reported in study 3 chapter 8. 
No. Questions 
1 Which town were you born in? 
2 What is your favourite food? 
3 What was the name of your favourite teacher in primary school? 
4 What is your favourite holiday destination? 
5 What is the name of your last school attended? 
6 What is your best friend's surname? 
7 What is your favourite academic course subject? 
8 Write the first three letters of your favourite cousin? 
9 What year did you graduate from High School? 
10 Who is the favourite hero of your childhood? 
11 What is the name of the first school you attended? 
12 What is the make of your phone set? 
13 What is your favourite TV program? 
14 What was your favourite place to visit as a child? 
15 What is your favourite name? 
16 What is the title of your favourite book? 
17 What is your date of birth? 
18 What is your favourite politician of all times? 
19 What is your favourite colour? 
20 What is your favourite restaurant? 
21 Who is your favourite singer? 
22 What is your favourite fruit or vegetable? 
23 What is your favourite town?  
24 What is your favourite sports?  
25 What is your favourite FLOWER? 
26 What is the name of your best childhood friend? 
27 What is your favourite colour car? 
28 Where did you go on your first train journey? 
29 What is your student number? 
30 What is your favourite website url? 
31 Where is your favourite shopping place? 
32 What is your father's year of birth? 
33 What is your favourite University? 
34 In which class or level you achieved your best grades ever? 
35 What is your favourite animal? 
36 What is your first line of your doctor's address? 
37 What is your favourite car? 
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38 What is your favourite bird? 
39 What is your favourite number? 
40 Where was your most memorable holiday? 
41 What is your favourite movie? 
42 What shop do you prefer to buy cloths in?  
43 What is your favourite pet's name? 
44 What is your favourite pet? 
45 What is the country of your ultimate dream vacation? 
46 What is your favourite sports player? 
47 What is your favourite pastime activity? 
48 What are the last four digits of your mobile number? 
49 When you were young, what did you want to be when you grew up? 
50 What is the name of your favourite world leader (current/past)? 
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Appendix C – Course Design & Dynamic Profile Ques-
tions  
C –I An Overview of Online Course 
The course outline used for study 3 using dynamic profile question reported in chap-
ter 9. 
Week 1 
 Let us know about you 
 Introduction Resource 
 PHP Installation (XAMPP Installation) Resource 
 My first PHP page Resource 
 PHP variables Resource 
 Strings and Variables Resource 
 PHP Operators Resource 
 PHP Introduction Lesson 
 Project Assignment Week 1 (Write one of the following PHP short pro-
grams) 
1) Write a PHP program to assign your name to $myname and quali-
fication to $qualification variables and display the output on page 
with on two separate lines. 
2) Write a PHP program to assign any two numbers to two variables 
and display their sum on screen. 
3) Write a PHP program to assign any number to a variable and dis-
play the value using pre-increment operator (++). Check PHP 
operators for help. 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about PHP variables, strings and 
lessons? 
 Week 1 Quiz 
Week 2 
 Conditional statements Resource 
 PHP switch statement Resource 
 PHP Arrays Resource 
 Conditional Flow Lesson 
 Project Assignment Week 2 (Write one of the following PHP short pro-
grams) 
o Write a PHP program to display your favourite fruit from the given 
choices Mango, Orange, Apple, Plum, and Cherry using a Switch 
statement. 
o Write a PHP program to Input three numbers n1, n2, and n3 and 
display the largest on screen? 
o Write a PHP program using an indexed array to store name of cars 
i.e. Honda, BMW, and Fiat and print them on screen. 
o Write a PHP program using associate array to store student’s 
score i.e. student 1 20%, student 2 40%, student 3 87%, student 4 
90% and display them on screen. 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about PHP condition statements 
in week 2? 
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 Week 2 Quiz 
Week 3 
 PHP Looping -While Loop Resource 
 PHP Looping -for Loop Resource 
 PHP functions Resource 
 PHP Looping Lesson 
 Project Assignment Week 3 (Write one of the following PHP short pro-
grams) 
o Write a PHP program using compute and display table of 2 e.g. 2 x 
1 =2 to the count of 10 using any of the Looping statements. 
o Using any of the PHP Looping, write a program to display 1-10 
even numbers 
o Using a PHP for loop, display values of an array $i=array(“BMW”, 
”Honda”,”Ford”, “Mini”); 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about PHP Looping in week 3? 
 Week 3 Quiz 
Week 4 
 PHP & HTML Forms Resource 
 $_GET method Resource 
 $_POST method Resource 
 HTML Forms Lesson 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about PHP HTML forms in week 
4 
 Week 4 Quiz 
Week 5 
 MySQL Resource 
 PHP MySQL Database connection & insert form data Resource 
 Create database connection and get data from Db Resource 
 Practice lesson -Select and display data from database Resource 
 Where clause, update, delete from database Resource 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about MySQL database functions 
in week 5 
 Week 5 Quiz –Final 
 
C –II Dynamic Profile Questions 
Below is the 18 dynamic profile questions implemented in study 3 reported in chap-
ter 9. 
Q.1 which one of the following statement below were written by you?  
 I am currently in second year of Economics Degree 
 I have a degree in Chemistry from Trinity College Dublin, Ireland and pur-
sued a part-time research MSc in Computational Chemistry with Trinity 
College. 3 publications. 
 I used SQL during the second year of my course a few years ago, along with 
Java (JDBC) 
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 Currently I’m enrolled at the MSc Computer Science course, previously I 
studied BSC (Hons) in Computers and Electronics at the Northampton Uni-
versity. 
 None of the above 
Q.2 which one of the following statement below were written by you as a course ob-
jective  
 I have over seven year experience in the IT sector, I’m currently working as 
database administrator/programmer 
 I am doing this course as part of my CPD required in my workplace 
 I would like to pursue this course in order to learn more for my field of work 
and have more knowledge for advancement. 
 I want to do this course because i can work as a freelancer after doing php 
as i have seen so many projects in Freelancer, Odesk and Elance and i al-
ready have some experience of Sql. 
 None of the above 
Q.3 which of the following statement were written in your introduction email?  
 For networking I need to know some of scripting languages and so I want to 
learn php. 
 I work in a non-IT related field- I am a cook. 
 Have already got the basics in HND for PHP and MySQL but thought this 
would be a good opportunity to refresh memory and expand on this 
 Recently my employer have introduced software products and web pages 
written in PHP and using MySQL databases so it will be highly beneficial for 
my career to familiarise myself with this technologies. 
 None of the above 
Q.4 which one of the following discussion posts were made by you?  
 I just completed the week 1 quiz and all the contents of week 1. I can’t ac-
cess to week 2, Am I too late for it, or is there any specific reason for it? 
 When I run the page that should execute Hello World. I'm getting an error 
saying the URL was not found on the server 
 I've tried the following: Test after starting of Apache (and MySQL), go to the 
address http://localhost/ or http://127.0.0.1/ in your browser and examine all 
of the XAMPP examples and tools. but all I get is a HTTP 404 not found 
page 
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 Did you save the example1.php in your xampp folder correctly? (i.e. make a 
new folder called myproject in the htdocs folder) 
 None of the above 
Q.5 which one of the following discussion posts were made by you?  
 I have now completed week 1 assignment. Can I have access to week 1 
quiz? 
 I have managed to install XAMPP but I cannot connect to MySQL module. I 
have tried to uninstall and reinstall but nothing is working. I had installed 
MYSQL database previously. 
 Thanks Mr Abrar but I do not think that is going to be necessary. I have 
managed to install XAMPP on another computer. 
 Hi Evens, It works for me but it is not is English. AND. Many thanks Chelsea, 
not a great start but you cracked it. 
 None of the above 
 
Q.6 which one of the following discussion posts were made by you?  
 I found this too. Googling it, as I understand it what is happening is when the 
script first runs the $i variable is not initialised, effectively resulting in a null 
being passed in to the switch statement 
 You have stated that the second example is the same as the first one. So 
how come you have used quotation marks for the second example?  
 Normally port 443 is used for secure host and accessible using https 
 You nailed it. Perfect. Actually if the port is used by another service, apache 
won’t start as the port is already taken. 
 None of the above 
 
Q.7 your score for the week 1 quiz was:  
 Within the 60%-69% range  
 Within the 80%-100% range 
 Within the 40% -59% Range 
 Within the 70%-79% range  
 Less than 40% 
Q.8 which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 1?  
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 Write a PHP program to assign your name to $myname and qualification to 
$qualification variables and display the output on page with on two separate 
lines. 
 List examples of logical operators and provide evidence with php programs? 
 Write a php function to compute standard deviation of data array? 
 Write a php program to connect to database using PDO and retrieve data us-
ing select statement? 
 None of the above 
 
Q.9 which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 1?  
 Write a php program to demonstrate difference between static, private and 
public class? 
 Write a PHP program to assign any two numbers to two variables and dis-
play their sum on screen. 
 Write a php program for traffic lights control 
 Write a php program to submit data using form $_POST and insert into 
MySQL database? 
 None of the above 
Q.10 which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 1?  
 Write a PHP program to assign any number to a variable and display the 
value using pre-decrement operator (--). Check PHP operators for help. 
 Write a PHP program to compute factorial of a number n? 
 Write a PHP program to demonstrate post decrement 
 Write a PHP program to compare pre-increment with post-increment 
 None of the above 
 
Q.11 which one of the following PHP code belongs to your assignment?  
 while ($minNum < $maxNum){ 
 echo "Perform addition: $a + $b = ".$addition."";  
 foreach($data s $dataitem) 
 $sum = $numberone + $numbertwo;
 None of the above
Q.12 which one of the following PHP code belongs to your assignment?  
 $a=++$a; 
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 $sum(a+b); 
 $addition = $a + $b;  
 addFunction(10,10); 
 None of the above 
 
Q.13 your score for the assignment 1 was:  
 Within the 40% -69% Range 
 Within the 70%-79% range 
 Within the 80%-89% range  
 Within the 90%-100% range 
 None of the above 
 
Q.14 which one of the following reflection posts were made by you?  
 I have learnt to create php classes and objects 
 I have learnt to create my first PHP page and coding, assign variables and 
the different arithmetic operations. 
 I have learnt to create database connection to backend using PHP in week 6 
 I have learnt email function using php, which is very relevant to my ongoing 
project 
 None of the above 
Q.15 which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 2?  
 Write a PHP program to develop gradebook using array 
 Write a PHP program to display your favourite fruit from the given choices: 
Mango, Orange, Apple, Plum, Cherry, pineapple, kewi using PHP Switch 
statement. 
 Write a PHP program to display odd number for array list 
 Write a PHP program to sort an array list 
 None of the above 
Q.16 which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 2?  
 Write a PHP program using an indexed array to store name of cars: Honda, 
BMW, Toyota, Ford, Audi and Fiat and print them all on screen line by line. 
 Develop a bubble sort program using PHP 
 Develop push and pop functions of stack using PHP program 
- 219 - 
 Write a php program to connect to database using PDO and retrieve data us-
ing select statement? 
 None of the above 
Q.17 which one of the following PHP code belongs to your assignment 2?  
 print_largest($array); 
 While(NOT $thelargetnumber) 
 function getLarget($array =array()); 
 $cars[0]="Honda"; 
 None of the above 
 
Q.18 which one of the following PHP code belongs to your assignment 2?  
 echo $cars[0]." ".$cars[1]." ".$cars[2]." ".$cars[3]." ".$cars[4]." ".$cars[5]; 
 foreach($numbers in $numbersArray()) 
 echo $find_favorite_fruite($fruitArray); 
 Do While ($num[0] <$num[1]) 
 None of the above 
 
C –III Introduction email  
An introduction email described below, was sent to all participants. 
 
Dear Student, 
Please read the following guidelines carefully to start your online PHP & MySQL 
course. 
 Please access the registration page at http:://research.xxx.xxx and complete 
your registration. 
 In order to access the course, select “Learning PHP and MySQL in 5 Weeks”. 
You are required to submit enrolment key in order to complete your registration 
& enrolment. The enrolment key is “php”. 
 The course is organized in 5 weeks short modules. The contents of the course 
will be released on day-to-day basis. There are three short beginner level as-
signments in the first three weeks. 
 Students are required to complete week 1 quiz in order to progress to the follow-
ing week.  
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 There is no pass or fail but students are required to complete the weekly quizzes 
in order to promote and able to access content of the following weeks. 
As part of our research, we are using a secure authentication system for access to 
online weekly quizzes. The authentication system will use some challenge questions 
to confirm your identity. These challenge questions will be based on your interaction 
with the learning content and your submissions. 
 
Abrar Ullah, 
Online Course Tutor 
 
C –IV Collusion Attacks Information: 
An email sent to participants regarding collusion attacks: 
 
Dear Student 
This course is designed to provide you with the basic skills in developing PHP and 
MySQL database driven applications.  
Besides providing quality training to online students, we are using the online course 
to help with a research study, which aims to investigate the threats of a student 
cheating in an online examination with the help of a 3rd party impersonator/helper. 
There are different types of collusion attacks and the focus of this study is to investi-
gate the following types of collusion attacks: 
 Collusion via Phone: In this type of attack, a student shares access credentials 
(Login ID and Password, and dynamic profile questions and their answers) with 
a third party attacker remotely via mobile phone to provide him access to online 
examination. The attacker using the access credentials impersonates as a stu-
dent and complete online examination. The attacker communicates 
synchronously with the student during the online examination. 
 Collusion via Email: In this type of attack, a student shares access credentials 
(Login ID and Password, and dynamic profile questions and their answers) with 
a third party attacker remotely via Email address before the online examination. 
The attacker uses the access credential impersonates as a student and com-
plete online examination.
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To help with the research, can I request you to collect as much information about 
your dynamic profile questions as possible to perform/simulate the collusion attack 
via email? 
Also, for a collusion attack via phone, please, send me your availability for an hour 
long skype session. 
 
Best wishes, 
Abrar Ullah 
Online Course Tutor 
 
C –V Collusion Attack in Non-real-time via Email: 
An email was sent to participants for participating in collusion attack via skype: 
 
Dear Student, 
As part of our research, we need your help to complete a remote location collusion 
attack via email. In this attack, we need you to share with us all or a maximum num-
ber of dynamic profile questions and their answers for authentication. 
Dynamic profile questions are those which are presented to you during your weekly 
quizzes for authentication and are based on your submissions and learning activi-
ties. 
Please share as many Challenge questions as possible. If you cannot share your 
challenge questions, please state a reason in the “Possible Answer/Reason”. See 
example below for guidance. 
Name  
No. Challenge Question Possible Answer  Reason for not 
sharing  
1-shared, 2-can 
share a cue, 3-
cannot recall but 
recognize answer, 
4-neither recall 
nor recognize the 
answer. 
1    
2    
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Example: 
Name Student 1 
No. Challenge Question Possible Answer  Reason for not 
sharing OR How 
do you know the 
question 
1 which one of the following dis-
cussion posts were made by 
you 
Something you have 
posted 
Copied the an-
swers in my 
computer 
 
 
C –VI Collusion Attack In Real-Time via Skype guidance: 
An email was sent to participants for participating in collusion attack via skype: 
 
Dear Student, 
As part of our research, we need your help to complete a remote location collusion 
attack via skype. In this attack, we need you to share with us correct answers to dy-
namic profile questions related with your learning experience. 
Dynamic profile questions are those which are presented to you during your weekly 
quizzes for authentication and are based on your submissions and learning activi-
ties. 
The attack will be carried out in a skype session. It is a brief 15 minutes session and 
the steps are described below. 
 You will login to skype using pbaf.authentication using password: Password.  
 A simulation attacker account pbaf.attack is already linked with the skype ac-
count above. 
 The attacker will share with you a dynamic profile question and multiple options 
from your profile. We need you to identify the correct answer as you would do to 
any of these questions in your weekly quizzes. 
 The attacker will repeat step 3 until all your dynamic profile questions are an-
swered. 
Please send us a convenient day and time for the skype session. 
 
Best wishes, 
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Abrar Ullah 
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Appendix D – Supporting Information Focus Group 
D –I Presentation to Online Programme Tutors 
The following slides were presented to online programme tutors in the start of the 
focus group session. 
Focus Session –Online 
Examination Authentication
Abrar Ullah
PhD - Student
University of Hertfordshire
 
Agenda
• Part -1
– Remote Online Examinations
– Security Challenges of Online Examinations
– Collusion 
• Part -2 
– Remote Authentication
– Profile Based Authentication
 
Remote Online Examination
• Remote Online Examinations that are:
– Held remotely
– In an out of classroom settings
– Disperse geographical locations
– No face-to-face interaction
 
Security Challenges
• Online Examination may offer more opportunities for 
academic dishonesty
– Cheating and Academic Dishonesty is widespread in 
all forms of education
– Online Examination is an integral part of online 
learning
– Learners interact with learning resources and 
assessment remotely
• Adversaries attacks: Attacking the system with 
malicious intentions.
• Collusion Attacks : Learners passing on their credentials 
to third parties for taking their exams
 
Collusion
• Type –I Collusion (Third party in a remote 
location)
• Type –II Collusion (Student and a third 
party in the same location)
 
End Part 1
• Feedback  Questionnaire Part 1
 
Part -2 
– Remote Authentication
– Challenge Questions Approach i.e. Profile 
Based Authentication (PBA)
 
Remote Authentication
• Knowledge Based Authentication:
– Verifies user identity on the basis of “What you know” 
e.g. user-id and password, security questions
• Object Based Authentication:
– Verifies user identity on the basis of “What you have”
e.g. magnetic cards, digital keys 
• Biometric or Characteristics Based Authentication:
– Verifies user identity on the basis of “What you are”
e.g. Fingerprint, speech recognition, face recognition
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Profile Based Authentication 
(PBA)
• PBA utilizes Challenge/Security Questions.
• Security Questions are recorded during learning process based 
on :
– Individual User’s response to Questions
– Individual User’s Learning Activities Performed
• A subset of Security Questions recorded during learning are 
used for Authentication purposes in online examination.
• The PBA does not address online examination environment 
security e.g. Remote Desktop, Instant Messaging etc.
 
Challenge Questions
• Predefined Multiple Choice Text-Based 
questions
• Predefined Multiple Choice Image-Based 
questions
• Dynamic Learning Journey questions
 
Example of Text-Based Questions
 
Example of Image Questions
 
Example of Learning Journey 
Questions
• Which of the following is your forum post
1. Some forum post 
2. Correct forum post 
3. Another random post
4. None of the above
• Which of the following modules have you finished?
1. Database
2. Operating System
3. Web Design
4. None of the Above
 
Empirical Findings
• Study 1: 
– Simulation online learning course
– Participants: 23
– Questions: Pre-defined Text-based
– Aim: Usability and Guessing Attacks
• Study 2:
– Real online learning course (PHP and MySQL)
– Participants: 70
– Questions: Pre-defined text-based and image-based
– Aim: Usability, Collusion and Guessing Attacks
 
Usability
• Accuracy: Memorability of answers  and syntactic 
variation, unrealistic answers
– Relevant challenge questions with better clarity had better 
accuracy
– Relaxed algorithm to compensate for spelling mistakes, syntactic 
variation would increase accuracy by 18%
– Overall matched answers were 38 (58%) in study 1, which 
increased to 583 (66%) in study 2
– Image-Based Questions had higher (85%) accuracy than text-
based questions (66%)
• Efficiency: Time taken to answer questions during 
learning causes distraction. There was a correlation b/w 
time taken and answer length.
 
Security Issues
• Guessing
– In study 1, friends and colleagues were able to guess answers to 
personal and academic questions
– In study 2, (0,40,60 and 100%) simulation attack, no linear trend 
was reported
• Collusion
– Out of 48 participants, 8 shared 59 questions for collusion with a 
maximum of 36% of their profile questions.
– Participants shared a higher number 50 (85%) of text based 
questions compared to image questions for collusion.
– A simulation collusion attack using 0,40,60 and 100% collusion 
indicates the number of shared questions is proportional to 
success of collusion attack (p<0.01)
 
Conclusion
• PBA is a new approach, which utilizes challenge questions for authentication 
in online examination.
• PBA may minimize the incidence of collusion in certain context, however, it 
could be implemented with other methods to prevent different types of 
collusion.
• The PBA does not address online examination environment security e.g. 
Remote Desktop, Instant Messaging etc.
• Challenge questions may pose usability issues including memorability, 
syntactic variation.
• Image based questions showed better usability than text-based question
• Participants shared more text-based questions for collusion than image based 
questions.
• The success of collusion is proportional to the number of shared questions
 
 
 
D –II Paper-based Questionnaire: 
Participants of the focus group were asked to provide their feedback by responding 
the following questionnaire. 
Part 1 
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 Questions Scale 
Collusion and Online Examination 
1 How concerned are you about the security of a 
remote online examination? 
1-No concern at all to 5. 
Strong concern 
2 How concerned are you about the authentica-
tion methods implemented for the security of a 
remote online examination 
1-No concern at all to 5. 
Strong concern 
3 In your view, how difficult it is for a student to 
cheat in remote online examination 
1-Not difficult at all to 5. 
Very difficult 
4 In your view, how difficult it is for a student to 
cheat in face-to-face invigilated examination 
1-Not difficult at all to 5. 
Very difficult 
5 Consider the threat of a student copying an-
swers from a book or other course material, 
please rate the seriousness of this threat in a 
remote online examination where there is re-
mote student authentication but no invigilation 
1-Not serious at all to 5. 
Very serious 
6 Consider the threat of a student copying an-
swers from the Internet, please rate the 
seriousness of this threat in a remote online 
examination where there is remote student 
authentication but no invigilation 
1. Not serious at all to 5. 
Very serious 
7 Abetting - Consider the threat of a student get-
ting help from someone else, based in the 
same location, please rate the seriousness of 
this threat in a remote online examination 
where there is remote student authentication 
but no invigilation 
1. Not serious at all to 5. 
Very serious 
8 Impersonation - Consider the threat of a stu-
dent getting help from a third party, based in a 
remote location, please rate the seriousness of 
this threat in a remote online examination 
where there is remote student authentication 
but no invigilation 
1. Not serious at all to 5. 
Very serious 
Part 2 
Please rate the usefulness of the three authentication methods below 
9 Login Identifier and Password Authentication 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
10 Graphical Password Authentication 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
11 Security/Challenge Questions Authentication 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
12 How effective would the Challenge Questions 
(PBA) approach be to deter impersonation at-
tacks? 
1. Not effective at all to 5. 
Very effective 
Please rate the effectiveness of the questions types below while using the 
PBA method 
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13 Pre-defined Text-Based Questions 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
14 Pre-defined Image-Based Questions 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
15 Dynamic Profile Questions 1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
16 How usable is the challenge question ap-
proach? 
1. Not useful at all to 
5.Very useful 
17 How secure is the challenge question ap-
proach in terms of non-collusion based 
intruder access 
1. Not secure to 5. Se-
cure 
18 How secure is the challenge question ap-
proach in terms of collusion attacks 
1. Not secure to 5. Very 
Secure 
19 Given that security and usability may be con-
sidered to be a trade-off , on the scale of 1 to 
10 please indicate where you think the best 
option should be 
1. Very Secure …. 5. 
About Equal …. 10.Very 
usable 
  
D –III Moderator Probes: 
A list of probes presented by focus session moderator for discussion. 
 Moderator Presented a Scenario: “You setup an online examination for a 
large group of students located remotely in several continents. They access 
the examination using the dynamic profile type questions that Presenter 1 
was telling us about. We can assume there is quite a time difference and 
students are allocated a time frame to complete. The student have been 
proctored using the Proctoring and secure browsing software (ProctorU) 
method Presenter 2 described” 
 Probe 1: In the context of collusion, what do you think is the difference be-
tween a banking system, where you are preventing access and an 
examination system, where you preventing access? 
 Probe 2: One of the things in the bank is that you want to keep people out. 
The whole point of bank security is that you don’t want people in. Is that the 
same or do we need doing the same thing in online examinations to keep 
people out? 
 Probe 3: With the challenge question approach (PBA), you do get chal-
lenged, so you could be challenged frequently, it ask you questions anytime 
based on your dynamic profile, of what you have learnt. In dynamic profile, 
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there could be lots of information and they could ask you randomly anything 
from your dynamic profile. Does that make it more secure you think? 
 Probe 4: There is always a possibility that you will get someone to sit next 
to you at a remote location who is the expert, how do you prevent that, how 
do you stop people from that. Do you think ProctorU (secure browser + re-
mote proctor) would help? 
 Probe 5: I would imagine the trick would be to prevent people sitting next to 
you and doing the thing with and I think that is the biggest problem. I think 
passing information between two locations like giving a password, the dy-
namic profile questions (PBA) approach completely destroys that one, 
because there is so much possibly randomly generated questions that we 
ask, that you have to keep on passing on that information, so the challenge 
questions prevents that. The remote proctoring possibility sorts out the per-
son sitting next to you to some extent anyway. Do you think with those two 
together we could achieve a satisfactory level of confidence? 
 Probe 6: Can I ask you all everyone with a question to answer yes or no. 
Supposing we have got a high stake examination say worth about 25% of 
the course, your own courses now, that the examination you are looking at, 
you have got the challenge questions (PBA) method and Secure browser + 
Remote Proctor (ProctorU) together, and you designed the course so it de-
ters collusion as much as you possibly can. Would you be prepared to do 
that examination now with this system? And you considered the challenge 
questions from the course work (Dynamic profile questions) 
 
- 229 - 
Appendix E – Dynamic Profile Questions Study 6 
E –I Study 6 Course Design: 
Below is an overview of a three weeks online course: 
Week 1 
 Let us know about you 
 Introduction  
 PHP Installation (XAMPP Installation) 
 My first PHP page  
 PHP Strings and Variables 
 Conditional statements 
 PHP switch statement  
 PHP Arrays  
 Project Assignment Week 1 (Write one of the following PHP short programs) 
 Write a PHP program to assign your name to $myname and qualifi-
cation to $qualification variables and display the output on page with 
on two separate lines. 
 Write a PHP program to assign any two numbers to two variables 
and display their sum on screen. 
 Write a PHP program to assign any number to a variable and display 
the value using pre-increment operator (++). Check PHP operators 
for help. 
 Write a PHP program to display your favourite fruit from the given 
choices Mango, Orange, Apple, Plum, and Cherry using a Switch 
statement. 
 Write a PHP program to Input three numbers n1, n2, and n3 and 
display the largest on screen? 
 Write a PHP program using an indexed array to store name of cars 
i.e. Honda, BMW, and Fiat and print them on screen. 
 Write a PHP program using associate array to store student’s score 
i.e. student 1 20%, student 2 40%, student 3 87%, student 4 90% 
and display them on screen. 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned in week 1? 
 Week 1 Quiz 
Week 2 
 PHP Looping -While Loop  
 PHP Looping -for Loop  
 PHP functions  
 PHP & HTML Forms Resource 
 $_GET and $_POST methods 
 Project Assignment Week 2 (Write one of the following PHP short programs) 
o Write a PHP program using compute and display table of 2 e.g. 2 x 1 
=2 to the count of 10 using any of the Looping statements. 
o Using any of the PHP Looping, write a program to display 1-10 even 
numbers 
o Using a PHP for loop, display values of an array $i = array(“BMW”, 
”Honda”, ”Ford”, “Mini”); 
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about PHP Looping in week 2? 
 Week 3 Quiz 
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Week 3 
 MySQL  
 PHP MySQL Database connection & insert form data  
 Create database connection and get data from Db  
 Practice lesson -Select and display data from database  
 Where clause, update, delete from database  
 Student Reflection –What have I learned about MySQL database functions 
in week 3 
 Week 3 Quiz 
 
E –II Presentation: 
Participants were presented the following slides during the face-to-face registration 
session.  
  
  
 
 
E –III Dynamic Profile Questions: 
The following dynamic profile questions were implemented in study 6. These ques-
tions are associated with Introduction, Course Content, Assignments, Forums and 
Quizzes 
 
Q.1 Which one of the following statements below were written by you? 
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1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement 
3. Distraction statement  
4. Correct Answer 
5. None of the above 
 
Q.2 Which one of the following statements below were written by you as a course 
objective?  
6. Distraction statement 
7. Distraction statement 
8. Distraction statement  
9. Correct Answer 
10. None of the above 
 
Q.3 Which of the following statements were written in your introduction email? 
 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Correct Answer 
3. Distraction statement  
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above 
 
 
Q.4 Which one of the following course materials were completed by you in week 1? 
 
1. Correct Answer 
2. Distraction statement 
3. Distraction statement  
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above 
 
Q.5 Your score for the week 1 quiz was: 
 
1. Less than 40%  
2. Within the 40% -69% Range 
3. Within the 80%-89% range  
4. Within the 70%-79% range  
5. Within the 90%-100% range
 
Q.6 Which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 1? 
 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement  
3. Distraction statement  
4. Correct Answer 
5. None of the above 
 
Q.7 Which one of the following assignments have you submitted in week 1? 
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1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement  
3. Correct Answer 
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above 
Q.8 Which one of the following PHP code belongs to your assignment 1? 
 
1. Correct Answer 
2. Distraction statement 
3. Distraction statement  
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above 
Q.9 Your score for the assignment 1 was: 
 
1. Less than 40%  
2. Within the 40% -69% Range 
3. Within the 80%-89% range  
4. Within the 70%-79% range  
5. Within the 90%-100% range 
Q.10 Which one of the following reflection posts were made by you? 
 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement  
3. Correct Answer 
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above 
 
 
Code Review 
Q.11 which one of the following is taken from your feedback to code review in 
week1? 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement  
3. Correct Answer 
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above  
Q.12 which one of the following is taken from your feedback to code review in 
week2? 
1. Distraction statement 
2. Distraction statement  
3. Correct Answer 
4. Distraction statement  
5. None of the above  
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Example Exercise 
Q.13 which one of the code excerpt was shown in week1 examples? 
<html> 
<body> 
 <?php print(“hello world!”); ?> 
</body> 
</html> 
<html>  
<body>  
 <?php echo "Hello World"; ?> </body> 
</html>  
<html>  
<body>  
<?php  
/* This is my first php page */ 
echo "This is my first PHP page";  
?>  
</body> 
</html> 
<?php 
$str=”Example: My first php page”; 
echo “My first php page”; 
?>  
None of the above 
 
Q.14 which one of the following example code excerpt was shown in week1? 
<?php 
$a = 5; // global scope 
 
function myTest() 
{ 
echo $a; // local scope 
}  
 
myTest(); 
?> 
<?php 
$var_str1 = "A variable with global scope"; // global scope 
 
function variableTest() 
{ 
$var_str2="This variable cannot be called outside this function"; 
 
echo $var_str2; //Local variable with local scope 
echo "<br>"; 
echo $var_str1; // Local scope  
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}  
 
variableTest(); 
?> 
<?php 
//variable with a global scope 
$var1 = 5;  
 
function exampleFunction() 
{ 
   echo ‘variable with a local scope inside a function cannot be accessed outside the 
function’; 
   echo $var2; // local scope 
}  
 
exampleFunction(); 
?> 
<?php 
     $str=”Hello world”; 
      $str_cnt=strlen($str); 
       echo $str_cnt; 
?> 
None of the above 
 
Q.15 which one of the following example code excerpt was shown in week1? 
<?php 
$cars[0]="Saab"; 
$cars[1]="Volvo"; 
$cars[2]="BMW"; 
$cars[3]="Toyota";  
echo $cars[0] . " and " . $cars[1] . " are Swedish cars."; 
?> 
<?php 
$num[0]=2; 
$num[1]=8; 
$num[2]=7; 
$num[3]=6; 
$num[4]=0; 
 
echo $num[0] . ", " . $num[1] . " and ". $num[3] ." are even numbers."; 
?> 
<?php 
$color[0]=”Red”; 
$color[1]=”Green”; 
$color[2]=”Yellow”; 
$color[3]=”Blue”; 
$color[4]=”Magenta”; 
 
echo $color[0] . ", " . $color[1] . " and ". $color[3] ." are core RGB colors."; 
?> 
- 235 - 
<?php 
$score['Alex'] = "30"; 
$score['Quagmire'] = "80"; 
$score['Joe'] = "54"; 
 
echo "Final score of Alex is " . $score['Alex'] . "."; 
?> 
None of the above 
 
Q.16 which one of the following example code excerpt was shown in week1? 
<?php 
$num1=30; 
$num2=40; 
 
if ($num1 > $num2) 
{ 
echo "$num1 is greater than $num2"; 
} 
else 
{ 
echo "$num2 is greater than $num1"; 
} 
?> 
<?php 
$d=date("D"); 
if ($d=="Fri") 
{ 
echo "Have a nice weekend!"; 
} 
else 
{ 
echo "Have a nice day!"; 
} 
?> 
<?php 
 
$string1 = "cake"; 
$string2 = "foo"; 
 
if(!$string1==$string2) 
{ 
echo "cake is a lie"; 
} 
?> 
<?php 
// alphabet comparison 
  $a="C"; 
  $b="X"; 
  if ($a<$b) 
     { 
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    echo $a."is smaller than".$b; 
    }                 
// Result : C is smaller than X 
?> 
None of the above 
 
Q.17 which one of the following example code excerpt was shown in week1? 
<?php 
$x=1; 
switch ($x) 
{ 
case 1: 
echo "Number 1"; 
break; 
case 2: 
echo "Number 2"; 
break; 
case 3: 
echo "Number 3"; 
break; 
default: 
echo "No number between 1 and 3"; 
} 
?> 
 
<?php 
$year=$_GET[‘year’]; 
  switch ($year) : 
        case  0:  
 echo  'Monkey';  
               break; 
        case  1:  
 echo 'Rooster'; 
 break; 
        case  2:  
 echo 'Dog'; 
 break; 
        case  3:  
 echo 'Boar'; 
 break; 
        case  4: 
 echo 'Rat'; 
 break; 
        case  5:  
 echo 'Ox'; 
 break; 
        case  6:  
 echo 'Tiger'; 
 break; 
        case  7:  
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 echo 'Rabit'; 
 break; 
        case  8:  
 echo 'Dragon'; 
 break; 
        case  9:  
 echo 'Snake'; 
 break; 
        case 10:  
 echo 'Horse'; 
 break; 
        case 11:  
 echo 'Lamb'; 
 break; 
} 
?> 
<?php 
 
$a = "abc"; 
$b = "def"; 
 
switch($c){ 
    case "a": 
        echo "a"; 
        break; 
    case "b": 
        echo "b"; 
        break; 
    default: 
        echo "default"; 
        break; 
} 
 
?> 
Will output default 
<?php 
$destination = "Tokyo"; 
echo "Traveling to $destination<br />"; 
switch ($destination){ 
case "Las Vegas": 
 echo "Bring an extra $500"; 
 break; 
case "Amsterdam": 
 echo "Bring an open mind"; 
 break;  
case "Egypt": 
 echo "Bring 15 bottles of SPF 50 Sunscreen"; 
 break;  
case "Tokyo": 
 echo "Bring lots of money"; 
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 break; 
case "Caribbean Islands": 
 echo "Bring a swimsuit"; 
 break;  
} 
?> 
None of the above 
 
Info Graphics  
Q. 18 which one of the following images/infographics have you seen in the course 
content? 
 
 
 
 
None of the above 
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Q. 19 which one of the following images/infographics have you seen in the course 
content? 
 
 
 
 
None of the above 
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Q. 20 which one of the following image have you seen in the course content? 
  
 
 
 
None of the above 
 
Q. 21 Which one of the following image have you seen in the course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Q. 22 which one of the following image have you seen in course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Q. 23 which one of the following image have you seen in course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Q. 24 which one of the following image have you seen in course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Q. 25 which one of the following image have you seen in course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Q. 26 which one of the following image have you seen in course content? 
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None of the above 
 
Information Collected using choice activity  
Q.27 how do you describe your PHP skills before starting this course? 
 No prior knowledge of PHP 
 Basic knowledge of PHP 
 Beginner level programming skills in PHP 
 Intermediate level programming skills in PHP 
 None of the above 
Q. 28 which one of the following PHP environment have you used? 
 XAMP 
 WAMP 
 MAMP 
 LAMP 
 None of the above 
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Appendix F – Research publications 
The research work reported in this thesis resulted in publication of journal and con-
ference papers. These are listed below:  
 
No Article /Paper Title 
1 Profile-based Student Authentication in Online Examination (Ullah et al., 
2012a), i-society 2012, London UK (IEEE), June-2012 
Abstract: Online examination is an increasingly important component of online 
courses, and student authentication is widely seen as one of the major concerns for 
online examinations. In most online examination scenarios, face-to-face supervision 
is absent, and students may attempt to use third party to increase their scores. This 
paper aims to investigate authentication challenges to online examinations, review 
benefits and constraints of existing authentication traits, and discuss alternative 
techniques. We propose the use of profile-based authentication framework (PBAF) 
together with a user-id and password for the authentication of students during 
online examinations. The proposed solution utilizes profile-based challenge ques-
tions, which is verified by development of PBAF in a virtual learning environment. 
2 Using Challenge Questions for Student Authentication in Online 
Examination (Ullah et al., 2012c), International Journal for Infonomics 
(IJI), Sept-2012 
Abstract: With the growth of Internet and technology in the past decade, online 
learning has become increasingly popular and evolved. Online examination is an 
integral and vital component of online learning. Student assessment in online learn-
ing is largely submitted remotely without any face-to-face interaction and therefore, 
student authentication is widely seen as one of the major challenges. This study 
aims to investigate potential threats to student authentication in the online examina-
tions and analysing the benefits and limitations of the existing authentication 
approaches. We propose the use of challenge questions for student authentication 
in the online examinations. For this purpose, we designed a profile-based authenti-
cation framework (PBAF) together with a user-id and password for the 
authentication of students during online examinations, utilizing a cohort of personal 
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and academic questions as challenge questions. We conducted an empirical study 
on a group of online students from local and overseas Universities. The result 
shows the impact of questions type on the usability, in particular the amount of time 
taken by the introduction of the proposed approach. We also conducted a post ex-
periment survey to collect student feedback on the proposed technique. 
3 Usability of Profile-based Student Authentication and Traffic Light 
System in Online Examination (Ullah et al., 2012b) 
The 7th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured 
Transactions, London UK (IEEE) Dec-2012 
Abstract: There has been an increased interest in effective approaches to student 
authentication, given that online examinations are a crucial component of online 
learning. The work presented here, is part of an ongoing programme of research on 
the extent to which challenge questions are an effective approach to student au-
thentication in online examination contexts, where face-to-face invigilation is not in 
use.  
Although the use of challenge questions shows great potential, there are some 
concerns about its usability in particular relating to memorability. This paper sum-
marizes the findings of an empirical study in which, 23 participants used a 
framework developed by the authors namely “Profile Based Authentication Frame-
work” (PBAF). Findings from the empirical study suggests  that memorability, 
questions clarity, varied writing syntax and case variation can cause usability issues 
leading to failed authentication. A traffic light scheme was implemented to improve 
the usability of challenge questions for online examination authentication 
4 Design, privacy and authentication of challenge questions in online 
examinations (Ullah et al., 2013) 
IEEE Conference on e-Learning, e-Management and and e-Services 
(IC3e), Kuching, Malaysia, Dec- 2013 
Abstract: Online examination is an essential part of the online learning and secure 
authentication is considered vital for the success of online learning. This study is 
part of an ongoing research on student authentication approaches and the use of 
challenge questions in online examination authentication. This paper presents the 
results of an empirical study based on “Profile Based Authentication Framework” 
(PBAF), which uses challenge questions for student authentication in online exami-
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nation. The PBAF uses challenge questions related to personal, academic and pro-
fessional information. These questions inform the usability, security and privacy of 
PBAF authentication approach. The results presented here summarizes the impact 
of questions design on the usability based on data collected from challenge ques-
tions authentication and a post-experiment survey on the data privacy. 
5 Evaluating security and usability of profile-based challenge questions 
authentication in online examinations (Ullah et al., 2014a) 
Journal of Internet and Services Appllications (Spriner), Mar- 2014 
Abstract: Student authentication in online learning environments is an increasingly 
challenging issue due to the inherent absence of physical interaction with online 
users and the potential security threats to online examinations. This study is part of 
ongoing research on student authentication in online examinations evaluating the 
potential benefits of using challenge questions. The authors developed a Profile 
Based Authentication Framework (PBAF), which utilises challenge questions for 
students’ authentication in online examinations. This paper examines the findings of 
an empirical study in which 23 participants used the PBAF including an abuse case 
security analysis of the PBAF approach. The overall usability analysis suggests that 
PBAF is efficient, effective and usable. However, specific questions need replace-
ment with suitable alternatives due to usability challenges. The results of the 
current research study suggest that memorability, clarity of questions, syntactic var-
iation and question relevance can cause usability issues leading to authentication 
failure. A configurable traffic light system was designed and implemented to im-
prove the usability of challenge questions. The security analysis indicates that 
PBAF is resistant to informed guessing in general, however, specific questions 
were identified with security issues. The security analysis identifies challenge ques-
tions with potential risks of informed guessing by friends and colleagues. The 
usability, security and traffic light system in a real online course needs further anal-
ysis on different settings. The study was performed on a small number of 
participants in a simulation online course and the results need to be verified in a 
real world environment on a larger sample size. 
6 Privacy and Usability of Image and Text Based Challenge Questions 
Authentication in Online Examinations (Ullah et al., 2014c) 
The International Conference on Education Technologies and 
Computers (IEEE), Sept- 2014 
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Abstract: In many online examinations, physical invigilation is often replaced with 
traditional authentication approaches for student identification. Secure and usable 
authentication approaches are important for high stake online examinations. A Pro-
file Based Authentication Framework (PBAF) was developed and implemented in a 
real online learning course embedded with summative online examination. Based 
on users’ experience of using the PBAF in an online course, online questionnaires 
were used to collect participants' feedback on effectiveness, layout and appear-
ance, user satisfaction, distraction and privacy concerns. Based on overall findings 
of the quantitative analysis, there was a positive feedback on the use of a hybrid 
approach utilizing image and text based challenge questions for better usability. 
However, the number of questions presented during learning and examination pro-
cesses were reported to be too many and caused distraction. Participants 
expressed a degree of concern on sharing personal and academic information with 
little or no privacy concern on using favourite questions (p < 0.01). 
7 Graphical and Text Based Challenge Questions for Secure and Usable 
Authentication in Online Examinations (Ullah et al., 2014b) 
The 9th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured 
Transactions, London UK, Dec -2014 
Abstract: In traditional online examination environments, physical interaction is of-
ten replaced with authentication mechanisms. The absence of face-to-face 
interaction increases the number of authentication challenges. The authors devel-
oped and implemented a Profile Based Authentication Framework (PBAF) with the 
aim to integrate learning and examination processes for secure online examina-
tions. The PBAF approach utilizes the widely used knowledge-based authentication 
mechanisms: login identifier and passwords and challenge questions. These ap-
proaches are reported with a number of benefits and limitations in term of usability 
and security. Previous studies suggests that the use of image-based graphical au-
thentication may provide usable and secure solution. This paper presents the 
findings of an empirical study, utilizing a hybrid approach combining image and text-
based challenge questions in a real online learning environment. A traffic light sys-
tem was implemented to improve usability of the PBAF. The traffic light system 
relaxed authentication constraints for a significant number of users’ attempts which 
would otherwise be penalized (p< 0.01). An abuse case scenario was designed to 
assess the security of the PBAF method against impersonation attack. The number 
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of participants in abuse case scenario was small, however, results demonstrate that 
participants were able to share both text-based and image-based questions for im-
personation attack. 
8 Usability of Activity-Based and Image-Based Challenge Questions in 
Online Student Authentication (Ullah et al., 2015) 
Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy and Trust, Aug-2015 
Abstract: There has been a renewed interest in secure authentication of students 
in online examinations. Online examinations are important and high stake assets in 
the context of remote online learning. The logistical challenges and absence of live 
invigilation in remote un-supervised online examination makes the identification and 
authentication process extremely difficult.  The authors implemented pre-defined 
text-based challenge questions for student authentication in online examination us-
ing a Profile Based Authentication Framework (PBAF) approach. The pre-defined 
questions require students to register their answers, which causes distraction and 
usability challenges. In this study, a non-invasive activity-based learning journey 
questions approach was implemented combined with the image-based questions, 
using the PBAF approach. Findings of the study shows significant difference in the 
efficiency of activity-based and image-based questions during the learning process 
(p <0.01). There was no significant difference in the accuracy of multiple-choice im-
age-based and activity-based questions (p > 0.01). There was a significant 
difference in the accuracy of activity-based questions and activity-date questions (p 
< 0.01). 
9 A Classification of Threats to Remote Online Examinations 
The 7th IEEE Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile 
Communication Conference, Oct-2016 
Abstract: Summative online examinations are important assets in online learning 
environments. There are rising concerns from different stakeholders to the integrity 
of high stake examinations. Cheating has been one of the main concerns due to 
remote authentication of students in online environments. The absence of face-to-
face interaction, monitoring or invigilation emerged new types of security threats. 
These threats include intrusion by hackers to collusion and plagiarism by students.  
This paper is based on a survey of literature to present a threats classification using 
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security abuse case scenarios. Collusion in online examinations has emerged as 
one of the challenging threats. In a collusion, a student invites a third party helper 
or contractor to impersonate or aid a student to complete the online test. While mit-
igation of all types of threats is important, the risk of collusion is increasingly 
challenging because it is difficult to detect, when a legitimate student involves a 
third party collaborator to cheat in an online test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
